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This dissertation examines the relationship between the growth and popularization 
of psychology in American life in the postwar period and Americans’ belief that theirs is 
a “classless,” or overwhelmingly middle-class, society. I argue that psychology has, until 
recently, inadvertently naturalized middle-class norms of self-perception, 
communication, aspirations, and subjectivity. From the 1950s on, the United States has 
been what observers call a “therapeutic culture.” Psychological ideas have infused the 
major arenas of American life, including the educational, judicial, commercial, political, 
personal, and interpersonal realms. This project examines the origins and development of 
psychological professionals’ views of class, highlighting the professional, economic, 
disciplinary, and cultural factors that combined to form those views.  
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I analyze a small but persistent thread of dialogue in the professional literature of 
the period that questioned mainstream psychological assumptions about class, and I 
explore how that impulse developed into major mental health policy initiatives in the 
1960s, then was undermined by political and social conflicts. I also develop a case history 
of one mental health project that attempted to transcend psychology’s class biases, only 
to be contained by structural and disciplinary factors. After examining psychological 
professionals’ views of various publics, this project investigates a series of publics’ views 
of psychological practitioners. I draw on popular portrayals of postwar psychological 
practitioners across various media, including one particular working-class medium, 
postwar men’s adventure magazines, and employ classic cultural studies readings to 
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 Americans are confused about class. The Associated Press gave us a perfect 
example of this confusion in February 2008 when it quoted then-presidential candidate 
Hillary Clinton describing herself as the "candidate of, from and for the middle class of 
America." In the very next sentence, with no apparent sense of inconsistency, the AP 
explained that “Clinton has relied on working-class Democrats for much of her support 
… .”1 For the newswire staff—arguably a group of people who care more than most 
about the precise use of language—the two terms were apparently interchangeable. I 
believe our confusion is the result of what Robert Seguin calls “middle-classlessness.”2 
Seguin uses this phrase as a shorthand for the widespread, deeply held, but inaccurate 
American belief that most of us belong to a vaguely defined middle class.  
 While the perception is widespread, it is patently untrue. Despite the fact that the 
United States currently has the least equitable distribution of wealth in the developed 
world, and despite widespread evidence that the gap between rich and poor has been 
expanding rapidly since the 1970s, popular and scholarly commentators alike note that 
Americans simply don’t have the vocabulary of class that would help them understand 
their economic situation.3  Inequalities of economics, opportunity, and autonomy are 
                                                
1 International Herald Tribune, “Clinton Presents Case for Middle Class as She Tries to Hold onto Her 
Coalition,” February 15, 2008. 
2 Robert Seguin, Around Quitting Time: Work and Middle-Class Fantasy in American Fiction (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2001). 
3 For inequitable distribution of wealth, see, for example, Timothy M. Smeeding, “Public Policy, Economic 
Inequality, and Poverty: The United States in Comparative Perspective,” Social Science Quarterly 86, no. 5 
(December 2005): 955-983.  Smeeding bases his claims on data from the much-cited but proprietary 
Luxembourg Income Study, a 20-year comparative analysis of national incomes.  What qualifies as the 
“developed” world is, of course, contestable, and Smeeding disallows both Mexico and Russia to rank the 
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much more likely to be attributed to race or gender than to class; in the words of one 
sociologist, “class denial is woven into the fabric of American life.” The question, then, is 
why.4  
 Scholars have identified a number of reasons for the lack of class awareness in the 
United States. They include the country’s lack of a formal aristocracy; the fact that the 
New England colonists were a fairly homogenous, middling group (the Virginia colonists 
were not, but they’ve never loomed as large in our national mythology as the Puritans); 
the egalitarian revolutionary rhetoric; the frontier’s function as a “safety valve” for 
people who couldn’t or wouldn’t fit into the traditionally stratified Eastern culture; the 
American ideal of rugged individualism; the constant stream of new immigrants into the 
American workforce; the government’s use of force against unions at the turn of the last 
century; the country’s affluence, which often afforded working-class people middle-class 
spending power; and of course, our long history of conflating race and class, which keeps 
us from seeing power and privilege clearly.5 
                                                                                                                                            
United States as the leader in inequality.  For the lack of an American understanding of class, see Benjamin 
DeMott, The Imperial Middle: Why Americans Can’t Think Straight About Class (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992); Reeve Vanneman and Lynn Weber Cannon, The American Perception of Class 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Paul Lauter and Ann Fitzgerald, Literature, Class and 
Culture:  An Anthology (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), among many others. 
4 Stanley Aronowitz, How Class Works:  Power and Social Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003), 15. 
5 All of these arguments have been developed fully elsewhere. See Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s 
Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York:  Knopf, 2003); Michael 
Denning, “‘The Special American Conditions’: Marxism and American Studies,” American Quarterly 38, 
no. 3 (1986): 356-380; Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern  
British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1988); Herbert George Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America: Essays In American 
Working-Class and Social History (New York: Knopf, 1975); Paul Lauter, From Walden Pond to Jurassic 




 But there is another, equally important factor at work. From the 1950s on, the 
United States has become what observers call a “therapeutic culture.”6 Psychological 
ideas have become influential throughout the culture: they infuse child development, 
education, the criminal justice system, corporate management, advertising, and politics. 
Popular culture and personal interactions are riddled with references to the id, ego, 
superego, complexes, neuroses, repression. We all know what behavior “obsessive 
compulsive” or “manic depressive” refers to, as do our radio commentators, our 
journalists, and the characters in the television shows we watch. This dissemination of 
psychological ideas has undoubtedly has its benefits; it has arguably made many of us 
more perceptive, more sensitive, more self aware. 
 However, there is also evidence that this psychologization of culture has 
contributed to America’s sense of middle-classlessness. It has done so in two primary  
ways: first, by privileging middle-class ways of feeling, thinking, and communicating as 
the ideal standard to which all people should aspire; and second, by defining the 
individual as the source of both psychological problems and solutions, thereby 
deemphasizing the role of systemic social inequalities or the possibility of collective 
solutions. Moreover, both of these phenomena have become pervasive and 
commonsensical in mainstream American culture, effectively masking awareness of the 
ways in which they support the status quo and favor the privileged classes. These two 
phenomena interact with each other to help sustain middle-classlessness. 
                                                
6 Philip Rieff introduced the idea of a therapeutic culture in The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith 
After Freud (New York: HarperTorchbooks, 1966), and the concept has been widely adopted. 
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 This middle-class perspective generally shared by the psychological profession has 
contributed to “middle-classlessness” in two primary ways. First, while psychology’s 
focus on the individual as a source of both problems and solutions has come to seem 
commonsensical to many modern Americans, that focus precludes the acknowledgement 
of or search for systemic social inequalities.  This is the sense in which a number of 
commentators have claimed that psychology obscures the reality of class inequality. 
Second, when psychological practitioners unreflexively carry their own middle-class 
assumptions about appropriate psychological functioning into their practices, it can 
reinforce negative class stereotypes for both parties. The unexamined distances between 
the professional’s expectations and the working-class client’s lived experience can leave 
those clients feeling misunderstood, inadequate, or angry, while simultaneously 
reaffirming the practitioners’ biases. As psychological ideas have infused our therapeutic 
culture, these unexamined, class-based assumptions about what “normal” is have 
increasingly made non-middle-class ways of living seem inferior or dysfunctional. 7 
 While many scholars have investigated Americans’ lack of class awareness, and 
many others have explored the histories of psychology, only a few have articulated a 
relationship between the two topics, and those have only done so briefly. No full-length 
treatment of that relationship exists.  Moreover, although a small number of mid-century 
psychologists and sociologists did recognize and write about middle-class bias among the 
                                                
7 For the negative effects of psychological professionals’ middle-class assumptions, see Marcia Hill, “We 
Can’t Afford It: Confusions and Silences on the Topic of Class”; Esther D. Rothblum, “The Rich Get 
Social Services and the Poor Get Capitalism”; and Nancy Lynn Baker, “Class as a Construct in a 
‘Classless’ Society”; all in Classism and Feminist Therapy: Counting Costs, ed. Marcia Hill and Esther D. 
Rothblum (New York: Harrington Park Press, 1996).  
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discipline’s practitioners and within its ideas, no scholarship that I am aware of addresses 
this atypical postwar body of work. 
 Psychology’s Middle-Class Worldview 
 Psychological professionals in the United States have tended to be from middle-
class families of origin; the few mid-century surveys that collected data on psychological 
practitioners’ socioeconomic backgrounds indicated that most were from the middle- and 
upper-middle classes, while very few came from the working classes.8 A large body of 
sociological and psychological work continues to claim that different class positions are 
correlated with different language patterns, values, preferences, patterns of sociability, 
and ways of perceiving and engaging with the world.9 This is not deterministic: no 
infallible correlation exists between class and cultural traits. The material conditions of 
                                                
8 A series of small surveys of psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric residents, and graduate students in 
counseling psychology found a preponderance of middle-and upper-middle-class backgrounds among the 
practitioners; see Arnold A. Rogow, The Psychiatrists (New York: G. P Putnam’s Sons, 1970), 57; Denise 
Bystryn Kandel, “Status Homophily, Social Context, and Participation in Psychotherapy,” The American 
Journal of Sociology 71, no. 6 (May 1966): 640-650; p. 644; David W. Rowden, Ronald C. Dillehay, Jerry 
B. Michel, and Harry W. Martin, “Judgments About Candidates for Psychotherapy: The Influence of Social 
Class and Insight-Verbal Ability,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 11, no. 1 (March 1970): 51-58; 
55; and Jarvis A. Wright and Ben O. Hutton, “Influence of Client Socioeconomic Status on Selected 
Behaviors, Attitudes, and Decisions of Counselors,” Journal of Counseling Psychology 24, no. 6 (1977): 
527-530; 528. While none of these were large-scale surveys, observers both at the time and today have 
frequently noted that psychological practitioners tend to be from upper-middle and middle-class 
backgrounds. See, for example, Jerome K. Myers and Leslie Schaffer, “Social Stratification and Psychiatric 
Practice,” American Sociological Review 19 (June 1954): 307-310; 309. 
9 See Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes, and Control: Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1971); Douglas E. Foley, Learning Capitalist Culture: Deep in the Heart of 
Tejas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990); Klaus Eder, The New Politics of Class: 
Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies (London: Sage, 1993); Nicole M. 
Stephens, Hazel Rose Markus, and Sara S. M. Townsend, “Choice as an Act of Meaning: The Case of 
Social Class,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 93, no. 5 (2007): 814-830; Wanda M. L. Lee, 
An Introduction to Multicultural Counseling (Philadelphia, Taylor & Francis, 1999), 16; Barbara Jensen, 
“Across the Great Divide: Crossing Classes and Clashing Culture,” in What’s Class Got to Do With It? 
American Society in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Michael Zweig (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2004), 174; and Melvin L. Kohn, “Social Structure and Personality: A Quintessentially Sociological 
Approach to Social Psychology,” Social Forces 68 (1989): 26–33. 
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life influence, but do not dictate, culture. That influence, however, is important: as 
sociologist Melvin Kohn put it, reiterating his long-held belief, “Members of different 
social classes, by virtue of enjoying (or suffering) different conditions of life, come to see 
the world differently—to develop different conceptions of social reality, different 
aspirations and hopes and fears, different conceptions of the desirable.”10 Further, 
individuals are generally unaware of the classed nature of their own preferences and 
perceptions, and sociologist Peter Kaufman has suggested that middle-class social 
reproduction in particular is so normative as to be invisible, even to class analysts, who 
have tended to focus studies of cultural reproduction on the working classes.11 
Psychological professionals, whose training fosters an individualistic rather than 
structural view of the world, are unlikely to be more aware of this socialization process 
than other members of the middle classes. 
 The small percentage of psychological professionals from working-class 
backgrounds, while not subject to middle-class socialization in their formative years, 
have generally been indoctrinated into more middle-class worldviews as part of their 
professional training. The education required of psychologists and psychiatrists is 
extensive, and working-class studies theorists maintain that the university itself fosters 
                                                
10 Kohn, 31. While the view expressed by Kohn and others clearly clashes with the traditional 
psychoanalytic approach to individual development, the sociological evidence and first-person accounts, 
particularly from individuals who have experienced cross-class mobility, are compelling. 
11 Peter Kaufman, “Middle-Class Social Reproduction: The Activation and Negotiation of Structural 
Advantages,” Sociological Forum 20, no. 2 (June 2005): 245-270; see especially 247-248. Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concept of habius is also relevant; Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
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middle-class ways of thinking and being.12 Additionally, the subject matter of psychology 
has, until quite recently, naturalized middle-class perspectives, communication styles, 
and modes of self-representation.13 The result is that most psychologists have 
unreflexively assumed that a “normal” or “mentally healthy” state of being resembles that 
of themselves and their middle-class peers. The upshot of this assumption is that modes 
of self-presentation, handling emotion, communication, relationships, and aspirations—all 
aspects of life that we now know are deeply classed—have been seen by psychological 
professionals through a lens of middle-class expectations.14 
 A number of psychological and sociological theorists have addressed this middle-
class perspective in psychology. In 1938, sociologist Kingsley Davis identified what 
future theorists would recognize as the central problem—that the practice of psychology 
(or “mental hygiene,” in 1930s parlance) unconsciously privileges middle-class 
worldviews and values.  However, Davis himself didn’t see that orientation as terribly 
problematic.  He explained, “Doubtless there is a tendency to spread the middle class 
Protestant ethic to classes which are not middle and hence not so mobile, but this could 
                                                
12 See Carolyn Leste Law and C. L. Barney Dews, eds., This Fine Place So Far from Home: Voices of 
Academics from the Working Class (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995) and Jensen for first-
person accounts of the middle-class culture of academia.  
13 Two recent developments, the theories of cultural psychology and the practices of multicultural 
counseling, have begun to challenge that naturalization. An outgrowth of heightened sensitivity to racial, 
ethnic, and gender differences in the 1970s, cultural psychology and multicultural counseling expanded to 
regularly include class differences in the 1990s. 
14 Dana Cloud, Control and Consolation in Culture and Politics: Rhetoric of Therapy (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 1998); Philip Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural 
History of Psychotherapy (Boston:  Addison-Wesley, 1995); Joel Pfister, “On Conceptualizing the Cultural 
History of Emotional and Psychological Life in America,” in Inventing the Psychological: Toward a 
Cultural History of Emotional Life in America, ed. Joel Pfister and Nancy Schnog (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997); and Steven C. Ward, Modernizing the Mind: Psychological Knowledge and the 
Remaking of Society (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2002). 
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scarcely be interpreted as class ‘exploitation.’ We believe, rather, that the mental 
hygienist is really enforcing, in a secular way and under the guise of science, the 
standards of the entire society.”15  In other words, for Davis, as for the vast majority of 
professionals, middle-class America was the America others should aspire to.  It is also 
worth noting that while the hygienists’ promotion of middle-class values and behaviors 
was not, as Davis noted, “exploitation,” it does provide a good example of hegemony at 
work, and demonstrates one of the unthinking ways in which dominant classes maintain 
their cultural dominance. 
Clinical psychologist William Haase noted a similarly middle-class perspective in 
psychology in 1953, though unlike Davis, Haase expressed discomfort with it. Haase was 
also one of the first to suggest that advanced education in psychology in particular, rather 
than just the broad acculturating effect of higher education, might foster middle-class 
perspectives in aspiring practitioners whose backgrounds were not middle class. Haase 
developed a research project to test for practitioners’ class biases. He developed pairs of 
Rorschach test responses that had been carefully crafted to reflect similar psychological 
states, but which were identified as being from patients with different class positions—
one middle-class patient, and one “lower-class” patient. He provided sets of these pairs to 
75  psychologists, discovering that the practitioners evaluated the lower-class patient as 
sicker than the middle-class patient.  Interestingly, this bias towards middle-class patients 
held even for practitioners whose backgrounds were working- or lower-class. Haase 
                                                




hypothesized that this bias was the result of academic socialization. In Haase’s words, 
“the formal, academic preparation and the correlative social processes … inculcate the 
class identification upon the noviate professional.”16 And not only does the new 
professional absorb “class identification,” but “where class is concerned, the 
psychologist’s attitudes and values are modified in the direction of norms relatively 
common for his discipline.” In short, the psychological professional adopts a middle-
class worldview as part of his professional training.  
Defining Class 
 The possibility of a “middle-class worldview” must be articulated against the 
complex and contested idea of class itself. “Class” refers both to objective socioeconomic 
position and subjective sense of identity; it is a social and cultural category as well as an 
economic and political one; and its boundaries, definitions, categories, and relevance are 
hotly contested by scholars in an array of disciplines, as well as by politicians, members 
of the media, and the general public. To approach the term’s economic and political 
meanings, modern theorists grapple with Karl Marx, Max Weber, and a host of neo-
Marxists and neo-Weberians.17 In the Marxist view, class involves the inevitable conflict 
                                                
16 For the original study, see William Haase, Rorschach Diagnosis, Socio-Economic Class, and Examiner 
Bias, unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University, 1956; cited in Frank Riessman and Sylvia 
Scribner, “The Under-Utilization of Mental Health Services by Workers and Low Income Groups: Causes 
and Cures,” paper presented at the AFL-CIO Meeting on Mental Health, May 20-22 1964, Kheel Center for 
Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, M. P. Catherwood Library, Cornell University (hereafter 
NILER), Box 5 Folder 12. For later discussion of the educational socialization, see William Haase, “The 
Role of Socioeconomic Class in Examiner Bias,” Mental Health of the Poor, ed. Frank Riessman, Jerome 
Cohen, and Arthur Pearl  (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); 244. 
17 In addition, Emile Durkheim’s model of society still enjoys some influence, though less than that of 
Marx and Weber. Durkheim believed that society functioned much like a biological organism, with the 
resulting interdependence of various positions fostering cooperation for the common good.  
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between owners of capital and workers whose only economic option is to sell their labor 
power. Moreover, this conflict is necessarily exploitive: the owners appropriate surplus 
labor value from the workers, ensuring the reproduction of class relations.  
 Alternately, the Weberian perspective, which has enjoyed more influence in the 
United States, highlights status and stratification rather than inherent class conflict and 
exploitation. Weber includes social status and political affiliation along with economic 
resources to determine what he calls an individual’s overall “life chances.” Individuals 
belong to one of four classes, which attempt to maintain their advantages by excluding 
others. Social mobility is possible within each of the classes, as each class is comprised of 
clusters of economic groups, but mobility is difficult between classes. While Weber’s 
emphasis on status, stratification, and mobility has resonated with mainstream American 
economic thought, status differentials simply do not provide the same explanatory power 
as does Marx’s description of exploitive relations. People with privilege maintain their 
privileged style of life precisely because they can exploit the underpaid labor of those 
who have no choice but to perform underpaid labor. 
 But class is not simply an economic phenomenon; it also has social, cultural, and 
psychological dimensions.   Class is social in that, as E. P. Thompson so memorably 
pointed out, it is a relationship, not a thing. Further, the parameters and textures of that 
relationship are constantly shifting. The cultural contours of class have been explored by 
a series of theorists: Antonio Gramsci’s idea of cultural hegemony posits that cultural 
norms tend to reflect the interests of the dominant classes while simultaneously making 
those norms seem natural, just, and beneficial to the broader society. Pierre Bourdieau’s 
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concept of habitus theorizes the deeply classed way in which individuals are socialized 
into their personal preferences, tastes, communication styles, and bodily comportments.18 
A host of scholars in the fields of cultural studies and working-class studies have 
grappled with the fluid and contested nature of class as lived experience. Finally, the 
“psychological,” or interior and subjective dimensions of class are central to issues of 
class consciousness, affiliation, and self-image, as well as being deeply embedded in the 
social and cultural experiences of class.  
 These multiple layers of meaning, as well as the varied and conflicting perspectives 
of class in the social sciences, render class a difficult subject to address. The power 
relationships that constitute class are perpetually in motion, complicating the project of 
definition still further. In addition, class positions are inextricably intertwined with other 
aspects of identity that similarly situate an individual within systems of privilege and 
disadvantage. People live classed lives inflected in various ways by their race, gender, 
sexual orientation, age, and ablebodiedness, among other characteristics. So it is 
inevitable that, when I investigate the relationship between psychology and class, I am 
artificially isolating one aspect of multifaceted identities that roughly correspond with 
positions of privilege. Still, such artificial isolation is the most feasible approach to 
undertaking an examination of the ways in which psychology has interacted with 
concepts of class. 
 My use of the term “class,” then, acknowledges objective socioeconomic location, 
                                                
18 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); Antonio 
Gramsci, Letters from Prison, trans. Lynne Lawner (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975); Bourdieu. 
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but necessarily in relation to other locations and in the context of power differentials. It is 
relational, it is in flux, but it does represent structures of privilege and disadvantage that 
impact real lives. Further, my use of class categories assumes widely shared, though not 
universal, subjective cultural experiences of class positions, or what I refer to as 
worldviews. It is important to note that an individual does not need to have class 
consciousness—an awareness of his or her objective class position—in order to be 
socialized into a particular class worldview. One may, for example, habitually speak with 
concrete language, rely on a “here-and-now” orientation rather a future one, and prefer a 
sense of fraternal community over competitive individualism—all, according to theorists, 
cultural characteristics of the working classes.19 However, that individual may never 
consider him- or herself classed at all, or may self-identify with the middle class. Finally, 
while my understanding of class includes its performative aspects and constant 
renegotiations of power, and while I acknowledge that identities are not fixed, I am 
convinced that for many individuals, the possibilities of identity are limited by material 
conditions.  
 While sociologists, economists, politicians, and the public vigorously disagree 
about the precise constitution of “middle class” or “working class” positions, I use 
“middle class” to refer to mental, rather than manual workers. Middle-class individuals 
typically have attended some college. “Upper-middle class” refers to more affluent and/or 
                                                
19 See Bernstein, Foley, and Stephens, Marcus, and Townsend. 
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highly educated professionals.20 The “working classes” refers to manual, industrial, semi-
skilled, and unskilled laborers. The terms are regrettably imprecise; however, that 
imprecision can be a helpful reminder that class is fluid, not fixed, and a relationship, not 
a thing. 
Defining Psychology 
This dissertation explores multiple facets of the diverse field that is broadly 
described as “psychology.” I address the mental hygiene movement, psychiatry, 
psychotherapy, industrial-organizational psychology, counseling psychology, social 
psychology, and Community Mental Health Centers, among other aspects of the field. 
However, much of this dissertation addresses popular perceptions of mid-century 
psychology, and those popular perceptions rarely included precise disciplinary 
identification. As psychological ideas have been disseminated into, adopted and adapted 
by mainstream culture, they have rarely maintained their original, academic forms.  
Similarly, the average individual adopting psychological ideas is generally oblivious to 
the battles over disciplinary boundaries that have so engaged theorists.21  One result of 
this popular oblivion is that scholars who focus on the popularization of psychology 
typically discuss that popularization as an aggregate of the “psychological,” rather than 
attempting to parse out specific influences of theoretical psychology, clinical psychology, 
neurological psychology, social psychology, psychiatry, etc. Where it is relevant, I am 
                                                
20 Bourdieu, among other class theorists, posits that classes can be divided into two main “fractions.” One 
fraction primarily values economic capital, and the other primarily values cultural capital. 
21 For example, a series of surveys published in American Psychologist from the 1950s through the 1970s 
consistently bemoaned the public’s inability to distinguish between psychology and psychiatry. 
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careful to describe the specific aspect of psychology under discussion. Otherwise, like 
previous scholars of popular psychology, I refer to the concept of psychology as 
understood by the public as “psychology” or, following Ward, “psy.”22    
 Previous Perspectives  
 While a handful of previous scholars have addressed the relationship between 
psychology and class, only one such work is a full-length treatment. Rhetorician and 
communications scholar Dana Cloud explores how the pervasive American idea of the 
therapeutic has naturalized individualistic, rather than collective, approaches to problems 
in modern society, privileging responses of “healing, coping, [and] adaptation” rather 
than challenges to inequalities in the social structure.23 While her case-history accounts of 
the therapeutic paradigm’s structural effects are generally persuasive, the scope of my 
investigation is both narrower and more specific. Where Cloud takes a macro view of the 
therapeutic’s effects on society at large, I focus on the emergence of class-based 
perspectives in psychological literature and practice, as well as class-inflected differences 
in the popular perceptions of psychology and psychologists. 
 Clinical psychologist Philip Cushman provides a compelling account of 
                                                                                                                                            
Summarized in Wendy Wood, Melinda Jones, and Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr.,  “Surveying Psychology’s Public 
Image,” American Psychologist 41 (1986) 947-953. 
22 Ward, 6. Other theorists who have grappled with the parameters of popular psychology in a similar 
manner include Schnog, who uses “psychology” as her all-encompassing term; Jansz and van Drunen, who 
define “practical psychology” as including professional, applied psychology, but also “the numerous other 
ways in which psychology is brought to bear on society, including popularization and the use of 
psychology by other disciplines, such as psychiatry, education, criminology, and cultural anthropology” 
(Jansz and van Drunen, x), and Ellen Herman, who explains that her “use of the term ‘psychology’ does not 
stop at the margins of an academic discipline or the boundaries of a professional job category.  Rather, it 
indicates an emphasis on analyzing mental processes, interpersonal relationships, introspection, and 
behavior as a way of explaining both individual and social realities”; Herman, The Romance of American 
Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1995), 5. 
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psychotherapy’s role in the construction of the “empty self,” his phrase for what he sees 
as the void of the modern psyche, which attempts to fill itself via consumption and 
psychotherapy.24 Like Cloud, Cushman acknowledges the impact of American 
psychology’s emphasis on individualized, interior experience at the expense of the social 
and structural. However, where Cloud attributes psychology’s politically neutralizing, 
interior emphasis to capitalism itself, Cushman takes a more nuanced approach, 
examining disciplinary schisms within psychotherapy, as well as how practitioners’ 
desire for scientific credibility led them away from a view of the self as socially 
constructed and towards the idea of an internalized that develops independently of social 
and economic influences. Cushman’s claim that modern psychoanalysis obscures social 
processes supports my own view, but his analysis is not class specific. He briefly alludes 
to my chief concern early in Constructing the Self, noting “There is something about the 
field of psychology and the practices of psychotherapy that is particularly emblematic of 
the texture of twentieth-century American middle-class life.”25 However, Cushman’s 
work does not pursue that point. 
 Finally, the theorist who has influenced my work the most is American studies 
scholar Joel Pfister. His introduction to Inventing the Psychological: Toward a Cultural 
History of Emotional Life in America helped me to conceptualize the questions I wanted 
to ask in my own project.26 Pfister’s formulation of the interplay between culture, social 
                                                                                                                                            
23 Cloud, xiv.  
24 Cushman, 6. 




structure, and the development of psychological subjectivities provided me with a more 
precise way to map the interactions of psychology and class than other approaches had. 
While Pfister addresses therapeutic culture’s individualization of structural social 
problems, his analysis encompasses much more. For example, reflecting on the process of 
theorizing Inventing with his co-editor, he describes their realization that “insight” itself is 
a highly constructed, culturally specific, and classed cultural artifact.27  
 Pfister grounds his ideas in specific, though diverse, examples such as cross-cultural 
comparisons, labor practices, and popular culture. His examples of the classed nature of 
psychological interiority, and the conflicts arising from that, were particularly helpful. 
Describing the antipathy between the working-class Stanley Kowalski and his bourgeois 
sister-in-law, Blanche DuBois, in Tennessee Williams’ Streetcar Named Desire, Pfister 
writes that Stanley “has no doubt that the display of a ‘therapeutic’ self is a marker of 
class status—a display he does not welcome on what he considers his domestic stage.”28 
Pfister also introduces the question of how these psychological interiors are perceived by 
people who, by virtue of class position, are excluded from performing them. Pfister’s 
conceptual framework and series of questions provided me with a launching point for my 
own investigations. 
 In contrast to the few works that address the intersection of psychology and class, 
the literature on class is enormous. My project has been particularly influenced by 
scholarship from the fields of cultural sociology, cultural studies, and working-class 
                                                
27 Ibid., 18. 
28 Ibid., 23.  
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studies. From sociology, Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and cultural capital, as 
well as Michele Lamont’s cross-cultural investigations into the symbolic boundaries of 
status, have been most useful. Michel Foucault has provided relevant theorizing as well, 
particularly with his “regime of the norm,” or the ways in which rules of behavior, 
standards of perception, and consequences for transgression become diffused throughout 
the practices of a society. While this concept has been most frequently applied to 
sexuality, it is also relevant to middle-class standards of decorum and civility. However, I 
am uncomfortable with Foucault’s postmodernist claim that identity is, in the end, 
performative; that view is incompatible with the very limited identity options available to 
individuals in particularly subordinated structural positions.  
 Cultural studies theorists such as Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, and Paul Willis 
pioneered a theoretical approach that grounded the study of cultural forms in the context 
of the economic and social structures from which they developed. Drawing on Marxist 
constructs of class relations and Gramsci’s model of hegemony, the Birmingham school 
interrogated the ways in which dominant cultural patterns were both imposed and 
resisted via popular cultural products. While the model is invaluable, late twentieth-
century critics have taken some cultural studies theorists to task for overstating the 
possibilities and incidence of resistance.  
 Finally, I have drawn on the field of working-class studies, exemplified by scholars 
such as Michael Zweig, Sherry Linkton, Terry Easton, and Barbara Jensen. Working-class 
studies theorists provide, among other things, first-person accounts of lived experience 
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and working-class subjectivity. These voices have been crucial in illustrating the ways in 
which class positioning can impact individuals’ lives, perceptions, interactions, and 
structures of feeling, to borrow Raymond Williams’ term. In particular, the many 
working-class voices describing the differences that they have perceived between 
working-class and middle-class cultures, values, relationships, and priorities have been 
enlightening, especially those voices of individuals who have experienced cross-class 
mobility. However, a great deal of working-class studies material relies solely on those 
voices and stories, to the exclusion of theory, historicization, and context.  
 Psychology and Class Normativity  
One way in which theorists have claimed that psychological ideas obscure the 
realities of class is through psychology’s insistence on the individual as the unit of 
analysis. Psychology’s focus on the individual seems, to people socialized into modern 
therapeutic worldviews and individualism, both obvious and inevitable. However, the 
“naturalness” of the idea that one’s deep interior is the source of personal problems is 
culturally constructed, and is rooted in the broader American development of 
individualization. Broadly, individualization involved a move away from identification 
with groups and communities and towards an emphasis on the individual him- or 
herself.29  In 1835, when a translation of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America 
introduced the word “individualism” to describe Americans’ preference for self-
sufficiency over public life, its meaning reflected a sixteenth-century perception of the 
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individual as defined by his exterior, public role (albeit, in the American’s case, his 
rejection of it).  However, by the late nineteenth century, the idea of oneself as an 
individual had come to be associated with a private, interior, psychological self. One 
recent social history of psychology described the impact of that turn-of-the-century 
development: “Feelings were increasingly seen as the foremost source of individuality.  
…  Some held that [rationality] was nothing but an artificial mask that tried to cover what 
really mattered ‘inside’: emotions as the source of an authentic self.”30  This interior, 
“authentic” self was, of course, the subject of investigation in what was then the new 
science of psychology.31   
Individualization has also been, as noted above, a highly political phenomenon. 
The American (and psychological) valorization of the individual has been blamed—or 
credited, depending on one’s orientation—for the lack of a viable socialist party in the 
United States, for the nation’s unwillingness to support social services to the extent that 
most European countries do, and for a fragmentation of community that has, 
paradoxically, resulted in poorer mental health for many individuals. Individualization is 
also heavily classed; its development intensified as the middle classes were forming, and 
it served as one way in which they could differentiate themselves from the masses. In his 
                                                                                                                                            
29 While historians trace the origins of individualization to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, its early 
form involved one’s effect on the community, not one’s personal, interior experiences.  In the nineteenth 
century, individualization evolved into the more modern form that we recognize today. 
30 Jeroen Jansz, “Psychology and Society: An Overview,” in A Social History of Psychology, ed. Jeroen 
Jansz and Peter van Drunen (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004): 12-44; quote on 22. 
31 Psychological professionals have worked tirelessly to frame their discipline as a “science,” mostly to 
establish credibility.  In the United States, however, psychology was originally taught in the philosophy 
departments of universities.  See John C. Burnham, How Superstition Won and Science Lost: Popularizing 
Science and Health in the United States (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 87-89.   
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overview of late nineteenth-century individualization, Jeroen Jansz claims that “[t]he first 
feature of the individual was a middle-class background.”32  This emphasis on 
individualism clearly fostered the popular acceptance of psychology, with its microscopic 
focus on the individual. It must be remembered, however, that the relationship between 
the two is clearly dialectical, and many argue that the pervasiveness of the psychological 
perspective has both intensified the process of individualization and naturalized it. 33  
Another way in which psychological ideas have, until recently, worked to mask 
class issues is through psychology’s insistence that the “self” is not culturally 
constructed. The recent development of social constructionism, particularly as it has 
developed in psychology, has begun to challenge that understanding of self.34  Social 
constructionism in psychology was an outgrowth of the broader sociology of knowledge 
work of the mid-1960s.  Citing Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman’s 1966 The Social 
Construction of Reality35 as a major influence and drawing together work on the social 
construction of emotion, identity, roles, and interaction, Kenneth Gergen pioneered a 
broader social construction of psychology with his seminal 1985 article, “The Social 
                                                
32 Jansz in Jansz and van Drunen, 24. 
33 See especially Graham Richards, Putting Psychology in Its Place:  An Introduction from a Critical 
Historical Perspective (New York: Routledge, 1996), and Jansz and van Drunen. 
34 Proponents of social construction in psychology include Kenneth J. Gergen, An Invitation to Social 
Construction (London: Sage, 1999), and Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); John Shotter, Cultural Politics of Everyday Life: Social 
Constructionism, Rhetoric, and Knowing of the Third Kind (Buckingham, England: Open University Press, 
1993); Richards; Cushman; Pfister and Schnog; and Ward. 
35 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). 
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Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology.”36  Gergen’s view, and that of the 
theorists who have followed him, recognizes that social, cultural, and specific historical 
influences combine to create any particular society’s idea of what a “self” is.  Further, 
this view cautions that there is no “true,” “natural” self hiding beneath these 
constructions, waiting to be discovered.  The implication for psychology, then, is that as 
it developed as a discipline, its process of describing and naming interior states did not 
simply map discovered “truths” of interiority, but rather helped to shape the very 
experience of that interiority as it created what came to be experienced as those truths.  
This process is what Schnog describes as “the power of culture not simply to discover 
emotional truths but to create them.”37 
And, as this culture was creating and mapping emotional “truths” in the 
burgeoning study of psychology, it was doing so in the context of a society that was 
stratified by class; whose members’ experience of life, self, and relationships were 
dramatically shaped by their class positions; but whose national mythology discouraged 
articulation of that stratification. So, in mapping and creating this new psychological 
frontier, the professional men who led the field in the United States created those maps in 
their own images.  
But there is another, more subtle way in which psychology has impacted the 
experience of class in the United States.  Several theorists, including Kovel, Pfister, and 
Ward, argue that the construction and demonstration of psychological interiority itself has 
                                                
36 Kenneth J. Gergen, , “The Social Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology,” American 
Psychologist 40 (March 1985): 266-275. 
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become a class marker.38  The “educated classes” have, since at least the turn of the last 
century, been socialized to value and display introspection, emotional “insight,” and a 
psychologically based vocabulary of interiority.  In Pfister’s terms, “[P]articular modes of 
defining emotions and rituals of reading the self have contributed to the constitution and 
presentation of middle- and upper-class identity.”  Conversely, the absence of those 
presentations and vocabularies tends to be interpreted as a lack of intelligence, education, 
or “depth” by members of the middle and upper classes, naturalizing and justifying their 
own place in the socioeconomic hierarchy.  Or, to borrow from Pfister again, the white 
middle class’s “invention of a therapeutic culture has also been tied to its strategy to 
establish its ‘inner’ (‘human’) value over the working class and over subordinate ethnic 
and racial groups.’”39   
While Pfister’s argument has merit on the macro level, it is also important to note 
that some individual practitioners of psychology were aware that their discipline not only 
ignored problems of social inequality, but exacerbated those problems. Their awareness 
is particularly impressive given the cultural and professional pressures that worked to 
naturalize the status quo. They held minority views in their own specialties, and many of 
the professionals who published class-based work soon moved on to other interests. A 
few maintained their interest, however, such as industrial-organization psychologists 
Arthur Kornhauser and Ross Stagner, social psychologist Frank Riessman, and 
                                                                                                                                            
37 Nancy Schnog, “On Inventing the Psychological,” in Pfister and Schnog, 4. 
38 Joel Kovel, The Radical Spirit: Essays on Psychoanalysis and Society (London: Free Association Books, 
1988), 152-153; Pfister, Pfister and Schnog, 23; Ward, 22-23. 
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psychiatrists Hugh Storrow and Frederick C. Redlich. These psychological professionals 
acknowledged that the profession did not address differences of class appropriately, 
interrogated the reasons for that deficiency, assessed its impact, and  attempted—
sometimes feebly, sometimes sweepingly—to rectify it. 
 This project, then, traces psychological professionals’ perceptions of class during 
the discipline’s dramatic growth in both numbers and influence in the postwar period. I 
examine a small but persistent thread of discourse that questioned mainstream 
psychological assumptions about class, and I explore the development, increasing 
influence, and eventual derailment of that discourse. I demonstrate how external political 
and cultural forces worked to contain the expansion of a more egalitarian mental health 
movement, and how the optimism of psychological professionals who promoted that 
expansion, especially via the Community Mental Health Center Act, eventually cost 
them credibility with the public.  
 But the class views of psychological practitioners are only part of this story. In 
addition to detailing how mid-century psy professionals perceived individuals through the 
lens of class, this project also aims to examine the ways in which variously classed 
publics perceived the newly influential psy professionals. Given that psychology has 
unthinkingly promoted middle-class worldviews, values, communication styles and 
emotional patterns as “normal,” we have to wonder how members of the working classes 
perceived a psychology that framed them as non-normative. How did they view a 
psychology that encouraged them to interiorize middle-class “structures of feeling” and, 
as it has been applied in schools, industrial settings, and the criminal justice system, 
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punished them for not doing so? While first-person, working-class views of mid-century 
psychology have been frustratingly elusive, divergent portrayals of psychological 
professionals are available in class-specific media.  This project analyzes presentations of 
psychology in both mass media and one specifically working-class medium to identify a 
range of the perceptions and uses of psychology.  I argue that, rather than having a single 
meaning, these representations of psychology served a variety of functions: they worked 
at times to mock the dominant culture, as well as to express working-class anxieties over 
diminishing autonomy, changes in gender roles, and sexuality. 
An “American” Study 
Though neither psychological thought nor denial of class stratification is an 
exclusively American phenomenon, both have developed in a unique way in the United 
States.  While psychological thought has pervaded much of the Western world, no other 
culture has embraced it as enthusiastically as the U. S. has. Since World War II, this 
nation has led the world in the production and utilization of psychological professionals, 
and observers acknowledge it as the world’s “most advanced psychiatric society.”40  As 
early as the mid-1950s, psychological professionals celebrating unprecedented public 
interest in their field identified that interest as “peculiar to the United States,”41 and 
watched as that interest manifested itself in a deluge of popular culture portrayals of 
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psychology and psychological professionals.  In the 1950s, major newspapers, national 
circulation magazines, self-help books, radio and television programs, and fictional 
representations of psychological themes and professionals on television and in films 
heralded what one Life series called “The Age of Psychology.”42    
At the same time, Americans have embraced a unique national myth of 
classlessness that has, in turn, shaped class perceptions and behaviors in specifically 
American ways. In addition, during the postwar period, the very disciplinary fields that 
would most be expected to study issues of class—sociology, economics, history, 
American studies—generally succumbed to Cold War pressures, both hegemonic and 
overtly political, to adhere to the consensus view of American culture, and abandoned 
“class,” a word with jarringly Soviet connotations.  Instead, analysts overwhelmingly 
used the concept of “social status” to discuss the visible hierarchical positions of 
American cultural life.  The United States government actively promoted the 
development of a status-ranking model, and most academic researchers in this country 
adopted it.43   
Interestingly, though, the field of American studies has yet to fully investigate the 
implications of class relationships, despite the flight from consensus history in the 1970s, 
and despite the field’s current attention to the interconnectedness of race, gender, and 
class.  While a handful of American studies scholars have made impressive contributions 
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to understandings of class, others argue convincingly that the field “has failed to embrace 
more thoroughly class and its attendant struggles,” the conclusion Larry J. Griffin and 
Maria Tempenis reached after conducting a content analysis of 50 years of American 
Quarterly issues. American studies scholar Paul Lauter calls class the “unaddressed item 
in the familiar trio ‘race, gender, and class,’” and other American studies scholars have 
concurred.44 
Similarly, the psychological professions have also neglected to fully address the 
implications of class.  Echoing Lauter’s critique of American studies, psychologists Joan 
Ostrove and Elizabeth Cole acknowledge that, although psychology as a discipline claims 
to attend to race, class, and gender, “class is the least explored of these three.”45 Even the 
advent of two new disciplinary offshoots, critical psychology and multicultural 
counseling, were slower to address class than race, gender, and sexual orientation.46 
Further, as psychological discourse has become a major part of American cultural life, 
the discipline’s blindness to class has continued to reinforce middle-class norms.  In 
addition to the subtle ways in which psychology’s emphasis on individualism has helped 
to divert attention from class structures, individual psychologists and psychiatrists have 
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played a role in normalizing middle-class beliefs, attitudes, and values.  Since most “psy” 
47 professionals are from middle-class backgrounds, they often uncritically carry their 
own cultural assumptions into their practices.  
Though I trace the development of psychological and class thought for a broader 
period, I focus my investigation on the 1950s and 1960s.  The post-World War II period 
saw an explosion in the popularization of psychology, ensuring that a broad swath of the 
population would acquire at least some familiarity with psychological concepts.  
However, the particular kind of psychological interiority that was popularized in the 
1950s lost some prominence with the ascendance of the biomedical model of 
psychological functioning and therapies in the late 1970s.  The same time frame is a 
significant one for the working classes. Working-class individuals experienced a major 
economic shift in the postwar period when many, but not all, of them experienced a new 
affluence and middle-class consumption capabilities. Another major shift occurred for 
this group in the 1970s, when working-class economic growth flattened, major employers 
began massive layoffs, and observers note the onset of a still-widening gap between well-
off and not-so-well-off Americans.  These temporal parameters in both psychology and 
working-class studies provide this project with a logical timeframe.   
Overview of Chapters 
To begin my investigation, I describe the apex of psychological studies of class in 
the 1950s, then retrace the development of class perceptions in the United States from 
their origins in sociology. For a variety of professional, theoretical, political, and 
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economic reasons, American sociology has been a fairly conservative discipline. Its 
leading practitioners developed a consensus-based model of social functioning which 
envisioned different groups in a culture as working together for the benefit of the whole 
society. This view pathologized dissent and conflict, and had the unintentional effect of 
justifying the status quo, including existing class formations. Chapter one outlines the 
development and pervasiveness of the sociological views of class, and examines their 
influence on psychological thought. It also details the factors that shaped psychological 
approaches to class: the development of intelligence testing, which evaluated people on a 
hierarchical scale and privileged those in the higher classes; the pervasiveness of 
eugenics, which provided “scientific” justification for elitism; and the expanding 
legitimacy of psychology through its application in both world wars. Finally, chapter one 
investigates the class-based critiques of the profession mounted by a few of its 
practitioners.  
Chapter two begins in the wake of World War II, as psychology rapidly expanded 
into the popular American consciousness, and psychological professionals increasingly 
insisted that workers’ mental health was different than that of the middle class. While 
most believed that those differences reflected deficiencies in the working-class psyche, 
some professionals attributed the problem to the class biases of psychologists themselves. 
Although one psychological specialty, industrial-organizational psychology, was well 
positioned to develop an especially nuanced view of working-class issues, the field 
instead aligned itself with management. This chapter outlines the evolution of industrial-
organizational psychology and its impact on psychological investigations of class. The 
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focal point of this chapter is a case study: in 1958, a labor-supported research program 
hoped to develop approaches to mental health that would improve workers’ lives. The 
program failed, but provides modern observers with a glimpse into the pervasiveness of 
middle-class psychological normativity. 
 In chapter three, my focus shifts from practitioners’ views of various publics to 
various publics’ views of psychological practitioners. As psychology became 
increasingly ubiquitous in postwar popular culture, representations of psychology in 
diverse media ran the gamut from earnest endorsements to outright mockery. Drawing on 
mass communications theory—particularly theories of reception—and sociological 
explorations of class-based media use, this chapter explores the multiple ways in which 
representations of psychology and psychological professionals could be “read,” offering 
present-day observers a glimpse into the ambivalent responses to this new cultural 
authority. This chapter also examines the disappearance of working-class characters and 
images from the new, and newly upscale, mass media, and their replacement by a middle-
class, consumer-oriented homogeneity.  
Continuing my exploration of mass-mediated presentations of psychology, 
chapter four examines the ways in which a particular working-class medium navigated 
ideas of psychology in the postwar period. Men’s adventure magazines, known in the 
trade as “armpit slicks,” “men’s sweat magazines,” or “the sweats,” were widely popular 
from the 1950s to the 1970s. Like mainstream periodicals, they addressed the “new” 
phenomenon of psychology. But while Newsweek advocated “fine tuning” one’s 
emotions, the sweats took a different approach. In addition to the predictable use of 
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psychology as a veneer of respectability for sexual themes, the genre’s use of psychology 
also demonstrated three major, recurring themes: fear of being controlled by external 
forces; concern over gender roles; and insecurities about sexual performance and sex 
norms. Relying on close readings and rhetorical analyses of the substantial collection of 
men’s adventure magazines at Michigan State University, this chapter teases out not only 
how working-class readers made sense of the world through the sweats, but also how 
they made sense of—and use of—the increasingly ubiquitous norms of psychology.  
My final chapter focuses on the social activism of the 1960s. In that decade, 
progressive social reformers achieved substantial gains. Congress funded a Community 
Mental Health Act in 1963 that proponents believed, in that optimistic era, would not 
only democratize mental health care, but would also elevate the functionality and 
personal development of the whole population. A year later, President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson launched an “unconditional war on poverty,” promising to eradicate economic 
oppression just as thoroughly as we had eradicated polio. The enormous social advances 
of the Civil Rights movement, combined with a new national affluence, world 
prominence, and a deeply-felt belief in technology and progress, all encouraged 
proponents to believe that they could truly change the world. However, racist backlash, 
the escalation of an unpopular war, unrealistic expectations, and, not least, a naïve 
understanding of the structures and functions of late capitalism all managed to snatch 
defeat from the jaws of victory. Though both the Community Mental Health Movement 
and the War on Poverty had seemed poised to disentangle the mental health professions 
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from unreflexive middle-class standards, both paradoxically ended up reinforcing the 
association instead. 
The various ideas and practices of psychology have had an enormous impact on 
twentieth- and twenty-first century American life. At the visible level, they have shaped 
the country’s educational, judicial, commercial, political, personal, and interpersonal 
realms. At a less visible level, they have privileged the understanding of social problems 
as individual problems, and they have constructed the idea of a subjective psychological 
interiority whose fullest, most psychologically ideal expression appears to mirror the 
subjectivity of educated elites. The popularization of this collection of psychological 
ideas has occurred in a country that is deeply stratified by class, and whose economic 
inequality has increased for decades, but whose national mythology leads many citizens 
to believe, perhaps vaguely, that they live in a “middle-class” society, and that most of 
them belong to an idealized (and ill-defined) middle class. 
The relationship between psychology and class remains largely unexplored. This 
dissertation examines various aspects of that relationship to map it more fully. It traces 
the ways in which most psychological professionals came to think about class, and 
examines the views of those outliers who were dissatisfied with that standard perspective. 
It also explores two instances in which progressive practitioners marshal resources in 
attempts to challenge their profession’s class-based inequalities. In both instances—a 
labor-backed research project and the national Community Mental Health Act—the 
progressive impulses were ultimately unsuccessful.  With the massive shift in the “psy” 
professions from psychology-driven paradigms to medication-driven paradigms, the 
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twentieth-century valorization of psychological interiority may lose some of its cachet, or 
at least some of its structural support, in the twenty-first century.  But over the course of 
the second half of the twentieth century, the psychological paradigm worked to 
naturalize, reinforce, and perpetuate middle-class normativity, while simultaneously 
creating a symbolic arena in which those middle-class norms could be contested. 
33 
Chapter One. Approaches to Class in the American Social Sciences:  
Defining the Parameters 
 In 1958, sociologist August B. Hollingshead and psychiatrist Frederick C. Redlich 
published the results of a ten-year investigation into the relationship between social class 
and mental illness. Their book, Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study, 
garnered public attention, inspired scores of similar studies, and quickly became a 
foundational classic in the field.  Additionally, like so many discussions of class in the 
United States, it also sparked heated disagreement. In a library copy of the 1958 
publication, an anonymous reader used a page margin to take exception to part of the 
preface. Where the authors had written “Each class exhibits definite types of mental 
illness,” the unknown critic penned, “thanks to practitioner bias.”1 The unknown 
commentator made an important, if oversimplified, point. By 1958, a number of 
publications had noted psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ preference for patients who 
shared their middle-class assumptions, priorities, and communications styles. Similarly, a 
series of studies had acknowledged differences in diagnosis, treatment, and length of 
treatment based on class. In fact, the authors of the marked library copy of Social Class 
and Mental Illness had made the same claims, albeit in softer terms. 
 But the unknown writer was only partly correct. In addition to practitioner bias, a 
number of other factors had combined to turn the postwar psychology of the nascent 
therapeutic society into a powerful force for middle-class normativity. Those factors 
                                                
1 Hollingshead and Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study (New York: Wiley, 
1958), vii.  
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include the traditional preeminence of sociology in matters of class, and the professional 
and disciplinary forces that shaped American sociologists’ perceptions of class. Those 
traditions and perceptions included the ideal of sociology as a pure, empirical science; the 
corresponding emphasis on professional objectivity; and the resulting preference for 
quantitative, rather than qualitative, research. All of those factors tended to justify the 
existing class structure, and were for the most part adopted by psychologists when they 
turned their attention to class issues in the postwar period.  
 Psychology also introduced additional factors that facilitated middle-class 
normativity. The discipline’s inherent focus on the individual psyche as the root—and 
remedy—of psychological problems precluded awareness of cultural, political, and 
economic factors that contributed to psychological dysfunction. Also, practitioners’ 
perception of the psychological interior as a fixed, transhistorical, “natural” part of each 
human’s experience camouflaged the ways in which psychological theorists  mapped 
their own experiences, perceptions, and interiors onto their descriptions of the newly 
developing discipline. Moreover, those “created” psychological interiors were highly 
classed, as the vast majority of practitioners were from the middle classes.  
This chapter traces the factors that combined to normalize an unreflexively 
classed psychology in the postwar period. I begin with the explosion of class-based 
psychological research and writing in the postwar period, an era that, at first glance, 
would seem to be an unlikely time for an upsurge of psychological interest in social class. 
Americans remember the 1950s as a time of conformity, the Cold War, and 
McCarthyism. It was also the decade during which the United States fully embraced mass 
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consumption, leading—at least in the short term—to a generally affluent consumerist 
society. The new array of mass-produced goods, coupled with the postwar prosperity that 
raised many working-class wages, allowed those working-class consumers a middle-class 
purchasing power. As a number of scholars have noted, this elision of working- and 
middle-class consumption is one of the many factors bolstering the popular belief in 
“middle-classlessness.”2 After outlining the deluge of postwar investigations into class, I 
return to the theoretical grounding for those investigations. This chapter examines the 
ways in which sociology, and later psychology, developed as professions, and traces both 
cultural and disciplinary influences on that development. One factor that shaped both 
disciplines’ perspectives on class was the dominant cultural worldview at the time, which 
included belief in American exceptionalism and anti-Marxist sentiment. Another set of 
influences came from issues within each emerging discipline, such as the desire of both 
sociologists and psychologists to define their fields as natural sciences. Additionally, in 
sociology, recurring schisms between reformers and objectivists helped to shape the 
discipline’s view of class, as did theoretical clashes between competing macro views of 
society. Combined, these factors tended to justify the status quo, foster description and 
quantification rather than analysis, and discourage any serious investigation of 
inequalities. 
                                                
2 For an exceptionally thorough overview, see Cohen, 152-165. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number 
of sociologists claimed that the new affluence of the working classes resulted in their “embourgeoisement,” 
or identification with the middle classes and rejection of traditional working-class values and lifestyles. 
While the values shift in the embourgeoisement thesis was largely rejected in the late 1960s, the popular 
conflation of increased purchasing power and middle-class identity remained. 
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My overview of sociological approaches to class has an additional purpose. 
People’s perceptions of what class is and how it functions are more often than not 
reflections of their own class positions and experiences. A number of theorists have 
acknowledged this; as one widely-used college sociology text explains, “What Marx 
discovered was that our own thought is a product of our social circumstances and that 
much of what we believe to be reality is but a reflection of our own socially determined 
interests.”3 Sociologist Michael Grimes makes the same point with his claim that class 
inequality “is unavoidably ideological, and as a consequence, each of us approaches it 
with certain ‘taken-for-granteds’ that derive from our own unique experiences as 
incumbents of class positions.”4 One purpose of this chapter is to identify the taken-for-
granted perspectives on class position that these shapers of class theory have held.  
A Postwar Mini-Boom: The Psychology of Class 
Hollingshead and Redlich’s groundbreaking work on social class and mental 
illness was the result of a ten-year community study in New Haven, Connecticut. 
Planning began in 1948, and in 1950, the five-year-old National Institute of Mental 
Health awarded Hollingshead and Redlich a substantial research grant. For the next eight 
years, a team of more than thirty conducted a large-scale investigation, modeled after 
sociological community studies. The researchers published study findings piecemeal in 
both sociological and psychological journals as the project progressed, publishing 
                                                
3 Randall Collins and Michael Makowsky, The Discovery of Society, 3rd edition (New York: Random 
House, 1984), 6. 
4 Michael D. Grimes, Class Analysis in Twentieth-Century American Sociology: An Analysis of Theories 




twenty-five articles and producing two final books, Hollingshead and Redlich’s Social 
Class and Mental Illness and, a year later, Jerome K. Myers and Bertram H. Roberts’ 
Family and Class Dynamics in Mental Illness.5 
Both books were marketed to a non-academic audience, and Hollingshead and 
Redlich’s opening lines anticipated public reactions: “Americans prefer to avoid the two 
facts of life studied in this book: social class and mental illness. The very idea of ‘social 
class’ is inconsistent with the American ideal... .”6 While the project was not the first 
community study of social class—sociologist Lloyd Warner had completed two large-
scale and highly publicized studies on social class a decade earlier—it was the first in-
depth look at the relationship between psychology and class. Further, while Warner’s had 
ended up affirming the equity of class stratification and reinforcing the American belief 
in social mobility for the deserving, Hollingshead and Redlich were much more critical of 
the inequalities and disadvantages wrought by the class structure. While Hollingshead’s 
middle-class background was unremarkable, he had demonstrated an unusual sensitivity 
to the inequalities of class in a previous work, Elmtown’s Youth. Redlich, a native of 
Vienna who immigrated to the United States in 1938, brought a European perspective of 
class to the project. Further, he may have been personally more inclined to investigate 
below surface appearances than many of his colleagues were: raised as a Catholic, he 
discovered at the age of 24 that he had Jewish ancestors. The discovery occurred as the 
Austrian German Workers’ Party aligned itself more closely with Adolph Hitler’s Nazi 
                                                
5 Jerome K. Myers and Bertram H. Roberts, Family and Class Dynamics in Mental Illness (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1959). 
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Party, an alignment that culminated in Austria’s annexation to the German Third Reich in 
1938.7 
Despite the authors’ concerns about public reaction to Social Class and Mental 
Illness, the book was widely read, went through multiple printings, and is still cited 
today. Both book-length reports produced by the study took pains to include descriptive 
anecdotes about class stratification that would resonate with readers. Rather than relying 
on the dry, statistical proof so common to the period’s sociological work, they mentioned 
the “acid” tone of the upper-class matron who, put off by what she apparently perceived 
as the vulgarity of the researchers’ questions, sniffed, “One does not speak of classes; 
they are felt.”8 Similarly, both books included engaging descriptions of actual cases, with 
details of class position that rang true. For example, to describe a patient from the lowest 
class on the scale, Myers and Roberts quoted his therapist’s statement that the patient 
“bristled with aggression. He spit tobacco juice on the floor, swore at me, and strutted 
around like a bully.”9 
In addition to engaging their readers, both works documented significant class-
based differences in the incidence, treatment, and prognosis of mental illness. 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Hollingshead and Redlich, 3. 
7 Warner’s work is addressed at length later in this chapter; Hollingshead’s childhood class in Grimes, 74; 
August B. Hollingshead, Elmtown’s Youth: The Impact of Social Classes on Adolescents (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1949); Redlich’s background in Hans Pols, “Voices from the Past: August Hollingshead and 
Frederick Redlich--Poverty, Socioeconomic Status, and Mental Illness,” American Journal of Public 
Health 97, no. 10 (October 2007): 1755. 
8 Hollingshead and Redlich, 69. 
9 Both reports used Hollingshead’s Index of Social Position to identify class. The index relies on 
neighborhood of residence, occupation, and education to assign a class position, which is ranked from class 
I (the most prestigious) to class V; for details, see Hollingshead and Redlich, 393-397. Anecdote from 
Myers and Roberts, 229. 
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Hollingshead and Redlich found that the highest socioeconomic group was 
underrepresented among mental patients; it comprised three percent of the population, but 
only one percent of the patients. At the other extreme, the lowest socioeconomic group 
was dramatically overrepresented among patients. This group made up only 18 percent of 
the community, but accounted for 38 percent of the mental patient population.10 Further, 
once identified, the patients were treated differently based on their class positions. 
According to Hollingshead and Redlich, “There is a definite tendency to induce disturbed 
persons in classes I and II to see a psychiatrist in more gentle and ‘insightful’ ways than 
is the practice in class IV and especially class V, where direct, authoritative, compulsory, 
and, at times, coercively brutal methods are used.” Finally, treatment varied by class. 
Higher-class patients saw their therapists more often, and for longer visits, than did 
patients in the lower strata. Even more disturbingly, patients in the lower classes were 
less likely to receive psychotherapy and were more likely to be subjected to electroshock 
treatments, lobotomy, and drug therapies.11 
However, Hollingshead and Redlich pointed out that psychological professionals 
were not solely responsible for the poor fit between their profession and patients from 
disadvantaged socioeconomic positions. Psychological therapies, more than somatic 
therapies, work best when the patient is aware of the underlying problem and the 
proposed process of addressing it. Psychological work also requires a degree of active 
                                                
10 The causal direction of this correlation became a significant research question in both sociology and 
psychology, most notably in the theory of “downward drift,” which posited that an individual’s mental 
illness resulted in downward mobility. For a later overview of the debate, see Bruce G. Link, Bruce P. 
Dohrenwend and Andrew E. Skodol, “Socio-Economic Status and Schizophrenia: Noisome Occupational 
Characteristics as a Risk Factor,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (April 1986): 242-258. 
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cooperation from the patient. Among the non-middle-class patients studied, few had a 
clear understanding of the therapeutic process: “Even among the class III’s who were 
able to talk about their problems, there were some who never grasped the meaning of 
psychotherapy and hoped that ‘after all the talking’ comes ‘the treatment.’”12 Patients 
with lower socioeconomic status (SES) tended to perceive their problems as physical 
rather than emotional, and were often referred for psychological treatment after visiting a 
physician for a physical or psychosomatic problem. They tended to be more hostile to 
psychology and its practitioners than higher SES patients were, and they and their 
families generally viewed illness as something shameful. Once in treatment, low SES 
patients expected the therapist to be authoritative and tell them what to do, and were often 
frustrated when those expectations were not met. They also tended to expect the therapist 
to be emotionally warm and sympathetic, and were surprised and unhappy when this did 
not occur.13 
For their part, the seventeen psychiatrists interviewed for the study were no more 
comfortable with their low SES patients than the patients were with them. They 
disapproved of these patients’ language, vulgarity, violence, apathy, and sexual mores. 
They reported disliking class IV and V patients much more frequently than they disliked 
patients from the higher classes, and they described these patients as “a chore,” “not 
interesting or attractive,” and “worlds apart” from the therapists’ own experience.14 
                                                                                                                                            
11 For incidence rates, see Hollingshead and Redlich, 199; quote on 192; treatment differences, 275. 
12 Ibid., 339. 
13 Ibid., 340-343. 
14 Ibid., 344. 
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Hollingshead and Redlich wrote at length about their perceptions of the difference in 
“values” (their word, never fully defined) between the low-SES patients and the high-
SES psychiatrists. At moments they seem to approach a position of cultural relativity, 
such as when they point out that “[t]he patients in classes I and II strive to live according 
to values which are not too far removed from the values of the psychiatrist. These values 
are neither ‘high’ nor ‘low’; they are simply the values of the higher classes.” The 
insistence that the higher-class values are not necessarily superior to other value sets is 
unusual for both sociological and psychological work in the era. Hollingshead and 
Redlich also made the point that, since psychological therapies relied so heavily on 
middle-class ways of thinking and communicating, other approaches should be found to 
reach patients from other classes.15 
It is important to note here that while Hollingshead and Redlich foregrounded 
class differences in their report, ethnic and religious differences also undoubtedly 
contributed to the social distance between the practitioners and the patients. While this is 
never specifically addressed in terms of patient-practitioner relationships, the authors do 
describe the lower status of “persons from disapproved ethnic backgrounds—Jews, Irish, 
Italians, Greeks, Poles, and other from southern and eastern Europe” in their overview of 
the community. Additionally, they include quotes from high-status citizens disparaging 
ethnic “others,” such as “Italians just swarmed into this area” and “The Poles and Italians 
                                                
15 Ibid., 348. Hollingshead and Redlich were not the first to approach cross-class values differences this 
way; psychiatrist Charles A. P. Brown had outlined differences in cultural perspective between 
underprivileged school children and the professionals who interact with them in 1951, but I have been 
unable to find any subsequent work that cites him.  See Charles A. P. Brown, “Social Status as it Affects 
Psychotherapy,” Journal of Educational Sociology 25, no. 3 (November 1951): 164-168. 
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gave us our vicious gangs.”16 Myers and Roberts’ companion piece does describe the 
ethnic and religious backgrounds of the fifty patients selected for a more detailed case 
study, and unsurprisingly, an inverse relationship exists between class position and ethnic 
and religious diversity.17 In light of this, the modern reader must remember that class 
differences are likely to account for only part of the practitioners’ distaste for their class 
IV and V patients. 
Hollingshead and Redlich’s awareness of cultural difference, while exceptional 
for its time, had other limits as well. One particularly insightful review, though generally 
enthusiastic about the work, pointed out that the authors’ analysis of their findings still 
reflected a middle-class perspective. For example, the review authors noted that when 
Hollingshead and Redlich outlined what lower-class patients seemed to want from 
therapy, it seemed as if they wanted “less” than what the professionals wanted to give 
them. In this view, the patients wanted a quick fix, while the professionals wanted more 
meaningful change for the patients. But, the reviewers wrote,  
… quite the opposite may be happening. Rather than asking for “less” than 
he is offered, the working class and lower class patient may actually be 
asking for “more” in the sense that he wants a fuller, more extensive, and 
more permanent relationship than is possible either within the traditional 
definition of the therapeutic relation or in terms of what the therapist 
wishes to enter into.18 
 
In other words, even while trying to contextualize motivations and behaviors in 
terms of the subjects’ own priorities, even sympathetic middle-class observers such as 
                                                
16 Ibid., 72. 
17 Myers and Roberts, 44. 
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Hollingshead and Redlich are subject to misinterpretation based on their own cultural 
assumptions. In this case, they privileged the professional perspective that assumed 
current treatment models were universally valuable, and that lower-class patients’ desire 
for different types of treatment reflected either a lack of understanding or laziness. The 
reviewers, however, sociologists S. M. Miller and Elliot G. Mishler, suggested that the 
deficiency was situated in the existing model of therapy itself, not in the unwilling 
patients.  
The New Haven study had a dramatic impact on both sociology and psychology. 
In addition to bringing readers credible and engaging evidence of class inequalities, the 
work spawned scores of similar studies in both disciplines. Sociologists showed the most 
interest, and devised various instruments to correlate mental illness rates with social 
mobility, status striving, religious affiliation, and size of town, among other variables.19 
Theoretically, they continued to debate the nature-nurture controversy as well, though the 
debate tended to narrow to various possible mechanisms on the “nature” side, pitting 
proponents of social selection against proponents of “downward drift,” or the idea that 
the mental illness itself caused the patient’s downward mobility. Some sociologists 
argued that the stresses associated with a low socioeconomic status could be the 
                                                                                                                                            
18 S. M. Miller and Elliot G. Mishler, “Social Class, Mental Illness, and American Psychiatry: An 
Expository Review,” The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 37, no. 2 (April 1959): 174-199; 196. 
19 For a summary of some, but by no means all, of the research on the topic, see Robert J. Kleiner and 
Seymour Parker, “Goal-Striving, Social Status, and Mental Disorder: A Research Review,” American 
Sociological Review 28, no. 2 (April 1963): 189-203. 
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precipitating factor in mental illness; however, this view was the minority opinion until 
the mid-1980s.20 
While the psychological journals never published as much class-inflected work as 
the sociological journals did, the Hollingshead and Redlich study did inspire a number of 
psychological professionals to investigate various aspects of class within their own 
profession. Postwar psychological studies used class differences to examine treatment 
outcomes, psychotherapy, treatment duration, Rorschach and Thematic Apperception test 
results, psychosomatic illnesses, patient attrition, and a host of other issues.21 And 
increasingly, these studies concluded that, as Hollingshead and Redlich had predicted, the 
profession needed to radically re-think the way it approached non-middle-class patients. 
However, as psychologists and the sociologists they collaborated with struggled to make 
sense of the class-based variations they saw in patients, treatment, and outcome, their 
analyses continued to be limited by cultural and professional preconceptions. 
 
 
                                                
20 For a review of the literature as well as a compelling environmental argument, see Link, Dohrenwend 
and Skodol. 
21 J. Reusch, “Social Factors in Therapy,” in Psychiatric Treatment, ed. S.B. Wortis, M. Herman, and C. C. 
Hare (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Company, 1953), 59-93; Leslie Schaffer and Jerome K. Myers,  
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22 1964, NILER Box 5 Folder 12; Frank Riessman and S. M. Miller, “Social Class and Projective Tests,” 
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The first social sciences to investigate class were economics and sociology, and 
American sociologists developed the understandings of class that would influence the psy 
professionals. Sociological thought originated in nineteenth-century Europe, where three 
of the discipline’s “founding fathers”—Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim—
developed approaches to class analysis that remain central to the field. In fact, until 
recently, American sociologists’ views of class conformed either to those of the dominant 
Weberian camp, which saw stratification as multi-layered and primarily about status, or 
the much smaller Marxist camp, which identified two primary classes: an inherently 
exploitive capitalist class and an exploited proletariat.22 While Marxist theory enjoyed 
significant influence in Europe, a variety of factors inhibited its acceptance in the United 
States, while simultaneously fostering the myth of American classlessness. Those factors 
include the lack of a formal aristocracy; the resultant strength of the country’s capitalist 
class; the national rhetoric of egalitarianism; early widespread suffrage for white males; 
the “safety valve” of the frontier; the country’s bountiful resources and comparative 
prosperity; the American ideal of rugged individualism; high levels of immigration and 
resultant xenophobia that divided workforces; the American conflation of race and class; 
                                                
22 Though loyalties to both Marxian and Weberian views certainly still exist in American sociology, recent 
work by scholars such as Erik O. Wright moves toward a synthesis of the two perspectives. See Wright, 
“The Shadow of Exploitation in Weber’s Class Analysis,” American Sociological Review 67, no. 6 
(December 2002): 832-853; Classes (London: Verso, 1985); and The Debate on Classes (London: Verso, 
1990). Also see Grimes, 209-211. 
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and America’s pioneering development of a consumer culture that seemed to either 
mitigate or camouflage the inequalities of class.23   
Despite most Americans’ antipathy to Marxian analysis, other ideas that were 
loosely categorized as “social science” found fertile soil in the States. The reform 
movements of the mid-1800s fostered a belief that perfecting human environments could 
perfect human beings, creating hopes that a science of social phenomena could provide 
knowledge that would correct moral imperfections. Beginning in 1869, university courses 
with titles such as “social science,” “sociology,” “the philosophy of social relations,” 
“science of society,” and “progress of society” found their way into campuses around the 
country.24 And while sociology had begun its theoretical development in Europe, the 
world’s first academic department of sociology was established at the University of 
Chicago in 1892; aside from Durkheim’s former school, the University of Bordeaux, 
European universities did not teach the subject.  
 The early American sociologists built on Auguste Comte’s belief that human 
relations, like the natural sciences, were subject to invariable and specific “laws,” and 
that a true science of human behavior would be developed. In the words of historian 
Dorothy Ross, they believed that sociology “was to be a science of the laws of history, 
                                                
23 See Denning, “The Special American Conditions”; Cohen; Vanneman and Cannon; Lauter, From 
Walden Pond to Jurassic Park; and Jerome Karabel, “The Failure of American Socialism Reconsidered,” 
The Socialist Register 16 (1979): 204-227. 
24 J. Graham Morgan, “Preparation for the Advent: The Establishment of Sociology as a Discipline in 




hence the laws that governed the progress of civilization.”25 Two factors intensified this 
self-identification with the physical sciences in the late nineteenth century: first, the 
period’s “culture of professionalization” led sociologists to align themselves with the 
unquestioned objectivity and clear standards of practice associated with physical science. 
Second, amid the intensified class conflicts of the Gilded Age, and with a view toward 
protecting their own status as professionals, academic sociologists were increasingly 
motivated to differentiate themselves from socialists and other radicals who called 
themselves “social scientists.”26 
But the post-Civil War period had been fraught with a degree of class antagonism 
that was new to the United States; before sociology was a field of study, social observers 
recognized that the country’s industrialization had created a permanent class of wage 
laborers, along with capitalist exploitation, labor unrest, and fears of European-style class 
conflict. A number of nineteenth-century social scientists, particularly historical 
economists, became sympathetic to socialist agendas, but their privileged class identities 
and professional aspirations could not withstand the anti-radical backlash from the 1886 
Haymarket riot. Leading economic scholars reconsidered their positions on socialism, 
undoubtedly impacting the perspectives of theorists in the developing sister field of 
sociology.27  
                                                
25 Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
85. 
26 On professionalization, see Mark C. Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over 
Objectivity and Purpose 1918-1941 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), chapter 1. Fear of 
conflation with radicalism is addressed in Smith, chapter 1, and Ross, chapter 4. 
27 Many of the new sociologists, in fact, were initially trained as economists. For a compelling description 
of what she calls “The Threat of Socialism in Economics and Sociology,” see Ross, chapter 4. Grimes also 
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In addition, many of the newly professionalizing universities actively discouraged 
ideas that were too “progressive.”28 Lester Frank Ward, considered a founding father of 
American sociology, found it necessary to caution a nephew who had accepted an 
appointment at Cornell. Citing an economist who had been fired from the university for 
his “advanced” views, which apparently consisted of sympathy for labor’s perspective, 
Ward wrote, “I hope you will find Cornell in all respects satisfactory, but I have some 
slight misgivings lest you may find your liberty of thought and speech somewhat 
restricted there.”29 Similarly, Albion Woodbury Small, the first chair of the sociology 
department at the University of Chicago, faced university pressures that tempered his 
work. Small, a Baptist minister and social gospel reformer, wrote in a 1894 textbook that 
socialism had “mercilessly exposed social evils,” though he acknowledged that it had 
been less effective in correcting them. Even such qualified praise of socialism was 
politically unacceptable for the times, however, and Small felt pressure to temper his 
activism. He acknowledged his retreat to a colleague, saying “although I hope to take up 
reform movements years hence, I am now going off in my lectures into transcendental 
philosophy so as to be as far as possible from these reform movements and thus establish 
the scientific character of my department.”30 
                                                                                                                                            
acknowledges that pre-1930s sociology borrowed heavily from the theories and methods of both 
economists and anthropologists; p. 10. 
28 See Mary O. Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social 
Science, 1865-1905 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1975), especially chapters 7-9. 
29 Ward to E. A. Ross, personal correspondence of April 23, 1892, cited in Bernhard J. Stern. “The Ward-
Ross Correspondence 1891-1896,” American Sociological Review 3, no. 3 (June 1938): 362-401. Quote on 
372. 
30 Edward A. Bemis to Richard Ely, personal correspondence of January 12, 1895, quoted in Ross, 133. 
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Most remaining sparks of socialist activism in sociology, as in other social 
sciences, were doused with the left’s defeat in the 1896 presidential election. That contest 
had forged a radical coalition of laborers, farmers, and “free silver” foes of Eastern 
financial interests. The coalition was substantial enough to ignite fears of social 
revolution among contemporaries. But William Jennings Bryan, the nominee of both the 
Democratic and Populist parties, lost to William McKinley, and that defeat sounded a 
death knell to the era’s radicalism. In the later Whiggish histories that sociologists 
constructed for themselves, early socialist sympathies simply didn’t register. By 1940, 
when sociologist Charles Page published his compilation on sociology and class—the 
first of its kind—he could claim that the leading pioneers of American sociology were 
aware of class issues, but their treatment of those issues “were, in the final analysis, 
highly colored by the ‘classlessness’ of the American scene.”31  
 Then, famously, the maverick University of Chicago economist Thorstein Veblen 
challenged that classlessness in 1899 with the publication of his now-classic The Theory 
of the Leisure Class; however, even that tour de force failed to convince most 
sociologists that class was rightfully a central issue in their field.  In Veblen’s view, 
American society was ruled by a “leisure class,” a wealthy elite that continually 
reaffirmed its status through demonstrations of conspicuous leisure. This was possible 
because the members of this elite had no economic need to work, and because they had 
the resources to indulge in what Veblen called “conspicuous consumption.”  He was 
                                                




among the first to describe the now-commonsense connection between consumption and 
groups’ attempts to maintain and demonstrate their place in the social hierarchy. Veblen’s 
work, which was read far beyond academia, insisted that class stratification was 
inherently comparative and competitive. This view of economic behavior as jockeying 
for position flew in the face of mainstream economic thought, which held that economic 
activity was motivated by the rational desire of the individual to accumulate wealth for 
utilitarian purposes.32  
While Veblen was no Marxist—his perspective was much more aligned with 
Weber’s emphasis on status—he did agree with Marx’s critique of capitalist exploitation: 
“There is no system of economic theory more logical than that of Marx.”33 However, 
Veblen was unconvinced by Marx’s historical materialism, and believed neither in the 
inevitability of class revolution nor that such a revolution could promise a utopian, 
classless society. By 1906, he noted that socialist union members were modifying Marx’s 
theory of class struggle, and he anticipated the possibility of exploitive hierarchies in 
ostensibly socialist and communist economic systems, if those systems were based on 
mechanized industry. Veblen also differed with Marx about the centrality of economic 
motivations in capitalist behavior, because for Veblen, the desire for power, not capital, 
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was at the root of exploitation. Not surprisingly, Marxists disliked Veblen’s work in turn, 
finding it not political.34  
Despite its popular acclaim, Veblen’s work has not had the impact on mainstream 
sociology that one might imagine. He coined and popularized now-familiar terms such as 
the “leisure class” and “conspicuous consumption,” and he broke new ground in both 
economic theory and sociology, but his academic colleagues have been, for the most part, 
slow to acknowledge his import. Further, the scholars who have been the most influenced 
by Veblen, such as Robert and Helen Lynd and C. Wright Mills, have also tended to be 
outside the mainstream of sociological thought.  Mainstream sociology, bound by its 
perceptions of scientific neutrality, professionalism, and American exceptionalism, could 
not embrace a serious analysis of class dominance, even in the assiduously apolitical 
form Veblen developed. Four decades later, sociologist Charles Hunt Page’s pioneering 
1940 overview of class in American sociology would note that Veblen’s work, though 
widely known, “led directly to no major schools of class research or theory.” In fact, Page 
continued, the topic had been so undervalued in sociology that “to many Americans, 
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including some professors of sociology, native class theory began and ended with 
Thorstein Veblen.”35  
 Beginnings: Psychology 
The word “psychology” has been used to describe the science of the soul or the 
science of mental life since the sixteenth century, yet the concept remained wedded to the 
field of philosophy for the next three hundred years. In the late 1800s, a “new 
psychology” took shape, so named to clearly differentiate it from the older mental and 
moral philosophies and to emphasize its scientism. Steeped in the era’s post-Darwinian 
enthusiasm for the physical sciences, theorists interested in the processes of the mind 
turned increasingly toward empiricism. In 1879, the German physician Wilhelm Wundt 
established the world’s first psychology laboratory to investigate the “inner experience” 
of sensation and perception. Four years later, a former student of Wundt’s—G. Stanley 
Hall—instituted the first American psychology lab at Johns Hopkins University. By 
1890, there were fifteen experimental psychology laboratories worldwide; within the next 
ten years, that number quadrupled. While labs were opened around Europe (and even in 
Japan), most of the new facilities were in Germany and the United States.36 
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While the discipline’s older, celebratory histories cite the empiricists as the field’s 
sole founders, recent cultural theorists have identified a second early influence. They 
argue that late 19th century enthusiasm for a series of mental healing movements laid the 
foundations for the incredible growth of American psychology in the next century. 
Although mainstream psychologists almost unanimously rejected these popular therapies, 
mental healing established a precedent for public acceptance of both non-somatic cures 
and of talk therapy. The mid-nineteenth century popularity of mesmerism and phrenology 
set the stage for widespread religion-based mental healing movements such as “mind 
cure,” which evolved into the New Thought movement, and then the church-based 
Emmanuel Movement. Though these practices and philosophies were not identical, they 
all shared the belief that illness, particularly emotional illness, was the result of incorrect 
perception or personal and spiritual inadequacies. Further, they shared the perception that 
these imbalances could be corrected by mental, not physical, processes.37 
Most cultural histories locate the origins of the mind cure phenomenon in the 
work of Phineas Pankhurst Quimby, who pioneered a form of talk therapy in Maine 
between 1859 and 1866. Though an interest in mesmerism introduced Quimby to non-
somatic therapies in the late 1830s, over the next two decades he rejected mesmerism and 
spiritualism as he developed his own “science” of what he called “mental therapeutics.”   
He insisted that unhappiness, mental instability, and physical disease of all kinds were 
caused by “false ideas” and “ignorance of ourselves,” problems which he purported to 
correct by talking one-on-one with patients. One of his patients, a woman with a long 
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history of various infirmities, was so impressed with the effectiveness of his approach 
that she published praises to him in the local newspaper. The patient, Mary Baker Eddy, 
went on to develop her own philosophy of mind cure and to found the Christian Science 
movement in 1879.38 
 The various popular mind-cure therapies indicate that broad swaths of the public 
rejected the reductionist scientificism embraced by much of that era’s medical profession. 
More importantly, several historians argue that these popular approaches to cure pushed 
an unwilling medical community to take the mental components of nervous disease and 
recovery much more seriously. Through the nineteenth century, most theorists and 
researchers of the new psychology strove to establish their field as a credible science. 
Luminaries such as John Dewey and early American Psychological Association president 
James McKeen Cattell clearly distanced themselves from metaphysics and folk practices 
while seeking to align their discipline with the hard sciences. Even William James, who 
had more sympathy for popular mind cure therapies than the vast majority of his 
colleagues, argued that psychology was a natural science. However, James was critical of 
what he saw as the minutia of the German-influenced empiricism, and unlike Wundt and 
his followers, believed that psychology should draw on both the natural sciences and the 
humanities.39 
As the new theorists of psychology worked to define their discipline at the end of 
the Victorian era, its elite practitioners unreflexively incorporated their own class 
perspectives and assumptions into their theories. The case of neurasthenia provides an 
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excellent example. Neurologist George Beard helped to popularize the condition of 
neurasthenia, or nervous exhaustion, in the 1880s. Beard and his colleagues attributed the 
rise of this malady to an increasingly competitive and stressful civilization, noting that 
the condition disproportionately afflicted the “comfortable classes.” According to one 
historian, the disorder became something of a badge of status. The outpouring of 
literature on neurasthenia emphasized the fact that its sufferers tended to be professionals 
and wealthy patients, and attributed their symptoms to excessive mental work and strain. 
The result was that, according to Eric Caplan, “[t]he explicitly class-conscious rhetoric 
employed by Beard and others did far more than destigmatize nervousness and anxiety. It 
made them seem virtuous.”40 
Another modern observer of the neurasthenia wave has identified a slightly 
different, but complimentary, phenomenon. Although most neurasthenia patients were 
initially from the higher classes, as the diagnosis received more publicity, patient 
demographics diversified. By the early 1900s, a number of published case studies 
identified working-class men as neurasthenics. However, physicians tended to attribute 
different causes to the disorder, based on the patient’s socioeconomic class. Professional 
men who developed neurasthenia were believed to suffer from overwork; in contrast, 
working-class men with the disorder were thought to have overindulged in alcohol, drugs, 
or sex. Clearly, turn-of-the-century psychological professionals were largely unaware of 
how their own class positions and assumptions affected their perceptions of patients.41 
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The academic discipline of psychology, unheard of before Wundt established his 
laboratory in 1879, grew rapidly at the turn of the century. Johns Hopkins granted the 
first American Ph.D. in psychology in 1886; the next year, the American Journal of 
Psychology debuted as the country’s first scholarly journal in the field, followed over the 
next several years by the Psychological Review, Psychological Monographs, and the 
Psychological Bulletin. In 1892, G. Stanley Hall founded the American Psychological 
Association (APA) with twenty-six original members. Six years later, APA membership 
had grown to 127, despite the association’s refusal to admit amateurs. By 1904, sixty-two 
American colleges listed at least three psychology courses in each of their curricula.42 
Intelligence Testing 
As American psychology grew in the early twentieth century, it continued to 
develop in ways that reinforced middle-class values and aligned psychology with 
business interests. Part of this phenomenon was an indirect result of the psychologists’ 
desire to be perceived as hard scientists, and their corresponding emphasis on 
experimental psychology; this orientation fostered the same value neutrality that 
distanced sociologists from sociopolitical analyses, while also focusing psychologists’ 
attention on discrete, easily observable phenomena. Additionally, the discipline’s early 
work in intelligence testing was developed within certain unexamined class assumptions, 
which subsequently contributed to the classed nature of the discipline,  
Kurt Danziger, noted for historicizing psychological ideas, describes how the 
concept of “intelligence” as a hierarchical gradation of performance developed as a result 
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of new demands on the educational system during the industrialization of the late 
nineteenth century. The need to standardize work, specialize tasks, evaluate output in 
quantitative terms, and instill new discipline on the workforce all led to a more formal, 
standardized, and quantifiable approach to education. At the same time, the new 
compulsory education laws that spread throughout the states from the mid-1800s through 
the turn of the century brought previously unserved populations into the schoolroom. All 
of these pressures exacerbated existing problems in the education system, and while a 
handful of reformers called for change in the system itself, most educators, along with 
most psychologists, focused on maximizing the efficiency of the existing system. One 
way in which they hoped to accomplish this was by more precisely evaluating which 
students were unlikely to benefit from education in the regular classroom. Early applied 
psychologists hoped that they could develop measurements of intelligence that could do 
just that.43   
But, as contemporary critics of intelligence testing have pointed out, the tests 
themselves were developed operationally. Theorists, both in the early twentieth century 
and today, have been unable to develop a satisfactory definition of intelligence, so early 
efforts to devise tests that could predict or assess “intelligence” were fruitless. In 1905, 
attempting to develop an evaluative test for Paris schools, Alfred Binet was finally able to 
construct the first working intelligence test, but he acknowledged that his instrument did 
not truly measure the constellation of qualities typically meant by the term “intelligence.” 
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Binet insisted that intelligence was too multifaceted a concept to measure accurately with 
a single scale. However, to achieve the goal of identifying students who would be unable 
to benefit from the traditional classroom, Binet designed his test such that a given 
student’s test results would correlate with teachers’ evaluations of that student’s 
“intelligence.” In this, Binet’s test proved effective.44  
On this side of the Atlantic, however, American psychologists, particularly those 
influenced by the social Darwinist, hereditarian arguments popularized by Francis 
Galton, embraced the test as measuring a single, stable, innate characteristic, despite 
Binet’s insistence that it did not. Further, they perceived this single characteristic of 
“intelligence” as being very much like the social Darwinist idea of “fitness.” In this view, 
life was a continual test at which only the most capable would succeed; school was an 
arena in which this continual life test could be easily observed.45 In describing how 
educational psychologists diverged from what he calls the “social point of view” shared 
by most educational reformers in the early twentieth century, education scholar Robert L. 
Church argues that “educational psychologists seemed the least optimistic, the least  
reformist of the educators of that period.” 46  
It is important to remember the conditions which predisposed turn-of-the-century 
psychologists toward social Darwinism and away from reform: the idea of biologically 
inherited mental fitness dovetailed with psychologists’ belief that they were indeed 
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developing a hard science; the precision of quantitative testing was appealing for the 
same reason. Additionally, there was a significant stigma attached to being an “applied” 
scientist; Wundt had insisted that the development of a pure science of psychology would 
take a hundred years of gathering data before it would be appropriate to apply the 
information to real-world situations, As a result, especially after 1905, many educational 
psychologists referred to their work as “experimental pedagogy,” focusing on the 
information-gathering aspects of their activities rather than any possible applications. 
With this focus, the amateur-inflected taint of reform could be avoided. Finally, despite 
the stigma of applied work, the real-world demands for mental testing in the fields of 
education, business, and later, the military, allowed practitioners of the fledgling 
profession to demonstrate their expertise to leaders of those fields as they worked to 
establish disciplinary legitimacy.47  
Regardless of what it may have signified to early psychometricians, intelligence 
testing both reflects and reinforces class-based assumptions. While some historians of 
early psychometrics argue that intelligence testing offered an unprecedentedly 
meritocratic means of identifying worth, unrelated to family or status, that is a distinctly 
minority view.48 More often—and more convincingly—evidence demonstrates the deeply 
elitist perspectives of early psychological professionals. Psychologist Robert Yerkes 
insisted that “[s]cience leaves no ground for the denial of human inequality.”49 In his 
view, socioeconomic classes were a natural and appropriate reflection of unequal 
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physical and intellectual attributes. Psychiatrist Elmer Ernest Southard agreed, but 
thought that the sheer numbers of mental defectives would inevitably end the “quite 
unfounded” American belief in egalitarianism. These men’s views were not exceptional, 
but rather representative of their field.50  
Eugenics 
Not surprisingly, intelligence testing was enthusiastically adopted by the 
eugenicist movement, which developed in the United States as a classist and racist 
attempt to “purify” American stock. The British gentleman-scientist Francis Galton, a 
cousin of Charles Darwin and the man who coined the term “eugenics,” had a much more 
significant impact in the United States than in his own country. Galton insisted that 
heredity was overwhelmingly more important than environment in determining 
intelligence. As a result, he proposed social engineering to expand the stock of “superior” 
genes—in his view, genes from more educated, higher-class, Caucasian individuals—and 
to limit the reproduction of “inferior” genes—those from less educated, poorer, and non-
Caucasian people. Galton’s ideas resonated with social Darwinists, and the fact that his 
arguments were developed in biological terms appealed to American psychologists’ 
predilection for hard science. Further, the American public was already concerned about 
degeneration of the American “stock”; President Theodore Roosevelt had popularized the 
idea of  “race suicide,” a phrase coined by the sociologist Edward Ross to describe the 
idea that white, educated, native-born Americans were experiencing declining birthrates 
at the same time that immigrants, minorities, and other “undesirables” were procreating 
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rapidly. While most contemporary accounts emphasize the racist nature of eugenics, it is 
important to remember its classed nature as well. 51 
The most broadly popularized eugenic study exemplifies the classist nature of the 
field. In 1912, psychologist Henry H. Goddard published The Kallikak Family: A Study in 
the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness.52 Goddard traced two very different lines of a single 
family tree from a Revolutionary War veteran he called Martin “Kallikak,” a fictitious 
name he created from a hybrid of the Greek words for “good” and “bad.” One side of the 
family tree descended from Kallikak and his wife, a “respectable girl of a good family.”53 
Generations later, these members of the Kallikak clan were successful, prominent 
citizens. However, Kallikak had, in his youth, sired a child with a “feeble-minded” 
barmaid, and the descendents of Kallikak’s illegitimate child were plagued with mental 
deficiencies, immorality, promiscuity, epilepsy, poverty, criminality, and poor health.  
Goddard claimed that the differences documented in this case study proved the 
hereditary nature of feeblemindedness, pauperism, and vice. The book was extremely 
well received, both among the public and other psychologists; it went through several 
printings and was cited in positive terms in many psychology textbooks.54 The early 
psychological community, convinced that complex social problems were genetic, and, in 
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historian Eva Moskowitz’s words, “[u]tterly blind to the realities of class,” 
enthusiastically promoted eugenics: early APA president James McKeen Cattell, Harvard 
psychologist Robert Yerkes, turn-of-the-century dean of educational psychology Edward 
L. Thorndike, Harvard psychiatrist Elmer Ernest Southard, 1912 American Medico-
Psychological Association president Hubert Work, and prominent psychiatrist and 
neurologist Pierce Bailey all advocated various strategies of population engineering to 
stem what they saw as the exponential growth of undesirable citizens.55 
While the United States was certainly not the only country in which eugenic ideas 
gained prominence, it did see a deeper entrenchment of “negative” eugenics than did 
most European countries. While proponents of “positive” eugenics believed that they 
could engineer a better world by populating it with more “fit” individuals, negative social 
engineering—active attempts to decrease the population of the “unfit”—also made great 
strides in this country, unfettered as it was by the types of national legislation that 
protected individuals from surgical sterilization in most European countries. By the time 
the first state—Indiana—passed legislation specifically permitting eugenic sterilization in 
1907, one of its reformatory physicians had already sterilized 206 inmates, and had urged 
the governor to “insist upon the General Assembly passing such a law or laws as will 
provide this as a means of preventing procreation in the defective and degenerate 
classes.” Over the next quarter century, twenty-nine more states adopted compulsory 
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sterilization laws. By the time the eugenics movement fragmented in the face of Hitler’s 
horrors, roughly 20,000 “unfit” had been sterilized. Often, poverty or poor education—a 
correlate of poverty—were the only “genetic” reasons given for sterilization.56 
The Influence of World War I 
Psychologists, still anxious to establish the legitimacy of their profession, were 
eager to offer their expertise to the government in World War I. While psychology’s 
foray into the national sphere during the Great War was hardly an unqualified success, it 
did establish a precedent of involvement that the profession would build on. It also 
provides modern observers with examples of the continuing class assumptions of the 
profession. Two days after Congress declared war, then-president of the APA, Harvard 
psychologist Robert Yerkes, established twelve committees to develop psychology’s 
roles in the war effort. While Yerkes couched his call to action in the most patriotic of 
terms, some of his colleagues believed that Yerkes’ real purpose had more to do with 
conducting a large-scale experiment of intelligence testing than with providing useful 
service to the military. Apparently, a number of military officers shared that concern.57   
Only two of the original twelve committee programs panned out: Yerkes’ 
committee revised the standard intelligence test to create the first group intelligence test, 
eventually administering it to 1.7 million recruits during the course of the war. The other 
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successful committee developed a separate psychological testing program to evaluate 
aptitude for different military vocations and tasks, including artillerymen, officers, and 
aircraft pilots. These aptitude tests were used to screen 3.5 million men. However, the 
work of both groups met with stiff resistance from old-school military officers. They 
resented civilian interference in traditionally military decisions about assignments and 
promotions; they were also impatient with a formal testing instrument that tended to 
agree with officers’ own assessments of their men. In the words of the commander of 
Fort Dix, he needed psychologists to evaluate his men as much as he needed “a board of 
art critics to advise me which of my men were the most handsome.” The choice of 
comparison must have particularly rankled the science-minded psychologists, but was 
likely an accurate assessment of how they were perceived by established military men: 
overintellectualized and effete.58 
One persistent area of disagreement between the psychologists and the military 
leaders involved the meaning and worth of the concept of “intelligence.” While the 
tests—and the psychologists developing them—valued those with scholastic skills, 
military commanders had other priorities. One noted that a draftee in his unit who had 
received a “D” rating on the intelligence test (on a scale of A-E, with E being least 
intelligent) was “a model of loyalty, reliability, cheerfulness, and the spirit of serene and 
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general helpfulness. … What do we care about his ‘intelligence’?”59 The officers’ 
objections anticipated those of later twentieth-century critics who exposed the classed, 
raced, and culture-based nature of instruments that were purported to be measures of 
“native intelligence.” But of course, the psychologists did care about “intelligence”: they 
were academicians, after all. Further, they cared about intelligence because intelligence 
was what their tests could measure, and they struggled to convince military officials that 
the information they could provide would be helpful. 
In the final analysis, skeptical military officials blocked psychologists from 
maintaining any real influence in the armed forces after the war. Psychologists’ 
contributions were acknowledged in 1918 when General Order no. 74 officially 
recognized the Psychological Division, but the same order subordinated psychological 
examiners under the command of post surgeons, a tactical loss that the psychologists had 
hoped to avoid. A later ruling specifically assigned medical practitioners, not 
psychologists, the ability to eliminate mental defectives from military service. On the 
other hand, the profession won clear gains from the war as well: intelligence testing 
expanded exponentially, becoming an essential tool for public schools, university 
admissions systems, and business. Clinical psychology, the practice of therapeutic work 
with patients, expanded from its original focus on children and learning to include adults 
and psychological difficulties, particularly in veterans’ hospitals.  The field that would 
come to be known as industrial-organizational psychology received an enormous boost 
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from the development of standardized testing during the war. Additionally, 
psychologists’ wartime service enhanced the credibility of the profession, both with the 
public and with members of other disciplines.60  
The 1920s afforded psychology a prominent place in the popular culture of the 
educated classes. Psychology seemed new, scientific, sophisticated, and slightly racy, 
with its emphasis on sexuality and the unconscious. It stepped decisively into the public 
sphere as fodder for magazine articles and cocktail party banter. Additionally, as the self 
came to be defined by “personality” rather than character, psychologists were well 
positioned to provide instruction.61 Ph.D. programs in psychology expanded, as did the 
number of graduates, many of whom went back to work in those same programs. The 
discipline also developed a significant presence in the business arena as applied 
psychologists pioneered industrial-organizational psychology.62 All of these 
developments, however, underscored psychology’s elite status and, as detailed further in 
chapter two, its affiliation with the managerial classes. 
Interwar Sociology and Community Studies: Middletown 
Progressive Era reformers developed the community study as a vehicle for urban 
reform. In what came to be known as the social survey movement, more than 3,000 
community studies were conducted between the turn of the century and the 1930s. But 
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until 1929, the studies had a parochial, preaching note; they tended to be written for town 
leaders, whose support the researchers generally cultivated; and their reports clearly 
described what the researchers felt sure should be done.63 However, beginning in 1929 
with the publication of Robert and Helen Merrill Lynd’s Middletown: A Study in Modern 
American Culture, a new type of community earned legitimacy in the social sciences. 
Typically borrowing the detached, analytical stance of the anthropologist, the new 
community studies attempted to describe taken-for-granted details and patterns of daily 
life as if from a stranger’s perspective. This flurry of studies, popular from 1929 through 
the 1940s, examined all aspects of the ways an individual community functioned. These 
heavily publicized research projects drew new attention to the concept of socioeconomic 
stratification in the United States. 
The first major American analysis of social class divisions was the Lynds’ 
anthropologically influenced investigation of “Middletown,” their fictional name for 
Muncie, Indiana. However, class was not what they had set out to examine. Robert Lynd 
was neither an anthropologist nor a sociologist, but rather a theologian whose graduate 
training consisted of a couple of exchange courses he was able to take at Columbia 
University while enrolled at Union Theological Seminary. Despite his lack of formal 
training in either sociology or class analysis, though, Lynd did bring an important asset to 
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his fieldwork: that intangible perspective that Grimes called our “unique experiences as 
incumbents of class positions.”64 
Two experiences in particular seem to have shaped Lynd’s outlook on class. 
According to his son, Lynd’s background was modest; he was the first of his family 
members to attend college, and when he did, “he went to Princeton, the snobbery of 
which left permanent scars.”65 In addition, Lynd’s class perspective was clarified when 
he took a summer preaching internship at an impoverished oil camp in Wyoming. The 
Rockefeller family held a controlling interest in the camp, and the contrast between the 
grinding poverty of the inhabitants and the profit-driven callousness of the owners 
changed the course of Lynd’s life. He left the ministry and became a social scientist and 
writer, eventually receiving a grant from the Institute of Social and Religious Research to 
study Protestant churches in a small community. However, the Lynds came to believe 
that the only way to understand the role of the church would be to understand the entire 
community. Applying the objectivist perspective of anthropology to a community studies 
model, the Lynds expanded their project to examine all aspects of Muncie’s culture.66  
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While community studies were nothing new, the Middletown project did break 
new ground in several ways; as a community study, it took an objectivist, scientific 
approach rather than the progressive, “uplifting” approach common to community studies 
of the day. It was also the first to detail the impact of modernization on all aspects of 
people’s lives. Most importantly, it was also the first to document the centrality of class 
position to modern American life. Robert Lynd had been heavily influenced by Veblen’s 
work, as well as by his desire for social justice and his experience in the Wyoming oil 
camp; and as a result, a sensitivity to class differences informed his analysis from the 
beginning.67 
Although the Lynds’ class analysis may seem simplistic to modern observers, 
since it identifies only two broad classes (the business and working classes), that analysis 
clearly—even bluntly—emphasizes the importance of class:  
[I]t is after all this division into working class and business class that constitutes 
the outstanding cleavage in Middletown. The mere fact of being born upon one 
side or the other of the watershed roughly formed by these two groups is the most 
significant single cultural factor tending to influence what one does all day long 
throughout one’s life; whom one marries; when one gets up in the morning; 
whether one belongs to the Holy Roller or Presbyterian church; or drives a Ford 
or a Buick; whether or not one’s daughter makes the desirable high school violet 
club; … and so on indefinitely throughout the daily comings and goings of a 
Middletown man, woman, or child.68 
 
 And, in fact, a great deal of the 550-page volume delineates the “outstanding 
cleavage” between the lives of the working class and the business class. Every aspect of 
life reflects this schism, from the age at which males begin working for pay (14 to 18 for 
                                                
67 For Veblen’s influence on Lynd, see Smith, 133-134. 
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the working class, 18-22 for the business class) to the time of morning that an employee 
must be at work, the length of the working day, prospects for retirement, types and 
amount of leisure, and prospects for children’s education. In addition, the Lynds 
emphasize the economic, systemic, and structural conditions that constrain the life 
chances of the working class, apparently in an attempt to refute “the traditional social 
philosophy [which] assumes that each person has a large degree of freedom to climb the 
ladder to ever wider responsibility, independence, and money income.”69 
The incisiveness of the Lynds’ community study made the book a best seller and 
won Robert Lynd a professorship in sociology at Columbia University in 1931. However, 
even scholars who applauded the Lynds’ approach seemed reluctant to describe it with 
the language of “class,” a word with disturbingly politicized connotations. As Leonard 
Reissman, a mid-century sociologist, explained, “Marx succeeded in giving class a 
revolutionary connotation and identifying it almost completely with his theory and its 
politics. In that form, ‘class’ became synonymous with ‘revolution’ and ‘radicalism.’”70 
As a result, many social scientists avoided the word, as did the political scientist who 
lionized Robert Lynd for thirteen pages for his “concentration on power,” his “power 
analysis,” and his “commitment to power,” presumably facilitated by the clear view 
afforded by what this commentator called Lynd’s “power glasses.” While the modern 
reader may find the image of power glasses amusing, the odd image underscores the 
                                                
69 Ibid., 65. 
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convolutions undertaken by many mid-century scholars to avoid the Marxist connotations 
associated with existing descriptions of class.71  
Despite Middletown’s popular acclaim, the Lynds’ work was largely ignored by 
sociologists, and the Lynds themselves were dubbed “untheoretical.” This professional 
disapproval could have stemmed from a variety of factors, including the Lynds’ focus on 
class, their “outsider” status in academia, and quite possibly because of their work’s 
popular acclaim among the general public, Paradoxically, the fact that Middletown was 
published at the onset of the Great Depression may partly explain its enthusiastic public 
reception as well as its sociological marginalization. While a credible, accessible 
description of class differences apparently resonated with the American public in the 
midst of bread lines and Hoovervilles, sociologists distanced themselves from the 
country’s crisis.72  
In a recent history, sociologist Charles Camic details how early in the Depression, 
sociologists—disappointed with the abrupt constriction of the growth their discipline had 
experienced in the 1920s, bitter about the prominence of economists and political 
scientists as public arbiters of the crisis, and stubbornly clinging to a self-image of 
objective scientificism—simply ignored the Depression.73 In December 1929, less than 
two full months after the crash, ASA president William F. Ogburn insisted that 
“sociology as a science is not interested in making the world a better place to live…or in 
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guiding the ship of state.”74 Most sociologists seemed to agree. While other disciplines 
such as economics, political science, and social work produced Depression-related work 
early in the financial crisis, sociology was strangely silent on the subject until the mid-
1930s. As Camic emphasizes, “before 1934 nothing about the Depression—not its causes, 
its diverse ramifications, nor any other aspect of it—roused the interest of sociologists as a 
topic for academic investigation or as an entry point into policy discussions. ”75 
Sociologists remained certain that their discipline’s future depended on rigorous 
scientificism, not what they perceived as reformist partisanship. 
American Sociology’s Dominant Paradigm: Functionalism 
 The scientific model also corresponded closely to one of Emile Durkheim’s 
lasting contributions to sociological theory, his conception of society as functioning like a 
biological organism. As might be imagined, this is far from a perfect analogy, and the 
biological model of society has been discredited. However, during its dominance, it 
fostered a view of society that deemphasized conflict between groups, and consequently 
minimized the importance of class. From this perspective, all parts of society function 
together to ensure the smooth continuance of the organism, striving for equilibrium. 
Because of this emphasis on equilibrium, Durkheim saw social institutions as positive 
forces, serving to promote the interests of the society as a whole.76  
Beginning in the 1930s, prominent Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons developed 
a theory that combined Durkheim’s social organism with Freud’s superego and its role in 
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socialization. The result was the contemporary concept of functionalism, which reigned 
as the dominant sociological paradigm into the early 1960s. Functionalism’s premise is 
that, since the whole society functions as if it were a biological organism, all parts of that 
society work together for the collective good; not just various groups, but society’s 
institutions, its norms, and its rules all have a positive function, and all work together for 
the greater good of the whole. This emphasis on the interdependence of different groups 
rather than competition between them tends to support the status quo. Similarly, the 
functionalist vision of society assumes that conflict, rather than being the inevitable 
outcome of struggles for shares of prestige, resources, etc., is instead the result of 
deviance. As a result, this perspective legitimized the myth of American classlessness.77 
We can see how functionalists naturalize obvious stratification by making it seem 
like the just outcome of natural processes. In 1949, sociologist Robert E. Clark attempted 
to describe why some parts of a city were worse than others: “Most of the differences in 
composition of the populations of ecological areas [parts of the city] are traditionally 
related to the fundamental process of competition which is, for the most part, economic 
competition. Through competition, different types of persons become segregated.” This 
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functionalist description claims that economic and social inequalities are the result of  
“competition,” much in the same way social Darwinist thought did.78 
From the 1940s into the early 1960s, Parsons was the dean of the field, and 
functionalism was synonymous with sociology. In fact, the functionalist worldview was 
so pervasive in sociology that the perspective was not seen as an orientation, but rather as 
objective, scientific “truth.” Functionalism was similar in perspective to the consensus 
view of history that also dominated its discipline in this period; in fact, some observers 
refer to mid-century functionalism as the “consensus school” of sociology. And like 
consensus history, functionalism both reflected and helped to shape the conformist, 
consensus-oriented views of the postwar era. Parsons was stridently anti-Marxist, and a 
number of later observers have argued that Parsons’ functionalist theory was an explicit 
response to Marxism, providing “the only way professionals within American sociology 
could tolerably deal with big issues without being dismissed to Marxian marginalia.”79  
A Functionalist Community Study: Yankee City 
The next major sociological study of American class after Middletown also came 
from an investigator trained in another field. In 1930, anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner 
began fieldwork for his Yankee City series, a large-scale community study of 
Newburyport, Massachusetts that consumed the efforts of roughly 30 researchers and 
                                                
78 Robert E.  Clark, “Psychoses, Income, and Occupational Prestige,” American Journal of Sociology 44 
(March 1949): 443-440; quote on 443. 
79 The term “consensus history” was coined by John Higham in “The Cult of the ‘American Consensus’: 
Homogenizing Our History,” Commentary 27 (February 1959), 93-100. Grimes describes functionalism as 
the “consensus” school of sociology, p. 11. For the anti-Marxism of Parsons and functionalism, see Alvin 
Gouldner, The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 177, and Irving 
Horowitz, C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian (New York: Free Press, 1983), 177. 
 
 75 
assistants for almost five years.80  Warner had been working with Elton Mayo on the 
Western Electric studies and realized that in order to study workers, one needed to better 
understand their lives outside of work.81  
Warner’s perspective on class was more ambiguous than that of the Lynds.  
Warner’s father was a middle-class rancher and engineer in California, but at a time and 
place in which class stratification was much less important than it was in the East or than 
it would be later. As an undergraduate at the University of California at Berkeley in the 
late 1910s, Warner was an active member of the Socialist Party. However, this seems to 
have been a period of experimentation; around the same time, he also tried his hand at 
acting in New York and briefly married. He returned to school, earned a bachelor’s 
degree in anthropology in 1925, and as a doctoral candidate at Harvard between 1929 and 
1935, eventually wrote and published (but never defended) his dissertation about 
Australian aborigines.82  
Given his early interest in socialism, it is not surprising that, unlike the Lynds, 
Warner approached his first community study with an overtly socioeconomic agenda, 
believing that “the most fundamental structure of our society, that which ultimately 
controls and dominates the thinking and actions of our people, is economic.”83 However, 
Warner was also firmly embedded in the era’s dominant theoretical paradigm of 
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sociological functionalism. His acceptance of this paradigm predisposed him to 
emphasize cooperation rather than conflict between groups. This functionalist 
justification of the status quo is evident in the first volume of Warner’s Newburyport 
findings, 1941’s The Social Life of a Modern Community. The second paragraph of the 
preface outlines the project’s goal of describing “the way in which these people have 
been divided into superior and inferior classes,” but the following paragraph reassures 
readers that “our New England subjects live a well-ordered existence according to a 
status system maintained by [the community’s] several social institutions.” 84 
The contrast with the Lynds is clear. The Lynds’ study—intended to focus on 
church and modernization—had demonstrated class inequalities in the community, while 
Warner’s study—ostensibly intended to focus on class—portrayed harmoniously 
coexisting status groups. In Warner’s presentation, even those individuals identified as 
belonging to the most subordinated group (the “lower-lower” group, in Warner’s 
terminology) were markedly optimistic about their chances of upward mobility in the 
land of the American Dream. One of the main ways in which Warner’s study 
unintentionally deemphasized inequality was by its use of a six-level status gradient to 
categorize socioeconomic positions. Warner claimed that the levels—lower-lower class, 
upper-lower, lower-middle, upper-middle, lower-upper, and upper-upper—reflected what 
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community members themselves would describe in interviews. Additionally, Warner 
attempted to naturalize the categorizations, as in his discussion of “How the Several 
Classes Were Discovered.” The use of the word “discovered” implies that the categories 
existed in Newburyport’s natural social state, and that the social scientist simply had to 
uncover them, as an anthropologist would uncover dinosaur bones or a biologist would 
uncover cellular structure. “Discovered,” here, both reestablishes the project as “true” 
science, and camouflages the fact that the researchers actually manufactured this 
particular status gradient. 
 While it certainly sounded more precise than the Lynds’ two-tiered class 
structure, Warner’s six-layered stratification positioned his findings in specific ways: 
first, the emphasis on status gradients deemphasized the power differential between (in 
the Lynds’ typology) the business class and the working class. Second, as a contemporary 
reviewer noted, the six-level structure gives the illusory view “that the class structure is 
not pyramidal in shape”—it makes the class populations seem fairly evenly distributed. 
But, as the reviewer continues, “if instead of six we take the usual threefold 
classification, we find that the upper class has 3 per cent of the total, the middle class 38 
per cent, and the lower class 58 per cent—definitely pyramidal.”85 Again, the effect 
deemphasizes inequality.86 
There were other problems with Warner’s approach. A young C. Wright Mills 
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wrote a blistering review that took Warner to task for undertheorizing the concept of 
class. Mills, drawing on Weber, argues that Warner’s material deals with economic, 
status, and power differences, but neglects to articulate them as such and instead blurs 
them all together. In fact, according to Mill, Warner’s schema primarily ranks people via 
status, but fails to interrogate the economic component of those status positions. In short, 
for Mills, Warner’s work was “more painstaking than skillful.”87 Additionally, a decade 
later, a few sociologists questioned Warner’s impartiality, claiming that his informants 
were disproportionately drawn from the higher classes and from people with aspirations 
of upward mobility—in other words, people who shared the higher classes’ values and 
perceptions. Critics similarly claim that Warner was overly susceptible to the perspective 
of the group he called the “upper uppers,” an old-money elite that made up less than 2% 
of Newburyport’s population.88 In short, Warner’s work and findings tended to reinforce 
the status quo and to reflect the dominant cultural perspective of the period.  
This orientation did not, however, dampen the enthusiastic reception of his work, 
nor its influence on sociology. Despite the few critical receptions cited above, the 
overwhelming majority of responses were positive. The Newburyport study produced 
five books, and inspired Warner to conduct a similar community study in a Midwestern 
town, “Jonesville.” The six-level structure used for Newburyport was condensed to a 
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five-level structure in the Jonesville study, since in the newer Midwest there was less 
differentiation between the “old family” and “new wealth” categories, and the five-level 
structure was widely adopted by other social scientists. And Life magazine ran a ten-page 
feature on Warner and his work in 1949, featuring photo layouts of families in each of the 
six levels. Not surprisingly, the Life piece trumpeted the functionalist perspective at every 
turn, full of peppy assurances such as “[American] democracy is like a ladder. Anyone 
can climb it….”89  
The Life vignette documenting the “lower-lower” family reinforces that optimistic 
sentiment. It describes the family’s home in a trailer camp just outside of town, where the 
only showers are communal, residents cook on hot plates after recent gasoline stove fires, 
and the neighbors “include Negroes.” But this story of the sample “lower-lower,” Sam 
Sygulla and his family, ends optimistically:  
Right now, in terms of his houses and job and his social position in 
general, Sam is at the bottom of the ladder. But he has dreams. He is 
excited about an air-conditioning training program in Chicago, which he 
may join. If things don’t work out he also has a plan to go to Rio de 
Janeiro. If he can make part of his dreams come true … Sam will have 
begun the slow but feasible climb upward.90 
 
The photos of the family draw the same contrast between actual material 
conditions and the Sygullas’ faith in the American Dream. Despite bare light bulbs with 
visible electrical cords snaking up, down, and diagonally across dingy walls; despite 
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Sam’s blue jeans, his wife’s head scarf, and their half-naked toddler; despite the crowded 
rows of unadorned metal trailers on flat, barren tarmac; despite even being held up to the 
world as a representative “lower-lower,” Sam smiles. The photos help the viewer believe 
in that “slow but feasible climb,” just as Sam seems to. Apparently unaware of the actual 
likelihood of upward mobility from his “lower-lower” position, Sam demonstrates the 
American tendency to see individual attributes, not structural ones, as the determinant of 
class position.91   
A Non-Functionalist Community Study: Elmtown 
One last community study deserves mention. August Hollingshead, who later co-
authored Social Class and Mental Illness with Fredrick Redlich, had worked with Warner 
in the study that Warner published as Democracy in Jonesville. Hollingshead published 
his own findings the same year as Warner’s in Elmtown’s Youth: The Impact of Social 
Classes on Adolescents. Hollingshead, the son of a  middle-class stock breeder, spent his 
early childhood on a Wyoming ranch, then moved with his family to California. Like 
Warner, he earned his undergraduate degree from Berkeley, but in contrast to Warner’s 
Harvard graduate work, Hollingshead completed his Ph.D. at the University of Nebraska 
in 1935, in the middle of the Depression.92  
While Hollingshead’s stratification system shared some similarities with 
Warner’s, Hollingshead presented a more sympathetic—and realistic—description of life 
in the lower classes than did Warner. Where Warner championed the national myth of 
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upward mobility and the “slow but feasible climb upward,” Hollingshead outlined 
systemic barriers to such mobility. He seemed to share the view of one of his informants, 
a sympathetic businessman, who said, “[t]he working class is made up of good solid 
people who live right but never get any place.”93  Hollingshead described a socialization 
process that privileged children from the upper classes and stigmatized children from the 
lower classes, all while naturalizing the process by defining it as merit-based. Further, he 
identified structural obstacles to the equality of opportunity underlying the “American 
creed,” noting that individuals in the higher classes were well-positioned to further the 
broad interests of their own class, while individuals in the lower classes were not, and 
claiming that “where values associated with the class system run counter to legal 
requirements … it is not unusual for the law to be tempered to fit the mores of the class 
system.”94  
Hollingshead outlined certain ideological beliefs that bolstered the class system. 
He described the circular nature of the relationship between class position and “ability”—
since men [sic] with high positions were presumed to have earned them by dint of 
superior ability, holding a high position was seen as evidence of ability; conversely, a low 
class position confirmed a lack of ability. Hollingshead also described the effects of what 
Gramsci would call cultural hegemony: how the elite classes, acting to further their own 
interests, can persuade the public that the self-interested policies are in everyone’s best 
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interest.  He concluded by calling on “idealists” to “change American society so that the 
ideals embodied in the American creed supplant the ideals of the class system.”95 
Hollingshead drew fire from contemporaries for this deviation from functionalist 
optimism: as one reviewer phrased it, “this reader feels that the case is made a little too 
strong for class and its consequences…. Isn’t there greater elasticity in our class system 
than the author implies”?96 Another reviewer so clearly outlined two perspectives 
suggested by the idea of “unique experiences as incumbents of class positions” that it is 
worth quoting him at length: 
From the first point of view, certain persons get the most money, 
the best jobs and choice houses, while others get what is left. Then the 
upper-level persons protect their possessions by a variety of means, 
including mutual co-operation, social exclusion of inferiors, and capture of 
political institutions. The lower-level persons, barred from the culture of 
the upper levels, try to climb, fail in this effort, and in their frustration turn 
to drink, crime, dissipation, and rebelliousness. …   
In a contrasting view, the behavior of the persons of the lower 
levels may be interpreted as the result of lack of experience with the 
cultures—as in the case of immigrants—or other occupational handicaps 
which place these populations in circumstances which produce 
disorganization. The upper and middle levels share in, and maintain, a 
culture and a social organization which the lowest levels do not fully 
share. It is erroneous to conceive of the behavior of the lowest level as 
constituting a separate culture. To the extent that they deviate from the 
general American culture, these people are disorganized and while in this 
state are incapable of maintaining any complete social organization.97 
 
The reviewer then justified, for a full page and a quarter, his support for the 
second view, and for his opinion of Hollingshead as naïve, biased, and a poor scientist. 
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This review was obviously written from the dominant functionalist perspective, which 
perceives deviant individuals at the root of social problems. However, the review is 
notable for being able to so clearly articulate another view, one that would soon become 
known as conflict theory. Conflict theory, addressed more fully later in this chapter, holds 
that inequalities in the system itself lead to both social problems and individual deviance. 
Depression-Era Politicization in Psychology 
We saw how sociologists as a discipline ignored the Depression for fear of 
diluting their professional image as pure, disinterested scientists. However, psychologists 
handled the 1930s differently. Perhaps because applied psychology had already been 
partly legitimized in such arenas as industrial-organizational psychology and 
psychotherapy, psychologists were less reluctant than sociologists to tackle real-world 
problems. Or perhaps it was simple self-interest; the rapid popularization of psychology 
during the 1920s, combined with a tendency of many of its popularizers to exaggerate its 
immediate potential, sparked a backlash in the 1930s. It is also possible that the racier 
components of the subject simply didn’t translate well from the roaring ‘20s to the 
austere ‘30s; the deluge of psychology articles in popular science magazines during the 
1920s slowed substantially after the crash. Finally, the discipline felt left out of New Deal 
public policy; historian Donald Napoli describes a deep professional disappointment 
when no psychologists were included in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “brain 
trust,” despite the profession’s belief that it was uniquely suited to help the nation cope 
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with the psychological aspects of the Depression. In addition, when the Science Advisory 
Board was established in 1934, it also rebuffed psychologists’ bid for inclusion.98 
The Depression did, however, provide the impetus for many psychologists to re-
think their discipline’s stance on the scientific model, objectivity, applied psychology, 
and social problems. A number of factors facilitated this reevaluation. First, many  
psychologists were unemployed in the 1930s, due to the combination of unprecedented 
numbers of graduates in the 1920s and the sharp drop in available jobs during the 
Depression. Unemployment can have a radicalizing effect, as it did when a group of 
mostly master’s level psychologists in New York City met in 1935 to talk about the 
unemployment situation and formed the Psychologists League. The League engaged in 
both practical action, such as lobbying for more federal jobs in psychology, and in social 
and political critiques of psychology and psychoanalytic theory.  However, the youth of 
most members, the group’s avowed Marxist orientation, and its unsuccessful focus on 
expanding government-funded jobs in psychology kept it from having much impact on 
the profession as a whole.99 
But another Depression-era psychological group did have an impact. In 1936, two 
young psychologists, frustrated by their discipline’s apolitical stance and refusal to 
address social problems in the midst of the country’s crisis, and frustrated too by the lack 
of employment for new professionals, wrote to like-minded psychologists to gauge 
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interest in forming an organization to address those frustrations. The interest was there, 
and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues was organized that fall with 
more than 400 members. While it certainly drew its share of fire—some of the 
psychologists who had received the introductory letter accused the organizers of “‘pink’ 
or darker” shades of thought, and others were appalled at what they saw as the retreat 
from pure science—the SPSSI managed to not only survive, but to establish a (contested) 
legitimacy for applying psychology to social problems.100    
As early as 1938, SPSSI members brought psychological theory to bear on labor 
relations and differences in “attitudes” among different social classes. Industrial conflict 
became a major topic for members, as did desegregation, racism, and militarism. Though 
controversial, these topics dovetailed with a broader shift in interwar psychology toward 
“environmentalism,” or the impact of the individuals’ environments on their development 
and functioning. Because of that shift, and because of psychology’s more obvious utility 
as an applied, rather than a “pure,” science, the SPSSI was not marginalized. It was an 
official affiliate of the American Psychological Association from 1937 on, and 1945, it 
also became Division 9 of the APA, continuing, in one founder’s words, to “nudge” the 
APA toward a social conscience.101  
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World War II and the “Age of Psychology” 
A number of historians have detailed the dramatic changes in the scope, stature, 
and public awareness of psychology during and after World War II.102 The military, after 
its small-scale and ambivalent use of psychologists in World War I, ardently recruited 
psychologists for testing, personnel administration, propaganda, morale work, mental 
health issues, and therapy. Government research funding extended into the Cold War and 
assured the growth of the discipline, just as psychological ideas were being popularized 
on a far broader scale than had occurred in the 1920s. Psychological concepts and 
advisors extended their influence into the military, public policy, education, the criminal 
justice system, child rearing, relationship management, and everyday life. In the words of 
one historian, psychology became a “mammoth technoscientific profession.”103  
This boom-town excitement was pervasive in psychological circles when 
Hollingshead and Redlich drafted their study of psychology and social class. As early as 
1913, a German researcher had noticed that schizophrenics were disproportionately 
members of the lower part of the socioeconomic spectrum, while neurotics were 
disproportionately from more privileged strata. The topic received a smattering of 
attention into the 1940s, with most efforts aimed at confirming the pattern, particularly 
for the schizophrenics, in different geographical and clinical locations.104 In the 1940s, 
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however, sociologists entered the conversation. Rather than simply confirming statistical 
incidence, the sociologists’ focus shifted to causality. The burning question became 
whether schizophrenia was the result of nature or nurture: was it part of a package of 
inferior heredity that kept afflicted individuals from succeeding at life, as the “social 
selection” theory held; did mental illness result in an individual’s downward mobility, as 
posited by the downward drift theory; or did a low socioeconomic position create 
stressors that spawned schizophrenia?  
The sociological opinion leaned toward social selection. The concept illustrates 
the way that functionalism implicitly supports the status quo by making class 
stratification seem  both natural (“natural” in two senses: that it is inevitable, and that the 
stratification process is not seen as being socially constructed to benefit one group over 
other) and reasonable. For example, note the lack of agency in one 1959 definition of 
social selection: “the manner in which a given social system functions through time and 
in its functioning tends to sort and sift persons into class and community positions.”105 
This understanding of stratification naturalizes the process, obscures the constructed 
nature of the social system, along with its beneficiaries, and implies that the “sorting and 
sifting” makes objective sense. 
And it was typically—though not always—with this understanding of the 
stratification process that both sociologists and psychologists turned to the puzzling 
problem of class differences in the ostensibly classless postwar period. For example, in 
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1966, discussing the results of his NIMH-funded research on “Social Status and 
Psychological Disorder” in the American Sociological Review, sociologist Bruce 
Dohrenwend discounted the idea that a marginalized class position may have produced 
mental disorder, stating “It is also possible, and somehow more readily credible, 
however, that a genetic or biochemical factor initially caused the disorder.” He made this 
claim because he found it “hard to think of an alternative social factor.”106 His statement 
betrayed his functionalist perspective, naturalized the idea of “mental disorder” as an 
ahistoric, absolute state rather than a culturally defined one, and indicated a lack of 
perception about the stresses and impacts of marginalized social conditions.  
His perspective was not atypical: as more work confirmed the class-based 
differences in psychology, more researchers insisted that those differences were, 
variously, inevitable, understandable, and not necessarily worth worrying about. In 1954, 
another psychiatrist/sociologist team acknowledged what was by then a commonly held 
view about middle- and upper-middle-class therapists working with patients from lower 
classes “Differences in value systems and patterns of communication…may hamper the 
establishment of the therapeutic relationship.” The authors were not optimistic about 
possible solutions: “[I]t appears possible that lower-class patients need to acquire new 
symbols and values to participate in expressive psychotherapy. Since this is a difficult 
process, many of them may be considered unpromising candidates for successful 
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treatment.”107 The authors added that “perhaps psychiatrists need to acquire new symbols 
and values in dealing with lower-class patients; or perhaps new approaches are necessary 
to bring psychotherapy to such persons.” However, compared to the insight displayed by 
a very few of their contemporaries, the last sentence seems tacked on and mechanical. 
Quantitative Sociology and Its Impact on Class Theory 
Both psychologists and sociologists were undertaking studies into the relationship 
between psychology and class, but both groups looked to sociological work for their 
basic understanding of class and its structures. I have noted how American sociologists’ 
functionalist perspective shaped their views of class. Similarly, a quantitative shift in 
postwar sociology resulted in a mechanistic, superficial view of class that influenced 
psychological thought as well. In their continuing quest for positivist credibility, postwar 
sociologists dove headlong into the country’s popular love affair with science. While we 
see some early emphasis on quantitative research in the community studies, for example 
in Warner’s elaborate, mathematically ranked status scale, the quantitative turn in the 
immediate postwar period is a significant departure from earlier work, both in the amount 
of quantitative data and in its focus.  
Quantitative sociological methods, particularly attitude surveys and statistical 
sampling, had been well financed and widely used during wartime research. This 
increased funding, combined with the accompanying sense of patriotic importance and 
the excitement generated by ever-more-precise quantitative methods, must have been 
                                                




very compelling for practitioners of the “littlest science.” As a recent historian phrased it, 
they “forged a scientific identity that could legitimate sociology as a distinct realm of 
professional competence and cumulative knowledge,” the Holy Grail of sociologists 
since Comte.108 However, this reification of numerical data further obscured the forest by 
so minutely examining the trees. Moreover, the misplaced focus was particularly 
problematic in the realm of class, since grasping the many economic, social, and cultural 
factors that perpetuate the class structure—and maintain its invisibility—requires a  
macro, not a micro, view. 
As part of their efforts to position their discipline as a scientific one, most mid-
century sociologists self-consciously constructed a value-neutral stance towards their 
work. Putting as much distance as possible between themselves and the amateur reformist 
sociologists of the Progressive era, they insisted on rigorously objective research. To 
combat residual traces of the profession’s reform heritage, which continued to color 
popular (and policymaker) perceptions of sociology, sociologists in the 1940s and 1950s 
examined social phenomena with quantitative precision, but stopped far short of analyses 
that could be interpreted as evaluation or recommendation. The hope was that this 
demonstration of scientific detachment would further buttress sociologists’ claims that 
theirs was a true science.109 
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However, an unintended consequence of this intense pursuit of neutrality seems to 
have been a general retreat from the pressing social problems of the day in favor of less 
controversial topics. One major example of this disciplinary distaste for relevant social 
issues has been documented: after the Supreme Court mandated school desegregation in 
1954’s Brown v. Board of Education, sociological work on race declined to its lowest 
rate in years. Robert Friedrichs, in his Sociology of Sociology, described the phenomenon 
as sociologists “turning their backs on critical questions of social disorganization and 
seeking islands of non-involvement,” all in pursuit of credibility as empirical scientists. 
This version of scientificism seems incompatible with analysis of any serious social 
problems, particularly one as slippery and multifaceted as class.110 
 Despite the convolutions undertaken by the discipline to appear scientific, the 
public opinion of sociology was still mixed, inspiring even greater strides toward 
quantitative credibility. During hearings for the establishment of a National Science 
Foundation, which sociologists very much wanted to be part of, some congressmen’s 
comments ranged to “the danger of crackpots,” “men addicted to isms,” and “wild-eyed 
so-called research,” all reflections of the old reformist stereotype that postwar 
sociologists fought so hard to overcome. 111 Quantitative sociology seemed tailor-made 
for countering that stereotype. Other factors that privileged quantitative methods included 
the general postwar infatuation with science and sociology’s longstanding empiricist 
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aspirations. In addition, recent improvements in sampling theory allowed smaller, less 
expensive surveys to be conducted, increasing the popularity of this analysis further.  
Unfortunately, the widespread enthusiasm for quantitative work tended to 
facilitate “bean counting” over analysis of social mechanisms, and with a topic as 
complex as social class, bean counting tends to distract rather than enlighten. As this type 
of quick and easy research spread, and it spread exponentially, results “were often 
clouded by later research that showed differences within the differences, plausible 
alternatives, and differences between subpopulations with respect to the differences.”112 
In other words, the studies eventually were done for the sake of a study, not to investigate 
a substantial theory. While there was some protest from contemporary critics, such as 
Brown University sociologist Dennis Wrong, who described the phenomenon as 
“obsessive methodolatry,” most sociologists—and certainly most prominent 
sociologists—embraced sophisticated quantitative methods. 113  
One important effect of this shift was that, rather than examining how class 
positions impacted people’s lives, as the Lynds and Hollingshead had, postwar 
sociological investigations of class instead measured various components of class 
position. Elaborate numerical systems were developed to pinpoint the precise 
socioeconomic status of one’s living room furniture; a flurry of separate studies measured 
occupational prestige.114 Path analysis in particular allowed sociologists to produce an 
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unprecedentedly detailed description of The American Occupational Structure in 1967. 
But despite its precise analyses and its enthusiastic reception, the work exemplifies how 
postwar sociology’s quantitative focus misdirected attention away from the broader 
cultural issues. Lewis Coser described the phenomenon in his 1975 presidential address 
to the American Sociological Association. Citing the 1967 publication on occupational 
structure, he argued that  
[T]his research contributes to the understanding of the distributive, not to 
the relational aspects of social class. … There is no concern here with the 
ways in which differential class power and social advantage operate in 
predictable and routine ways, through specifiable social interactions 
between classes or interest groups, to give shape to determinate social 
structures and to create differential life chances.115 
 
Coser argued that the emphasis on quantitative research, by ignoring how class 
actually functioned in society, delegitimized the function of class as an object of inquiry. 
While quantitative analysis necessarily focuses on visible and quantifiable aspects of a 
situation, the mechanisms of class are hidden. Coser’s point was that as sociologists 
developed models of investigation for the quantifiable aspects of class, they lost sight of 
what class meant for classed people, leading to a situation in which “the methodological 
tail wags the substantive dog.”116  
Dissent and the Emergence of Conflict Theory 
 While the vast majority of sociologists embraced the functionalist, quantitative, 
“value neutral” sociology dominant in the postwar period, there were exceptions. In 
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1951, one small group of sociologists, frustrated with their field’s increasing 
disengagement with social problems and humanism, as well as what they perceived as its 
institutional elitism and cronyism, founded an organization that they hoped would offer a 
more socially engaged alternative to the dominant American Sociological Society. They 
established the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP), loosely modeled on the 
older Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, with which some of them had 
been involved. 
The SSSP rejected both what members saw as an overemphasis on quantitative 
research in sociology and the belief that such research was value neutral; no research 
methodology, they insisted, guaranteed freedom from researcher bias, funding 
considerations, or other influences. For its first decade and a half, critiques of mainstream 
sociology’s value neutrality and quantitative focus were central to the SSSP. One SSSP 
founder claimed that the scientific aura of quantitative methods was often used simply to 
lure potential clients: in his words, “The hard nose sociologist is often the brown nose 
sociologist.” More disturbingly, many early SSSP members were alarmed at the 
profession’s expanding role in the military, government, and business, where sociological 
work was increasingly used to “manage” workers, consumers, and citizens, to justify the 
status quo, and to support and naturalize existing power structures. However, the 
American Sociological Association and mainstream sociologists denounced the SSSP in 
its early years, claiming that the new group was divisive, unprofessional, and biased.117  
                                                
117 For the development of SSSP, see Jessie Bernard, “My Four Revolutions: An Autobiographical History 
of the ASA,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 4 (January 1973): 773-791; Elizabeth Briant Lee and 
 
 95 
Around the same period, other fissures appeared in the hegemonic facade of the 
field. In 1954, C. Wright Mills produced a very public critique of his discipline in an 
essay for the Saturday Review of Literature. He accused his colleagues of unnecessarily 
dense and pretentious jargon; of a disproportionate focus on scientism and quantification 
that trivialized the field; and of large-scale administrative research that facilitated 
bureaucratic functioning at the expense of intellectual analysis. He developed the same 
themes more fully in his 1959 The Sociological Imagination, which additionally 
bemoaned the inherent conservatism of the functionalist perspective.118  
More to the point for our purposes, Mills had become a keen observer of the 
American class system, and had rejected the dominant functionalist perspective that 
explained subordinated class positions as the result of individual deviance, inadequacy, or 
social disorganization. He explored the growth of organized labor in The New Men of 
Power, describing labor’s cooptation in what later came to be called “business unionism” 
well ahead of other social theorists. He analyzed the dramatic growth of the middle class 
in White Collar, noting its passivity and alienation in the face of bureaucratization, and 
also pointing out management’s increasing (and increasingly successful) use of 
psychological coercion with its workforce. He argued that “with rising material 
standards, exploitation becomes less material and more psychological,” using both a 
language (“exploitation”) and perspective on power much more common to Marxian 
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analysis than to 1951 American sociology, an indication of his distance from mainstream 
professional thought. Finally, Mills’ 1956 The Power Elite challenged the popular belief 
in American classlessness by delineating the ways in which military, political, and 
economic leaders maintained their own class interests.119 
However, while Mills’ observations foreshadowed the directions that critical 
theorists would later take, his work did not have a broad impact on sociology during his 
lifetime. Mills was a sociological outsider during most of his career, and was perceived 
by colleagues as combative and unpolished. While he is cited as an important theorist in 
today’s sociological texts, his colleagues did not, for the most part, share that view. A 
1961 article in the British Journal of Sociology noted Mills’ status as an “intellectual 
hero” to politically conscious young Brits, but added, “It must be reported, however, that 
he has little importance for contemporary American sociology.” Another indication of 
Mills’ marginality is that introductory sociology textbooks did not portray his work as 
central to modern sociological thought until the mid-1970s.120 
But disciplinary critiques by marginalized figures did not challenge the core of 
sociology’s hegemonic function. That core was functionalism, and it was through the 
functionalist worldview that sociology endorsed the inherence, and inherent goodness, of 
the current class structure. In 1956, Lewis Coser took aim at that core when he published 
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The Function of Social Conflict, arguing that the functionalist view of conflict—that 
conflict is dysfunctional and that is should be (and could be) minimized or eliminated—
was misguided. He pointed out both the inevitability of social conflict and its positive 
social functions. Reviews were generally favorable, although only one seemed to 
foreshadow the significance of Coser’s impact on the field: the reviewer for The British 
Journal of Sociology introduced his comments by indicting the American belief “in a 
millennial society where harmonious integration will have dispensed with social 
struggle.” Western Europeans, on the other hand, “know better,” and the reviewer’s 
highest praise for Coser was that his perspective was a European one. In retrospect, one 
main strength of Coser’s work was indeed that he had managed to free his vision from the 
functionalist hegemony of mid-century American sociology.121 
Despite the book’s positive reviews, it did not achieve its position in the 
sociological canon until the cultural upheavals of the 1960s. In the midst of the civil 
rights movement, student activism, and anti-war protests, Coser’s thesis seemed to be a 
more compelling explanation of social behavior than functionalist harmony was. The 
Functions of Social Conflict is credited with paving the way for the development of 
conflict theory, whose emphasis on inequitable allocations of power and other scarce 
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resources in societies provided sociologists with the theoretical tools they needed to 
investigate class issues in more substantial ways.122  
German theorist Ralf Dahrendorf added psychology to conflict theory in his 1958 
essay, “Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis,” which 
lambasted American sociologists for both the utopian and conservative nature of their 
functionalism. He also noted that, in order for the functionalist model to cohere, any 
disturbance to the harmonious equilibrium of society must be blamed on a 
psychologically malfunctioning individual. The following year, Dahrendorf’s Class and 
Class Conflict in an Industrial Society was published in English. As the title indicates, 
Dahrendorf argued, as had Marx, that social conflict based on class position was 
inevitable. However, where Marx had defined classes based on ownership of the means 
of production, Dahrendorf saw power, not property, as the dividing line. He described 
two opposing class positions, one whose members had authority over subordinates, and 
one whose members obeyed the authority of others.123 
While these challenges to functionalism ended its unquestioned hegemony, their 
impact was marginal at first, and gained acceptance only slowly. Mainstream sociologists 
initially perceived the critiques as the views of crackpots and malcontents. From this 
perspective, the SSSP was radical and unprofessional, and Mills was a fringe character. 
Into the mid-1960s, the dominant sociological paradigm clearly reflected the 
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conservative, functionalist view, and continued to endorse the American class system as 
beneficial to all. 
Anomie 
In 1949, Harvard sociologist Robert K. Merton resuscitated Emile Durkheim’s 
word “anomie” to describe a particular class-based phenomenon.124 For Merton, anomie 
was the condition that resulted when certain groups in a culture lacked access to 
legitimate means to attain the dominant cultural goal, which Merton described in the 
United States as the accumulation of wealth.  As he explained it, 
[O]ur egalitarian society denies by implication the existence of 
noncompeting groups and individuals in the pursuit of pecuniary success. 
The same body of success-symbols is held to be desirable for all. These 
goals are held to transcend class lines, not to be bounded by them, yet the 
actual social organization is such that there exist class differentials in the 
accessibility of these common access-symbols. Frustration and thwarted 
aspiration lead to the avenues of escape from a culturally induced 
intolerable situation; or unrelieved ambition may eventuate in illicit 
attempts to acquire the dominant values.125 [Italics in original.]  
 
Merton’s insight was important: he pointed out that, while the dominant classes assume 
that all other classes want to obtain “success” as defined in dominant class terms, 
subordinate classes do not have the same levels of access to the signifiers of that success 
as the higher classes do. The responses to subordinated class members’ frustrated 
acquisition are either “escape” from the pursuit, or the employment of culturally 
unacceptable means to acquire the desired cultural symbols. In short, the unequal access 
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to these symbols, combined with the insistence that everyone should desire them, leads to 
deviance. 
Further, Merton acknowledged that the culture was more classed than its rhetoric 
implied, admitting that “despite our persisting open-class ideology,” financial success 
was rare for those with limited educational and economic opportunities. And in a 
footnote, Merton discussed the possibility that the American class structure was 
becoming more rigid, and that social mobility was declining.126 Merton’s work made 
anomie one of the most high-profile concepts in the field during the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, most of the postwar work on the topic focused not on the inequitable access to 
legitimate avenues of wealth, but on the deviance of the individual, and as well as his 
(and it was always “his”) alienation in mass society. In fact, the concept of anomie 
provided a useful alternative to  “alienation,” which carried a problematic Marxist 
association.127  
This functionalist perspective of individual deficiency dovetailed nicely with 
psychology’s increasingly persuasive view of the individual psyche as the locus of all 
problems. Historian David Haney demonstrates how, in their attempt to develop 
quantitative measures of anomie, sociologists ended up focusing on the phenomenon’s 
individual, psychological manifestations rather than its broader social functions. Leo 
Srole codified the shift in 1956 by introducing the concept of “anomia,” or individual 
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anomie. Anomie, properly understood, required a complex, macro view of society; 
anomia, on the other hand, could be easily investigated with a sample survey. In the 
postwar era, more than a thousand sociological studies investigated individuals’ levels of 
alienation; correlated anomia with hostility towards minorities; compared levels of 
anomia in Protestants and Catholics; and explored anomia levels in relation to deviance, 
criminality, suicide, voting patterns, and media preferences. However, in the onslaught of 
statistical material, a broader cultural analysis of inequality was lost.128 
Psychology and Class 
So, with the narrow and quantitative sociological approach to class as their model, 
psychologists continued to investigate the puzzling class-based differences in mental 
illness and health. Propelled by both the upsurge of attention to class variables in 
psychology and by what seemed to be an ever-increasing NIMH research budget, studies 
proliferated. A few scattered publications had interrogated class and psychology between 
1938 and 1941, with a hiatus in the war years. But after the war, class became a constant 
(though still minor) topic in psychological publications. The relationship between 
schizophrenia and class variables continued to be a popular topic of research, though the 
definitions of those variables remained clunky and undertheorized. For example, one 
study addressed “Psychoses, Income, and Occupational Prestige,” components of class 
that are easy to quantify but which, narrowly focused as they are, do not facilitate broader 
explanatory hypotheses about the nature of the social system and its inequalities.129 Other 
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studies correlated class with attitudes towards therapists, rates of treatment, types of 
treatment, drop-out rates, length of therapy, experience levels of assigned therapists, 
psychosomatic symptoms, and responses to various psychological tests.   
 But, as had happened in sociology, a great deal of the research began to seem 
simplistic, mechanical, and repetitive. By 1975, an NIMH report could note that at least 
50 studies had confirmed the higher prevalence of schizophrenia in the lower classes. 
And the studies found (and confirmed) differences, but without attempting to understand 
why those differences existed or what they meant. In 1950, an emerging leader in the 
field, social psychologist Richard Centers, pointed out that the expanding body of work 
in the field rarely exceeded simple description and correlation. Further, even 
professionals in the discipline lacked a working vocabulary for the phenomenon of class. 
He complained, “A particular conceptual difficulty in most of this research is the lack of 
adequate differentiation among such concepts as stratification, status and class. These 
terms are generally used interchangeably and with a breadth of reference that renders 
them confusingly vague.”130  
 And, from our modern vantage point, they were. Centers had been raised in poverty 
and had been a migrant laborer before earning his Ph.D. in psychology. He was, as a 
result, unusually perceptive about the inaccuracies of middle-class mythology, and wrote 
his doctoral dissertation on class consciousness. That work, published in 1949 as The 
Psychology of Social Classes: A Study of Class Consciousness, is still cited by class 
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theorists today. Center was the first American researcher to object to traditional “upper, 
middle, and low” options for individuals’ self-rankings of class. When he added the 
category of “working class,” the majority of respondents chose it. But despite Centers’ 
heightened sensitivity to class divisions and affiliations, even he lacked a satisfactory 
theoretical model for his observations.  “Class” implies structural allocations of power 
and privilege. Both power and privilege on the one hand, and marginalization and 
disempowerment on the other, are, by virtue of class position, unearned. Further, the 
relationship between the powerful and the disempowered is exploitive. But Centers, 
along with the vast majority of postwar professionals, had no access to that theoretical 
understanding. It had been branded as “Marxist,” and was thus academically and 
politically disreputable.131 
However, despite the theoretical void, a handful of class researchers did manage 
to see beyond their own socialization, and to challenge dominant perceptions and 
explanations of class differences. Some were adept at employing what Mills had called 
the “sociological imagination,” and appreciating how social, political, and economic 
forces impacted individuals’ lives and behaviors. New research worked to identify 
differences in working-class and middle-class values, perceptions, and communication 
styles, not in an attempt to “blame the victim,” as the culture of poverty theory would 
later be appropriated to do, but in an attempt to understand and possibly bridge 
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differences. And, in that moment of postwar optimism, in the midst of unprecedented 
national affluence and world influence, and during a dizzying expansion of psychology’s 
professional prestige, that bridge seemed possible.  
Conclusions 
Postwar psychological practitioners’ views of class differences were influenced 
by the widespread cultural belief in a classless society, as well as the individualistic belief 
in meritocracy. These cultural assumptions were reinforced by psychologists’ reliance on 
sociological constructions of class. American sociologists have, for a number of reasons, 
tended toward more conservative views than their European counterparts. Their early 
desire to differentiate themselves from reformers, the American antipathy to Marxism, 
early American universities’ conservatism and aversion to controversy, the theoretical 
dominance of functionalism, and the postwar ascendance of quantitative sociology all 
combined to naturalize the American class system and downplay structural inequalities. 
Further, twentieth-century developments in psychology itself fostered similar views of 
class relationships. The development of intelligence testing evaluated people on a 
hierarchical scale and privileged those in the educated classes, and the field of eugenics 
provided “scientific” justification for elitism and racism.  
 However, despite the pervasiveness of middle-class bias in psychology, a small 
number of researchers and practitioners recognized and challenged this class normativity. 
Beginning with Kingsley Davis’ 1938 acknowledgement of mental hygiene’s middle-
class values, observers have described and, at times, attempted to combat psychology’s 
classed orientation. The next chapter investigates the development of industrial 
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psychology, arguing that here again, for a number of reasons, American practitioners 
aligned themselves with management. This pro-management perspective worked to 
naturalize middle-class worldviews while fostering professional skepticism towards the 
claims and perspectives of labor. Here too, though, challenges to the dominant 
perspective existed; chapter two also examines a labor-sponsored program whose goal 






Chapter Two.  Industrial-Organizational Psychology and the National Institute for 
Labor Education Mental Health Program: A Case Study. 
 
 In the wake of the massive postwar strike wave, the popular American bi-weekly 
Science News Letter introduced an article with the headline, “Strikes Are Preventable.” 
The text began, “Psychologists and sociologists could help industry prevent strikes like 
the present work stoppage in the steel and coal industries. They have the necessary 
‘know-how’ to cure friction.”1 The article then proceeded to explain that mediating labor 
conflict is similar to marriage counseling, listing mediation strategies one by one. 
However, one by one, the description of each strategy ended with an explanation of its 
ineffectiveness in labor disputes. For example, in the first suggested technique, non-
directive counseling, the therapist never suggests solutions, but guides the participants 
into talking through their own options to arrive at an agreement. Unfortunately, the 
author acknowledges, in an industrial dispute, “one or both sides may lack any desire to 
arrive at a settlement.” The second technique allows the therapist to suggest strategies for 
the participants to experiment with. However, the author admits, “[t]his technique also 
works better in reconciling married partners than in industrial associates.”2  
 This news snippet hints at both the pro-management perspective adopted by 
American industrial-organizational (IO) psychologists, and also at the conceptual failure 
of postwar IO psychology: its insistence on assuming that labor and management had 
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similar, rather than competing, interests. After World War II, psychology exploded as a 
profession. The military, the government, and industry suddenly courted psychological 
opinions; funding for professional training and research skyrocketed, as did the numbers 
of professionals; and psychological ideas and language inundated the popular American 
consciousness. Amid the many permutations of psychological ideas, practices, and 
subdisciplines, one field in particular—IO psychology—had the potential to more fully 
investigate class issues. It was, by the postwar period, a well-established discipline. 
However, a number of factors constrained its ability to shed light on class. 
 This chapter traces the development of industrial psychology in the United States, 
describing the forces and attitudes that shaped its practitioners’ perspectives, as well as 
the way that labor perceived those perspectives.  While a few early IO pioneers made 
efforts to examine workplace relations from neutral perspectives, the bulk of the field 
rapidly aligned itself with management, often using the tools of psychology against 
workers in repressive or manipulative ways. In addition, most industrial workers only 
came into contact with psychological professionals at the workplace, since individual 
therapy was a pursuit of the middle and elite classes. As a result, industrial workers 
developed a mistrust of psychology that was based on their experiences with IO 
professionals. 
 I also examine a small and all-but-forgotten mental health research program, a 
collaboration of union leaders and university-based industrial psychology researchers 
that, quite progressively for its time, challenged the middle-class bias of the 
psychological profession. It did not succeed, but provides modern observers with a 
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fascinating example of the pervasiveness of middle-class psychological normativity, the 
attempts to challenge that normativity, and the ways in which those challenges were 
deflected. 
 Psychology’s Popularity in the 1950s 
 The military had funded psychological studies during World War II and had given 
psychological professionals unprecedented input into public policy, input that continued 
into peacetime. Wartime psychologists had been heavily involved in personnel testing, 
classification, and training, as well as work in adjustment and morale. The influx of 
psychological ideas and professionals was so pervasive in the military that at war’s end, 
the navy’s representative on the National Defense Research Committee would claim that 
“the application of psychology in selecting and training men, and in guiding the design of 
weapons so they would fit men, did more to help win this war than any other single 
intellectual activity.’3  
  In 1946, Congress passed the National Mental Health Act and established the 
National Institute of Mental Health. Increased funding for both psychological training and 
research produced a surge of new psychological professionals: the number of 
psychiatrists in the country more than quintupled between World War II and the mid-
1960s; the number of clinical psychologists in the American Psychological Association 
almost tripled between 1948 and 1960, while the tally of counseling psychologists 
doubled. And although less than 4 percent of the American population had used 
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psychological services at the start of World War II, by the mid-1950s 14 percent had.4  
 But this dramatic expansion of psychology wasn’t just top-down, government-
fostered phenomenon; a number of factors converged to create the boom. The alienation 
of postwar society, the isolation of the new suburbs, and the stresses of 1950s conformity 
all combined to create fertile ground for new ways of understanding the subjective 
interior. Additionally, the public needed psychology in the postwar period, or needed 
something like it, to try to cope with the disturbing aftermath of concentration camps and 
nuclear devastation as well as with the unsettling impersonality and mechanization of 
postwar America. Against this backdrop, and seemingly overnight, average people were 
engrossed by the recently obscure discipline of psychology; the id and the ego became 
dinner table conversation, along with “complexes,” “neuroses,” and “repression.” 
Psychological ideas and jargon spread into the far reaches of popular culture: 
newspapers, magazines, self-help books, radio, television, films, and novels were rife 
with the new psychological themes. Life magazine captured the mood in its 1957 series 
“The Age of Psychology.”5 
 Organized Labor and Psychology 
 The leaders of organized labor shared the national infatuation with psychology in 
the postwar period. There were compelling reasons for labor leaders’ interest: with the 
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popularization and growth of psychology, access to mental health care was, for the first 
time, put on the union bargaining table. In 1946, the medical care provider for Teamsters 
Local 688, an entity called the St. Louis Labor Health Institute, added limited psychiatric 
services to the local’s health care services. The program relied on social workers as 
therapists, encouraged patients to “vent,” distributed psychotropic drugs, and 
administered electroshock therapy. Despite the limited nature of the services, the simple 
fact of their inclusion in the local’s medical services is significant. 6    
 In addition to the nascent idea of providing mental health services for workers, 
labor leaders were also concerned by recent studies, including Hollingshead and 
Redlich’s New Haven study, indicating that non-middle-class patients experienced both 
mental illness and its treatment differently—and, in the case of treatment, less 
successfully—than middle-class patients did. The reports suggested that poorer patients 
tended to see their problems as physical rather than psychological or even interpersonal; 
in fact, they often entered the mental health system after presenting a psychosomatic or 
somatic complaint to a physician.  Additionally, both patients and their families and 
friends from the lower socioeconomic strata generally saw mental illness as stigmatizing, 
and as a condition that required involuntary institutionalization.  Finally, these patients 
generally expected the psychological professional to take an authoritarian and directive 
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approach, seemed frustrated when their expectations were unmet, and were unable or 
unwilling to engage in traditional analytical talk therapy.7  
 Postwar Perceptions and Vocabularies of Class 
 These findings, as one might imagine given the egalitarian rhetoric and class 
denial so prevalent in the culture, sparked enormous concern.  Of perhaps more interest to 
modern-day observers, with the benefit of an additional half-century of both 
psychological and class studies, is the way in which these investigations were framed.  
The language used to describe patients typically divided them into two categories:  
middle class and “lower” class.  A small minority of researchers did, to their credit, 
choose other language:  a few relied on Hollingshead’s typology, some, especially in the 
later 1950s, used designations of blue- and white-collar, and at least one apologized for, 
but still used, “lower” class.  Language is a powerful shaper of perceptions, and the 
decision of most researchers to call their non-middle-class subjects lower class instead of 
using a term with a less negative connotation is, at best, unsympathetic.   
Additionally, this linguistic choice was unlikely to have simply been born of 
ignorance.  In 1949, social psychologist Richard Centers, skeptical of a Fortune 
magazine report that almost 80% of the American public self-identified as middle class, 
conducted his own investigation.  He discovered that the Fortune survey had only offered 
respondents three choices:  lower, middle, and upper class.  What he found in his own 
project was that, if “working class” were an option, 51% of his respondents selected it, 
                                                




while only 43% would then describe themselves as “middle class.”8  One can only 
assume that the working-class subjects in 1950s psychological investigations weren’t 
given the option of defining their own socioeconomic position.   
 However, although the name of the “working class” was apparently too 
proletarian-sounding for Cold War sensibilities, the idea of occupation was clearly 
associated with socioeconomic level.  In fact, this link was extremely important to 
observers in the 1950s, given the absence of other ways to understand or talk about 
socioeconomic differentiation. The sociological and psychological literature on class 
fostered this association, relying on occupation, sometimes in conjunction with 
education, to categorize class positions.9  As Leonard Reissman accurately noted in 1959, 
“[o]ccupation has become the most frequently used index of class.”10 Using occupation in 
this way, investigators ranked occupational categories hierarchically according to prestige 
levels. These rankings leaned heavily on the distinction between intellectual and manual 
labor—the comfortable categories of “white collar” and “blue collar,” which were more 
acceptable to Americans than descriptions involving the word “class.” This 
methodological and conceptual centrality of occupation may help to explain why, through 
the 1950s and 1960s, and until the development of cultural studies and working-class 
studies, a rhetoric of “labor” seemed to stand in for a national dialogue about class. 
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Since Frederick Winslow Taylor published his systematic theory of industrial 
management in the early 1900s, corporate interests have attempted to use principles of 
psychology to control workers.11  Taylor’s “scientific management” system used detailed 
time and motion studies to identify the most efficient way to complete a task, then 
required workers to strictly adhere to those specific movements. Taylor also radically 
altered the way work was completed and evaluated by jettisoning the traditional “work 
gang” approach in which groups of workers were the unit of production, as well as the 
entities to which pay rates and bonuses were allotted. Taylor found that system 
inefficient, and argued that the individual worker could be more effectively motivated 
and evaluated. He claimed that “[p]ersonal ambition always has been and will remain a 
more powerful incentive to exertion than a desire for the general welfare.”12 While 
individual financial incentives can clearly motivate workers, it is important to note that 
many present-day sociologists and psychologists have identified class-based differences 
in that arena. While most middle-class individuals are socialized to value individualism 
and competition, many members of the working class develop a stronger affiliation with 
group membership and fitting in.13 
 Taylor touted his system as a way for workers and management to evolve away 
from their “old mentality” of conflicting interests and toward one of cooperation: workers 
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would have to adhere to management’s detailed work plans, rather than performing tasks 
as they themselves thought best. But management, for its part, would have to reward 
workers’ increased productivity with generous bonuses of up to, but never exceeding, an 
extra 60 percent. Although Taylor believed that his system was in the workers’ best 
interest, he also warned that bonuses of more than the recommended 60 percent could 
result in workers who were “shiftless, extravagant, and dissipated,” betraying an 
underlying middle-class paternalism. Additionally, many managers ignored both his 
insistence on incentive bonuses and his warnings against raising production norms, with 
the result that the practical application of Taylorism spawned intense resentment in 
workforces. After a 1910 time study at a government arsenal in Massachusetts sparked a 
strike, U.S. Representative William Wilson, a former miner and future Secretary of 
Labor, took Taylor to task for using the veneer of scientism to give employers even more 
power over their employees.14   
Hugo Münsterberg, the head of the psychological laboratory at Harvard, admired 
Taylor’s work but believed that Taylor erred by neglecting psychology in his system. In 
his 1912 Psychologie und Wirtschaftsleben: Ein Beitrag zur angewandten Experimental-
Psychologie, Münsterberg described the beneficial relationship that he envisioned for 
psychology and industry. While the German title was simply descriptive (“Psychology 
and Business: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology”), the English version 
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published the following year suggested a stronger claim: Psychology and Industrial 
Efficiency. Although the book’s title reflects a management perspective, Münsterberg, 
like Taylor, insisted that implementation of his plans would benefit workers as well, “We 
must not forget,” he wrote, “that the increase of industrial efficiency by future 
psychological adaptation and by improvement of the psychophysical conditions is not 
only in the interest of the employers, but still more of the employees; their working time 
can be reduced, their wages increased, their level of life raised.” 15  
 Münsterberg outlined several arenas in which he believed that psychology could 
benefit business, such as worker fatigue, monotony, physiology, movement, training, and 
the effects of alcohol, He also advocated the application of psychology to advertising. 
However, one aspect of his work received much more attention, and had far greater 
impact on industry, than the others: over the course of the next two decades, American 
business wholeheartedly embraced Münsterberg’s suggestion that psychological testing 
techniques could be used to facilitate personnel selection. In 1915, the Carnegie Institute 
of Technology established the Division of Applied Psychology, the first psychological 
consulting service for industry. The facility focused on developing personnel selection 
tools to help reduce employee turnover. The same year, Carnegie debuted a Bureau of 
Salesmanship Research, which was funded by annual $500 subscriptions from 30 
participating companies; two years later, a Research Bureau for Retail Training was 
added. Though Carnegie took the lead in providing psychological services to industry, 
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Wirtschaftsleben (Leipzig: J. A. Earth, 1912); Psychology and Industrial Efficiency (Boston: Houghton-
 
 116 
other psychologists followed throughout the nineteen teens. World War I provided a 
large-scale laboratory in which psychologists could refine their standardized testing 
procedures, as they administered the group intelligence test to 1.7 million recruits before 
war’s end. In addition, psy professionals responded to the demands of war by developing 
tests for vocational aptitude.16   
After the war, the next major application of psychology in the workplace was the 
result of what is now known as the Hawthorne studies. In 1924, the Western Electric 
Company initiated a series of studies on the effects of various working hours, rest 
periods, and lighting levels at its Hawthorne plant in Cicero, Illinois. In the lighting 
study, two groups of workers were given the same tasks in two different rooms; in one 
room, the level of light was kept constant, and in the other, it was varied. However, the 
results were unexpected: both the control and experimental groups increased productivity 
during the project, regardless of lighting levels. Over the span of nine years, Western 
Electric researchers explored possible reasons for the boost in productivity. They 
eventually theorized that the increased management attention to workers in the study had 
made the workers feel valued, and that this positive emotional response had heightened 
the workers’ motivation to perform well.17 
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Study results trickled out piecemeal in journal articles and books until 1934, when 
a more complete history, Management and the Worker: Technical vs. Social 
Organization in an Industrial Plant, was published. The studies’ impact on the 
developing field of industrial psychology was enormous: one 1947 article quotes an 
unnamed enthusiast’s claim that “the Hawthorne experiments are to social science what 
Galileo’s demonstration of falling weights was toe the physical sciences.”18 The 
Hawthorne experiments were significant in that they marked a pioneering use of “soft,” 
or qualitative, social science in industry, rather than the customary quantitative research; 
rather than simply measuring responses, these studies aimed to understand the worker’s 
experience. One particular aspect of the experiment was widely publicized: Hawthorne 
researchers had discovered that worker compliance could be increased by simply 
providing a forum for worker complaints, even if those complaints were never addressed.  
If workers believed they had a voice, their resistance to management practices decreased 
dramatically. Unsurprisingly, however, once workers became aware that their grievances 
were simply being aired, not addressed, they were critical, as when a 1949 United Auto 
Workers’ magazine described the study as “prying into the psychiatric bowels of factory 
workers.”19  
By the 1950s, it is clear that labor had ample reason to mistrust industrial 
psychology. A then-progressive Daniel Bell charged in 1947 that social science research 
in industry didn’t take workers seriously, and that researchers “uncritically adopt 
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industry’s own conception of workers as means to be manipulated or adjusted to 
impersonal ends” (italics in original), In 1957, industrial psychologist William Gomberg 
outlined the reasons for unionists’ skepticism about his profession. He acknowledged that 
scientific management’s “one best way” of performing tasks was dehumanizing and 
unrealistic; he noted that the vocational testing in the 1920s often went hand in hand with 
“open shop” union-busting campaigns, and that the tests were sometimes used as anti-
union weapons; he described the “authoritarian control” facilitated by the Hawthorne 
experiment, and critiqued its researchers for ignoring the influence of unequal power 
relationships between management and labor. And current observers, too, have 
documented an overwhelming pro-management orientation in industrial psychology.20 
IO psychologist Michael Zickar has suggested several reasons for this early 
alignment with management. He notes that management ties facilitated IO psychologists’ 
access to data, allowing employees to be interviewed or tested while they were on the 
clock. He also argues that the alignment with management was more financially lucrative 
and prestigious than a neutral position or an affiliation with labor would have been. 
Additionally, very few early IO psychologists were strong proponents of labor. Zickar 
suggests that the lack of early IO leaders who played that role dissuaded future 
practitioners. Zickar also describes labor unions’ early mistrust of psychologists, as well 
as social scientists in general. Additionally, psychologists have generally embraced a 
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perspective that, like functionalism in sociology, emphasizes common goals instead of 
conflict. This perspective—that of the personnel management school—minimized the 
conflicting interests and power dynamics that many unionists saw as central to their 
relations with management. Interestingly, Zickar argues that the financial motive was not 
a primary one, based on the fact that neither economists nor sociologists embraced a 
management perspective in the way that psychologists did.21 However, Zickar fails to 
recognize that by mid-century, psychologists had different expectations of financial 
reward than did other social scientists. Unlike sociologists or economists, large numbers 
of psychologists were establishing successful private practices in this era, a fact that 
could not have escaped the IO professionals.  
There were exceptions. Gomberg himself maintained a pro-labor perspective 
throughout his thirty-year publishing career; Ross Stagner, president of the Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology from 1965-1966, remained staunchly pro-labor; 
and Arthur Kornhauser worked to develop an industrial psychology that would focus on 
improving worker wellbeing.  Kornhauser and the others, unlike most of their 
contemporaries, were acutely aware of middle-class tendencies to blame low-income 
people for their lack of success and for their problems. From 1951 to 1957, Kornhauser 
studied the mental health of Detroit autoworkers under a grant from NIMH.  Starting with 
his concern over the body of literature indicating higher levels of psychological problems 
in low-income groups, Kornhauser sought to find out whether factory workers were well 
                                                




adjusted, and whether their relative status at work had any bearing on that adjustment. 
His work controlled for education, background, and preexisting mental issues, and 
focused on how the men fared once in the factory.  In contrast to the “deficiency model” 
studies that assumed a relationship between low socioeconomic position and poor mental 
health, Kornhauser found that “mental health is dependent on factors associated with the 
job,” and suggested a series of plausible causes, including low pay, noisy and stressful 
factory environments, unused potential, repetitive work, and lack of autonomy.22 
 National Institute for Labor Education 
 The relative success of unions in the 1950s led to standardization of union 
processes, an expansion of union bureaucracy, and a widening of the scope of union 
activities. As part of that widening scope, The National Institute of Labor Education was 
chartered in the fall of 1957.  This new organization solidified what had begun in 1951 as 
a temporary liaison between university industrial relations departments and AFL-CIO 
education directors.  Its board membership was drawn from an assortment of academics, 
government bureaucrats, and labor representatives, the latter of whom were hand-picked 
by AFL-CIO president George Meany.  NILE’s stated purpose was to “foster 
experimentation in labor education and increase the educational opportunities provided 
for workers,” and mental health was on its agenda from the beginning, in addition to 
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other topics such as individuals’ union participation, community participation, use of 
leisure time, civil liberties, and technological change.23   
This was the environment in which NILE, clearly backed by labor interests but 
taking pains to insist that it didn’t speak for labor, expressed its interest in mental health.  
However, the organization was conceived as a research broker rather than a research 
entity; it obtained and disbursed funding, but didn’t conduct its own research, so in 1958, 
NILE executive director Joseph Mire began the search for a psychological professional to 
head a mental health study.  He found Robert Reiff, a clinical psychologist who had been 
a shop steward in the Detroit auto industry.  Reiff wasn’t his first choice—he had made at 
least one previous offer, asking Karl U. Smith, a psychology professor teaching in the 
business school at Indiana University, to direct the program on a part-time basis.  But 
Smith had decided not to take on the project, and Reiff became principal investigator. 24  
 The first order of business was to secure funding, and Mire and Reiff managed to 
obtain an initial grant from the National Institute of Mental Health to support a year of 
secondary source research and planning.  Their timing was good: NIMH was just ten 
years old, and had seen its budget grow exponentially during that period. While its 
Research Grants and Fellowships Branch had funded 37 projects in 1948, its first year of 
operation, for a total of $366,961, by 1960—the first year that the NILE Program applied 
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for funding—NIMH made 908 awards for a total amount of $18,406,509. Three years 
later, the total award amount had almost doubled again, to $34 million.25 
 Luckily also, the early NIMH funding philosophy cast a wide net. While a 
disproportionate number of projects involved child development, juvenile delinquency, 
physiological psychology, and pharmacology, NIMH funded projects in incredibly 
diverse areas. As one observer acknowledged, “lacking definite clues to the etiology or 
best methods of treatment of mental illness, it is wisest to support the best research in any 
and all fields related to mental illness.” This eclectic approach thus funded researches on 
topics as varied as hypnosis, speech intonation, and test anxiety. It also funded a small 
number of projects that addressed social class. A Harvard project received a year of 
funding to study the antecedents of adolescent behavior in lower classes; a University of 
Michigan study received three years of funding to investigate shift work and mental 
health (1960-1962); a separate University of Michigan project examined job environment 
and mental health performance (1960). But from a listing of the top 10 academic 
institutions whose researchers were recipients of NIMH funding between 1948 and 1963, 
only those three projects—out of 350 total—explicitly involved social class. 
The Mental Health Program: Theoretical Orientation and Development 
The initial NILE proposal specified two kinds of projects that the Mental Health 
Program would develop:  projects that would use labor organizations as a “channel for 
mental health education,” and projects that would explore how unions could help 
                                                
25 Charles E. Rice, “The Research Grants Program of the National Institute of Mental Health and the 
Golden Age of American Academic Psychology,” in Psychology and the National Institute of Mental 
Health: A Historical Analysis of Science, Practice, and Policy, ed. Wade E. Pickren and Stanley F. 
Schneider (Washington , DC: American Psychological Association, 2005), 63. 
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“[adjust] plant conditions to meet psychological needs of workers.”26 While both project 
types clearly reflect the NILE emphasis on labor’s stake in mental health, the underlying 
assumptions of the two descriptions differ notably. The first project type, mental health 
education, reflects an older progressive tradition of so-called “uplift,” and is basically an 
attempt to continue longstanding efforts at paternalistic mental hygiene education. This 
goal reflected the parent NILE’s own focus as a labor education entity, but was also 
clearly a response to reports in the literature of low-income group resistance to and 
misunderstanding of psychology, reports that were discredited by the 1970s and shown to 
reflect practitioner class biases more than patient deficiencies.27 However, based on 
worries about such alleged deficiencies, the labor leaders and psychological practitioners 
on the NILE board made educating workers about mental health central to their project. It 
is important to note that the premise of this educational model is that it is the worker who 
is deficient, and who needs to change.   
The second project type, adjusting plant conditions to meet the needs of workers, 
is based on a very different assumption; its premise is that plant conditions, not the 
worker, are deficient. Industrial psychologist Arthur Kornhauser was a pioneer of this 
approach, and the NILE Program’s principal investigator, Robert Reiff, emphasized this 
perspective, but it was definitely the minority view. It is clear from the two project types 
that the NILE Program both conformed to and challenged middle-class assumptions 
about lower-income groups, but Reiff chose to highlight his role as challenger.  In his 
                                                
26 Reiff, Final Report, 4, NILER. 
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final report to NIMH, eight years after the NILE Program began, Reiff decried “the 
managerial bias of industrial mental health programs and their near-exclusive concern with 
increased productivity and efficiency,” and insisted that, under his guidance, the 
Program’s orientation had focused on “maximizing the worker and his potentialities 
rather than maximizing output.”28 
However, despite Reiff’s claims, the surviving documentation from the NILE 
Program tells a different story. It provides a fascinating glimpse of how even the most 
well-intentioned middle-class attempts to address working-class issues could be weighted 
with faulty assumptions and miscommunications. For example, early in the program, 
Reiff air mailed a request to Lew Carliner, a United Autoworkers appointee to the 
advisory committee, to ask him to arrange a get-together at his home so that faculty at the 
Washington School of Psychiatry and “some labor people” could meet.  The explanation 
for his request was awkward:  “You will notice, in the Progress Report,” he wrote, “I 
state that the top labor leaders of the country want education in behavioral science, but 
evidently this is only hearsay evidence and I would like to have a frank discussion with 
some of them to find out exactly what their feelings about this are.” 29 Reiff, apparently 
acting with the best of intentions, initially presumed to speak for labor leaders based only 
on hearsay.  
                                                                                                                                            
27 See Laura Smith, “Psychotherapy, Classism, and the Poor,” American Psychologist 60, no. 7 (2005): 
687-696. 
28 Reiff, unpublished final report, 8-9. 
29 December 15, 1959 letter from Reiff to Carliner. Box 34 Folder: Consultants 1963 Carliner, NILER. 
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 The Awkwardness of Addressing Class 
Another problematic perspective was aired at an advisory board committee 
meeting in 1960, still early in the program. Charles Strother, a psychology professor 
from the University of Washington, wrote a note asking whether “research in theoretical 
class questions [would] raise antagonisms to the educational project on labor’s part.” 
While his concern may have been a reaction to the conservatism of business unionism, it 
could just as credibly reflect his embarrassed middle-class assumption that it would be 
impolite to draw attention to workers’ subordinate class positions.30  The handwritten 
meeting notes give no indication of a clear answer, but later another academic suggested 
conducting a survey of psychiatrists to find out “if they have labor patients and what their 
experience is.” This proposed reliance on professional-class informants to provide 
working-class perspectives seems problematically indirect, and suggests an unintentional 
silencing of the non-middle class perspective.31 Both of these moments indicate that at 
least some of the middle-class board members, despite the mission of the Program, had 
no real contact with or understanding of working-class people. 
                                                
30 Gerrie Casey describes a similar dynamic among some of her middle-class faculty colleagues at the City 
University of New York, who intentionally avoid discussions of class with their predominantly working-
class students out of what Casey sees as a misguided fear of causing embarrassment or offense. Casey, “But 
She Brings So Much More to the Table!: The Not-So-Hidden Injuries of Class and Race at the City 
University of New York” (paper presented at the biannual conference of the Center for Study of Working 
Class Life, Stony Brook, New York, June 2008). 
31 Many working-class theorists address the silencing of working-class voices; see, for instance, Barbara 
Jensen; Michelle Fine and Lois Weis, Silenced Voices and Extraordinary Conversations: Re-Imagining 
Schools (New York: Teachers College Press, 2003); and Tony Crowley, Language in History: Theories 




Despite the limits of their cultural understanding, participants seemed to have a 
generally progressive agenda. Mire, a nonacademic, suggested making work more 
pleasant, and the next day Strother asked for suggestions about how to conduct research 
on the effects that working conditions might have on the mental health of workers.  
Strother’s question, which clearly reflects Kornhauser’s work, is the only early indication 
of thoughts about “maximizing the worker and his potentialities.”  When the advisory 
committee meeting notes were typed, the front page of the final copy was marked with a 
large red stamp reading: “FOR PRIVATE USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLICATION.”  
The document specified that the Program’s first and primary objective should be meeting 
the mental health education needs of labor—in other words, falling back on the 
perception that the main problem was the failure of the working class to appropriately 
understand and take advantage of the benefits of mainstream psychology.  Research into 
labor and mental health issues, which could potentially challenge those perceptions by 
examining class-based psychological practices, unhealthy work environments, and the 
like, would be secondary. 
Labor’s Role in the Program 
As the Program continued, it became clear that Reiff was fighting an uphill battle 
in his efforts to create a true collaboration of academics and labor representatives. The 
Program was never designed to hire its own researchers, but rather planned to recruit 
collaborative research teams, approve projects, and disburse the NIMH funds. Reiff 
consistently reminded academic participants that the projects were required to be 
collaborative. In his first newsletter to research teams, distributed in 1961, Reiff wrote: 
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The cooperation of labor is essential for the successful completion of the 
Project … It is therefore essential that university study committees should 
be truly cooperative enterprises between representatives of labor 
organizations and university personnel.  Labor representatives must 
become regular members of the committees and should participate on an 
equal basis with members of the university team. … N.I.L.E. … will not 
support a university-union study committee which does not include 
representatives of the labor movement.32   [Emphasis in original.] 
 
 While the emphasis seems awkwardly heavy handed to modern ears, Reiff’s 
concern was apparently justified. In a private letter to the board, Reiff mentioned that two 
University of Michigan researchers, Drs. John French and Robert Kahn, had committed 
to the Program, but added, “Dr. French, however, qualified his willingness to work on 
this study by stipulating that he felt that the kind of labor people whom he had to work 
with would be crucial.  He was concerned with the problem of labor people 
understanding the problems of basic research.  We assured him that we would try to find 
labor representatives who would understand the problems of basic research.” Although 
Dr. French’s obvious condescension would seem to make him a less-than-desirable 
candidate for a program whose stated goal was “maximizing the worker and his 
potentialities,” there is no indication in the records that his suitability for the work was 
ever questioned.33    
 It is too easy, of course, to criticize Reiff for not living up to his own rhetoric.  
Administrative positions require compromise and the ability to actually produce results, 
and very few ideologues administrate well.  But other signals from this period also 
                                                
32 Reiff, N.I.L.E. Mental Health Project Bulletin 1 (May 1961), Box 5 Folder 14, NILER. 
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indicate that Reiff’s approach may be problematic.  Earlier that spring, the man that Mire 
had originally wanted to direct the program, Karl Smith, answered his friend Mire’s 
request for help this way:  
Certainly, I will be glad to serve on your committee, if [for] no other 
reason than to express my views about the nature of your man, Bob Reiff. 
… I am going to explain … how the program has been altered, watered 
down, and turned into an adjustment conformity program by Reiff.  …  I 
am going to ask Ivan to appoint a subcommittee of some sort or another to 
see … that the money is not wasted by a series of clinical psychological 
and psychiatric talkie artists.34 
 
Mire’s reply reminded Smith that he had been given a chance to direct the project, and 
that it was only natural for the project to have shifted to reflect its actual director’s 
perspectives.  Then, since they were friends, he ended with a joke.35  And Mire himself 
could certainly seem ambivalent about NILE’s orientation; in correspondence with a 
university representative that same spring, he wrote, “The union people are putting a lot 
of pressure on us to include them in the program,” a statement that raises serious 
questions about how serious administrators were about the collaborative nature of the 
Program. 
 The Research Agenda 
 Perhaps the best way to evaluate the extent of the NILE Program’s challenge to 
middle-class normativity is by examining the research agendas chosen for funding. Reiff 
                                                                                                                                            
33 April 16, 1961 letter from Reiff to the executive committee, Box 34, Folder: Advisory Committee 1961, 
NILER. 
34 March 27, 1961 letter from Smith to Mire, Box 5, Folder 14, NILER. 
35 He wrote, “As per your request, I am adding another story, presumably also coming from Republican 
sources.  Somebody asked for directions on how to get a job in the new administration.  Back came the 




and NILE had vetted ten projects, and were requesting funding to begin January 1, 1963, 
and extend for four years.   Three of the ten teams withdrew from consideration for 
various reasons—Cornell missed a deadline, UCLA was unable to secure labor support, 
and Roosevelt bristled at NILE’s suggested project changes and decided to apply to 
NIMH independently.  The remaining projects were varied. Wayne State University 
submitted three separate proposals; others came from Rutgers University, the University 
of Minnesota, Ohio State University, and the University of California at Berkeley.  
Three of the final proposals were for traditional mental health education programs, 
reflecting an underlying assumption that it is the worker who is deficient and needs to 
change. Another two teams planned to study the effects of certain situations on 
workers—prolonged unemployment and technological innovation. These two projects 
seem assumption neutral; they neither reflect middle-class perspectives nor necessarily 
challenge them. Another team proposed an educational project that would not only 
educate workers about mental health, but also educate mental health professionals about 
workers. While the first part of this proposal is traditional, the second part allows the 
possibility of a challenge to existing assumptions. Only one of the chosen teams 
submitted a proposal that would have clearly challenged mainstream assumptions about 
low-income groups. 
Wayne State’s first proposal was a straightforward plan to develop education 
materials on mental health problems “as they actually confront union leaders in the 
shop.”  The team explained that such problems often manifest themselves as “chronic 
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absenteeism, or peculiar or idiosyncratic behavior and usually end up in the grievance 
procedure,” and proposed to develop a casebook for union stewards and committeemen.  
The Rutgers University proposal aimed to develop a rehabilitation program for 
union members returning from mental hospitals, a traditionally difficult transition.  The 
research plan called for a survey of the problem and its scope, a more in-depth study of 
actual returning patients, and a series of workshops with labor leaders to develop 
solutions. Here, though, the challenges were framed in terms of the inappropriate and 
stigmatizing reactions of co-workers, so followed the traditional mental health education 
model and assumptions. Additionally, the language of the proposal did not demonstrate 
any particular understanding of or empathy with working-class perspectives. In contrast 
to more sensitive theorists of the era who consciously attempted to empathetically 
understand the unique nature of working-class problems, the Rutgers team sounded 
clinical and detached about their topic, writing “It is hoped that if an adequate 
conceptualization of stress can be developed for the working class patient that his 
rehabilitation can be handled more intelligently. It is suspected that our eventual 
understanding of working class patients may be different from our present general 
understanding of middle class patients.”36 
The University of Minnesota also proposed a mental health education campaign, 
although this team’s proposal suggested addressing mental health aspects of collective 
bargaining and legislative and social action as well as direct education of workers.  The 
                                                
36 Rutgers University, “Project Proposal: Study to Formulate Rehabilitation Program for Union Members 
Returning from Mental Hospitals,” Box 5 Folder 13, NILER. 
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first three proposals, then, conform to the traditional mental-heath education paradigm.  
In addition, Wayne State’s second submission suggested a mental health education 
project aimed at workers themselves, with the secondary goal of training psychological 
professionals to effectively educate working-class people about mental health.  While the 
first part of this plan falls within the traditional parameters, the second part allows the 
possibility of a challenge to existing assumptions. 
The next two proposals are, at least in proposal form, relatively neutral.  Ohio 
State University submitted a plan to investigate the effects of prolonged unemployment 
on workers’ mental health, and The University of California at Berkeley proposed a study 
of technological innovations in an auto plant, focusing on the impact on workers’ mental 
health.  The team discussed findings that industrial workers’ gratifications on the job 
were more dependent on social relationships at work than on the work itself, and pointed 
out that automation disrupted those social relationships by dismantling work groups.   
One proposal, however, did seem to have potential to challenge middle-class 
assumptions about low-income groups. The third Wayne State University proposal 
sought to adapt psychotherapy to the needs of working-class patients.  Citing the body of 
literature about the middle-class assumptions underlying the psychotherapeutic process, 
the team proposed to identify specific ways in which that process differs between classes 




by evaluating the actual therapies of an equal number of middle- and working-class 
patients as those therapies occurred.37   
There is no indication in the records of the NILE Program that the Wayne State 
research was ever conducted.38 What is clear is that, despite Reiff’s later assertion that the 
NILE Program focused on “maximizing the worker and his potentialities,” the bulk of the 
proposals selected did reflect typical middle-class perceptions about low-income groups. 
In light of Reiff’s desire to challenge those perceptions, it seems that several factors 
combined to neutralize that challenge.  First, the university base of the projects likely 
fostered the traditional middle-class view, since virtually all industrial relations 
departments were, by definition, pro-management. Second, the intellectual parameters 
that each team’s primary investigator was comfortable with would almost certainly 
reflect the bulk of contemporary scholarship, which was traditional. Finally, it is likely 
that team members and NILE Program staff self-censored toward a traditional view to 
maximize their chances of having their projects funded by NIMH.   
To Err Is Human:  The Director 
By late 1962 and early 1963, Reiff was embroiled in protecting his turf.  Advisory 
committee member Margery Mack, a social science consultant for the mental health 
section of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Region V, called him to 
                                                
37 All project descriptions from “Proposed Plan of Work of the N.I.L.E. Mental Health Project from the 
Text of the Grant Application Submitted to the National Institute of Mental Health,” June 1, 1962, Box 5 
Folder 13: Mental Health Continuation Project II 1962, NILER. 
38 By March 1963, the program director for the Wayne State project, Frank Auld, had withdrawn his 
proposal from NILE and applied for funding directly from NIMH, as noted in personal correspondence 
from Auld to an NIMH official on March 4, 1963; Box 33, unnumbered folder, NILER. However, none of 
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task for the description of his role that he drafted for the NIMH proposal.  She 
particularly questioned his claim that he should assess the team projects for adherence to 
their goals, since, as she reminded him, Public Health Service policy was to allow each 
grantee full freedom once the grant was made.  Reiff seems to have written himself a 
more authoritative role in the Program than funding rules (or professional practice) would 
allow.  
At the same time that Mack was trimming Reiff’s wings, Mire was noting in his 
personal files that NIMH would prefer to award individual grants to each research team 
rather than to NILE, as it had in the past, but that it hoped to keep Reiff on as co-director 
of each project “to maintain the character of a cooperative project,” though one wonders 
if “appearance” wouldn’t have been a more precise choice of words. At the very least, the 
shifting of funds to the research teams deprived Reiff of any real supervisory power over 
the projects. During the same period, Lawrence Rogin, director of education for the AFL-
CIO and vice-president of NILE, refused Reiff’s invitation to join the advisory committee 
of the Program.  Rogin’s curt message ended, “I definitely do not want to serve.  I have 
neither the time nor the specific interest.  I think the three representatives which you have 
are satisfactory.”39   
Reiff responded by throwing himself into public relations work.  He released the 
Program’s first report in June 1963, “Issues in the New National Mental Health Program 
                                                                                                                                            
Auld’s subsequent publications addressed the topic of class, nor did the work of the other researchers listed 
on the proposal. 
39 July 10, 1962 Letter from Mack to Reiff, Box 34 Folder: Consultants 1963/64, NILER; January 22, 1963 
memo to files from Mire, Box 5, File 11, NILER; and July 12, 1962 letter from Rogin to Reiff, Box 34 
Folder: Consultants 1963 Rogin, NILER. 
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Relating to Labor and Low Income Groups,” which, as the title indicates, broadened the 
Program’s focus to include a broader swath of the non-middle-class population, insisting 
that “there appears to be no significant difference [between what he now calls “blue 
collar workers” and low-income groups] insofar as attitudes, values and expectations 
about mental illness are concerned.”  The report justified that expansion by adding, 
inaccurately, that the labor movement has “historically and traditionally been the 
organized expression of the needs and interests of all the deprived sections of the 
community.”   
“Issues in the New National Mental Health Program…” also incorporated some 
now-familiar social justice concepts like the accessibility of services to lower-income 
people, both in terms of geographic location and hours of operation, since many people in 
this population lack control over their own working hours.  It also, for the first time, 
addressed ways the providers could avoid making patients feel stigmatized by free or 
reduced-fee rates.  Finally, it articulated the “need to help mental health professionals 
increase their understanding of the style of life, values, and attitudes of blue-collar 
workers and their families.”40  While all of these points seem like standard progressive 
fare to current observers, they demonstrate a departure in style and in perspective from 
both previous Program writings and from the four reports published later.   
In addition to releasing the report, Reiff instituted a new newsletter, titled “Mental 
Health Issues.” The debut issue again summarized NILE’s mission, wrote a laudatory 
                                                
40 NILE, “Issues in the New National Mental Health Program Relating to Labor and Low Income Groups,” 
June 1963.   
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article about a Wayne State University “Psychology of Adjustment” course sponsored by 
the Wayne County AFL-CIO, and, of course, recapped President Kennedy’s Message to 
Congress, an unprecedented pitch for mental health funding.  Soon after Kennedy’s 
address, companion bills House Resolution 3688 and Senate Bill 755 were introduced to 
authorize federal funding for community mental health centers.41  Reiff, apparently still 
in the writing mood, wrote a nine-page statement in support of HR 3688 and sent it to the 
congressional committee overseeing the resolution.42 Though the records don’t indicate 
how Mire was alerted to Reiff’s politicking, we do know Mire’s response was a stern 
message to Reiff, reminding him that NILE’s program objectives limited their activities 
to educational and research efforts alone.  Lobbying was not only outside the scope of 
NILE’s mission, but jeopardized the entity’s tax exempt status.  Reiff was instructed to 
desist.43 
 Around the same time, the progressivism demonstrated in “Issues in the New 
National Mental Health Program” seemed to wane. Mire wrote to Sylvia Scribner, whose 
official title was NILE associate director, but whose lack of an archival paper trail 
suggests she may have been more of an executive secretary to Reiff.44  His note 
expressed sympathy that she and Reiff were disappointed in the “meager attendance of 
                                                
41 NILE, Mental Health Issues 1 (April 1963), Box 5 Folder 11: Mental Health I Continuation Program 
Jan-June 1963, NILER. 
42 Rieff, Statement in Support of H.R. 3688,  Box 5 Folder 11: Mental Health I Continuation Project Jan-
June 1963, NILER. 
43 May 13, 1963 letter from Mire to Reiff, Box 5 Folder 11: Mental Health I Continuation Project Jan-June 
1963, NILER. 
44 Scribner enrolled in gradate school after her work at NILE, completed a Ph.D. in psychology in 1970, 
and enjoyed an impressive teaching and publishing career.  
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labor people, both at the cocktail party and the program session.”  He pointed out, 
however, that the individuals in question  
are essentially local union people, in Detroit, Chicago, and somewhere in 
New Jersey.  …  The three people from the I.A.M. who did attend the 
cocktail party … felt quite uneasy, as they told me, and their presence was 
obviously of little value to the others or themselves.  We may find it even 
more difficult to get them next time, unless we can make them feel 
needed.45   
 
Mire’s response indicates that Reiff was insensitive to the social awkwardness “local 
union people” might feel at a cocktail party, especially at one in which they were 
strangers. While Reiff was focused on his desire for an impressive demonstration of 
union participation, he was apparently oblivious to the discomfort of the actual union 
people who did participate. However, Reiff was familiar with the sociological literature 
on class, and it is surprising that he did not anticipate the awkwardness: according to 
sociologists, members of the working class prefer socializing with family and very close 
friends, and dislike socializing across status levels.46  
 As Mire’s note to the files had suggested, NIMH decided to suspend the full grant 
approval pending resubmission as individual projects.  Reiff, apparently not noticing the 
sinking ship, accepted a move from regular employment with NILE to a contractual 
agreement.  On the face of it, though, the broader project was going well.  Congress 
passed the Community Mental Health Centers Act in October; a number of unions were 
winning mental health insurance at the bargaining table; and a handful were establishing 
                                                
45 March 8, 1963  letter from Mire to Scribner. Box 5 Folder 11: Mental Health I Continuation Project Jan-
June 1963, NILER. 
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their own mental health centers.  The enthusiasm and sense of possibility generated in the 
mental health community by President Kennedy’s message to Congress and the 
subsequent enactment of the Community Centers Act must have been exhilarating.   
But the Act had its opponents, and even sparked controversy among the 
President’s advisors over whether the new resources would be used to improve and 
develop the existing mental health system, or whether the entire paradigm should be 
revised.  The revisionists won, many mental hospitals lost their funding in favor of the 
new community centers, and traditional state control was ceded to or shared with the 
federal government.47   
In the midst of the brouhaha, one voice was notably silent.  Labor had not spoken 
out on the pending mental health issues as late as summer of 1963, as Program advisory 
board member Lisbeth Bamberger, assistant director of the Department of Social Security 
for the AFL-CIO, reminded Program participants at the June 1963 advisory board 
meeting.  She counseled the group to be patient and prepared to contribute with 
information and suggestions when asked (and one can imagine that sentiment being 
directed at Reiff). Another member, Edward Linzer, director of program services for The 
National Association for Mental Health, Inc. asked a series of questions about NILE’s 
relationship with the labor movement.  As someone, presumably Reiff, parroted the party 
line that NILE doesn’t speak for labor, Lew Carliner from United Autoworkers pointed 
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out that the Program had expanded from its initial function, and suggested that the 
Program’s labor representation be reviewed.  Perhaps, he added, higher-ranking union 
officials should become involved. 
 And, in fact, organized labor did intensify its public involvement with mental health 
issues.  In May 1964, the AFL-CIO sponsored a three-day Meeting on Mental Health in 
New York City.  However, AFL-CIO organizers did not call on the NILE Mental Health 
Program to take a major role in the meeting. In fact, the Program’s participation consisted 
of two paper presentations.  Frank Riessman, a new member of NILE’s advisory board 
and a faculty member at Columbia University, presented “The Under-Utilization of 
Mental Health Services by Workers and Low Income Groups: Causes and Cures.”  As the 
title implies, the paper listed examples of new mental health services for low-income 
people, then documented the fact that they weren’t being used.  It ended by calling on 
labor to help educate people about the benefits of mental health services.  Riessman did 
try to differentiate between the old “traditional mental hygiene stress on ‘attitude 
change,’” which he presumably recognized as centered around middle-class values and 
perspectives, and his current proposal, which he saw as “in keeping with the established 
orientation in labor education which links education with action” [emphasis in original].48   
Reiff also presented a paper at the meeting, “New Directions in Mental Health for 
Labor and Professionals.” However, Reiff’s involvement in this major confluence of 
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labor and mental health was minimal: he did not help with the organization of the 
meeting, and the single paper he presented was mostly recycled from earlier reports and 
proposals.  In addition, by his name on the title page, he listed both his position as 
director of NILE and his new appointment as director of the division of psychology at 
Albert Einstein College of Medicine.  While later board correspondence indicates that 
Reiff had hoped to develop his NILE and Einstein work in tandem, the board perceived a 
conflict of interest. 
 The Program’s marginalized position at the meeting was no one-time oversight.  
With NIMH funding projects on an individual basis, the Program—and Reiff—were 
unnecessary.  NIMH slashed the Program’s budget and requested a final report. For his 
part, Reiff apparently refused to either recognize or acknowledge this shift, leading to 
two years of squabbles with the board.  By the end of 1964, Reiff had tried to fund an 
Einstein project surreptitiously via the NILE Program, without the board’s consent; had 
tried and failed to have the Program fund Reiff’s travel to Europe for a meeting; and had 
begun a spat with the New York Central Labor Body over credit for part of a training 
plan. Reiff’s financial accounting also became problematic; the board began questioning, 
then denying, reimbursement for various expenses, particularly those that seemed to be 
related to Reiff’s position at Einstein.  There were questions about where proceeds from 
report sales had gone, and expensive recording went missing from Reiff’s office. Perhaps 
most frustrating for Mire and the board was Reiff’s interminable delay in delivering a 
final report. By the time Reiff finally submitted the report in December 1966, it was more 




than a year and a half late, the NILE board was threatening legal action, and NIMH was 
strongly suggesting that Reiff would never be funded again. 
 Conceptual Flaws 
 However, the Program had more deeply rooted problems than its choice of 
director. The philosophical disconnect indicated by the two primary Program goals of 
developing mental health education programs on one hand and adjusting plant conditions 
to benefit the worker’s mental health on the other were never clearly identified or 
addressed by anyone involved in the Program. And Reiff, while paying lip service to the 
Kornhauser perspective, only briefly demonstrated a truly progressive view on the mental 
health of low-income and working-class individuals in “Issues in the New National 
Mental Health Program.” Although he frequently reminded the Program’s university 
researchers to incorporate labor participation in their work, he himself often neglected to 
include labor representatives in Program discussions and events.  
Additionally, there were conceptual problems with both main components of the 
research part of the Program. The university researchers were based in industrial relations 
departments, which, as we have seen, tended to be overwhelmingly pro-management. In 
addition, the intellectual parameters that each team’s primary investigator was 
comfortable with would almost certainly reflect the bulk of contemporary scholarship, 
which was traditional; and finally, it is likely that team members and NILE Program staff 
self-censored toward a traditional management view to maximize their chances of having 
their projects funded by NIMH.   
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 For their part, the labor representatives involved were labor leaders, and thus 
more socialized into a middle-class worldview than were the rank-and-file workers.  As 
trade unionist and writer Sidney Lens described the postwar labor representative, “His 
own salary and benefits become progressively larger by comparison with the members 
who still work at the lathe, and his economic stake tends to make him moderate just as 
the secure doctor or lawyer tends in the same direction. He is now an ‘organization 
man.’” No rank-and-file workers were ever invited to participate in the NILE Program, 
and there is reason to doubt whether the officials who did participate completely 
understood the perspective of or the issues facing the average worker. One study 
published in the early 1960s found that even shop stewards, people in volunteer positions 
at the lowest level of union bureaucracy, identified with the professional union officials. 
They also tended to see rank-and-file workers as apathetic and in need of “a lesson.”49 
 Other developments in the postwar period deradicalized unions and widened the 
gulf between membership and leadership. A newly elected Republican Congress 
responded to the wave of postwar labor strikes by passing the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act 
in 1947, overriding President Truman’s veto. The new law curtailed a number of union 
strategies and provided more power to businesses. In addition, it prohibited communists 
from holding leadership positions in unions, resulting in large-scale anti-communist 
purges. Labor leaders turned to a model of business unionism that downplayed the natural 
conflict of interest between management and workers, emphasizing cooperation instead. 
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Unions did manage to get wage increases for their members during the postwar 
prosperity boom, but often at the expense of autonomy on the shop floor. The model of 
business unionism expanded the administrative functions of unions to the extent that 
many unions themselves came to resemble large, bureaucratic businesses. 
Simultaneously, Cold War anti-communism provided union leaders with the means to 
purge rivals and stifle dissent about union strategies. Ultimately, business unionism 
seems to have made union leaders even poorer representatives of actual workers.50 
 Conclusions 
 While practitioners of industrial-organizational psychology were uniquely 
positioned to develop a more sympathetic and nuanced view of working people than 
other psychologists had, the discipline overwhelmingly did not take advantage of that 
position. Instead, its practitioners aligned themselves with management and used their 
professional knowledge to help industry weed out potential union members among job 
applicants, as well as to control and manipulate workers. It is unsurprising, then, that 
industrial workers developed negative views of psychology and its practitioners.  
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Chapter Three. Popular Representations and Polysemic Readings of Psychology  
in the Postwar Period 
 For 50 years, millions of Americans chuckled over the Peanuts comic strip in 
their daily papers as Lucy invariably cut off Charlie Brown’s angst-ridden soul searching 
with a dismissive one-liner and the inevitable tag line, “That will be 5¢, please.”  The 
representation of psychological professionals and psychological help as somehow similar 
to a bossy, self-interested elementary-schooler peddling advice from a makeshift 
lemonade stand apparently struck a chord with a sizeable part of the American public. 
And Lucy was by no means the only fictionalized psychotherapist capturing public 
attention in the postwar era. Psy professionals were also making appearances in short 
stories, novels, plays, movies, and the increasingly popular new medium of television.  
These newly popular fictional representations reflected a much broader trend of 
public interest in psychology. Scores of newspaper and magazine articles offered 
enthusiastic accounts of this rapidly popularizing science. But observers, both in that era 
and the present one, noted an interesting difference between the factual and fictional 
representations. While the mass-circulation, mainstream nonfiction accounts of the psy 
sciences tended to be celebratory, a surprising percentage of the fictional representations 
of psy professionals were unflattering.  Like Peanuts’ Lucy, many fictional psychologists 
were portrayed as self-serving and uncaring; others were drawn as bumbling idiots; and a 
memorable handful were devious, manipulative, and sinister. This chapter explores the 
contours of these representative tropes. In addition, drawing on both cultural studies and 
mass media theory, it investigates the multifaceted ways in which these popular 
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representations both shaped Americans’ perceptions of psychology and were shaped by 
them. 
 As psychology’s scope, influence, and number of practitioners mushroomed in the 
postwar years, public interest in the profession expanded as well.  Psychology and its 
practitioners became increasingly common topics in all forms of mass media. In 
response, practitioners vigorously attempted to shape the emerging public perception of 
their discipline, and demonstrated a great deal of concern over popular representations of 
the field. The same month that Life magazine concluded Ernest Havemann’s celebratory 
series on “The Age of Psychology” in 1957, the editors of American Psychologist 
debuted a new regular column, “Psychology in the News,” to help readers make sense of 
their profession’s increasingly public profile. They hired a publicist with experience in 
science writing, Michael Amrine, as the regular columnist. Amrine began that first 
column by clearly differentiating his work from that of the mass-circulation press: 
“Things published about psychology perhaps fall into two classes: psychology as written 
by psychologists, for love and maybe for money, and ‘psychological’ articles written by 
nonpsychologists, for money and maybe for love.”1 He added, probably unnecessarily for 
his readers, that his approach reflected the “real” psychology. The column ran for eight 
years, crowing about positive press, harrumphing about negative press, publicizing 
skirmishes in the psychology-psychiatry turf wars, and vacillating between amazement at 
the new public interest in the profession and frustration at the public’s inability or 




 In fact, one of the most notable aspects of the explosion of psychological 
discourse in postwar America is its practitioners’ apparent obsession with what the public 
thought of them.  Situated between their shaky status in the broader medical community 
on the one hand and their new semi-celebrity status as emerging cultural icons on the 
other, psychological professionals seem to have spend an inordinate amount of time—and 
print space—trying to make sense of it all.  The professional journals were rife with 
articles titled “The Public Image of Psychology,” “The Image of the Psychiatrist,” “The 
Public’s Attitudes Towards Psychologists,” “How Others See Us,” “What the Citizen 
Knows about Psychiatry,” “Psychology Versus Psychiatry: A Study of Public Image,” 
and even “The Involvement of the Psychologist's Family in the Establishment of a Public 
Image of the Profession.”2 The main concerns outlined in this mini-genre of professional 
writing were the public’s inability to differentiate between psychologists and 
psychiatrists; the popular conflation of “legitimate” psychologists with mind-cure 
proponents and other “quacks”; and the public’s lack of familiarity with what 
psychological professionals actually did. Many of these articles urged practitioners to 
hone their public relations skills as well, as each practitioner was potentially an 
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ambassador to the public at large. In addition to these concerns, a number of psy 
professionals wrote—and write—about fictionalized representations of their professions.  
Psychology in Popular Literature 
Psychological practitioners appeared in popular literature read by Americans 
during the 1920s, debuting with the first popularization of psychology among the 
country’s educated classes. From the beginning, portrayals were generally, though not 
universally, unflattering: the psychiatrist in Virginia Woolf’s 1924 novel Mrs. Dalloway 
is bloodless and mercenary, and Mrs. Dalloway herself thinks of him as “obscurely evil.” 
The 1930 English translation of Italo Svevo’s The Confessions of Zeno features a petty 
and naïve analyst who believes a patient’s outrageous lies, then ostensibly published the 
case notes from the patient’s file in retaliation when the patient terminated his analysis. 
And Dick Diver, the analyst and protagonist of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 1934 Tender Is the 
Night, demonstrates his own weak character and lack of insight as he spirals into alcohol 
abuse, legal problems, and a disintegrating career. However, there were positive 
portrayals as well: in 1928, Ludwig Lewisohn crafted a sympathetic psychoanalyst-
protagonist in The Island Within, a novel which Bertrand Russell complimented for the 
“penetrating quality of its psychology.”3  
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For the most part, though, representations of psy professionals in literature 
continued to disappoint the actual practitioners. The analyst in Mary McCarthy’s 1942 
The Company She Keeps is pleasant, well meaning, and professional, but less emotionally 
perceptive and intelligent than the heroine. She found him average and dull, and 
occasionally thought of him in terms such as “stupid” and a “blundering sophomore,” 
though she still wanted to impress him.4 Representations of even less intelligent psy 
professionals were common, such as those in Mac Hyman’s 1954 best seller, No Time for 
Sergeants, and Joseph Heller’s 1961 classic, Catch 22. Additionally, the trope of evil and 
manipulative psychiatrists continued in novels such as Graham Greene’s 1943 The 
Ministry of Fear, William Lindsay Gresham’s 1946 Nightmare Alley, and Mickey 
Spillane’s 1947 I, The Jury.   
This preponderance of negative representation inspired one psychological 
practitioner, Charles Winick, to compile a 1963 overview that he published as “The 
Psychiatrist in Fiction.”5 Reviewing thirty-four novels published between 1925 and 1961, 
Winick found a generally dismal picture. Most of the fictional psychiatrists in private 
practice, he noted, “do not seem to be helping their patients very much.” Winick also 
noted a preponderance of “grave sexual and marital difficulties,” practitioners who were 
less admirable than their patients, and professionals who were “not very bright.” On the 
last point, Winick claimed that “there are approximately twice as many inept and foolish 
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(January 1963): 43-57. Winick himself was not a psychiatrist; he was a professor of sociology, but 
described himself as a “consulting psychologist.” See “Appeal of P[ostal] S[ervice] Docket No. 22/155,” 
online at http://www.usps.com/judicial/1986deci/22-155.htm. 
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psychiatrists in fictional institutions as there are devoted and intelligent ones.”6 Here, 
Winick was referring specifically to psychiatrists represented as working in institutions 
rather than in private practice. Frequently, the institutional novels relied for part of their 
narrative tension on a single psychiatrist who was intelligent, well meaning, and 
effective, but who had to contend with overwhelmingly inept and uncaring colleagues. 
This recurring theme seems to reflect the postwar ambivalence about institutions as well 
as conflicting attitudes towards psychiatry.  
Perhaps most troubling to Winick, though, was “the fictional psychiatrist’s 
lackluster ability to explain and predict other characters’ behavior.  … The relative 
flatness of their professional observations tends to give the reader a feeling that 
psychiatrists are fairly insightless persons.”7 The article emphasized that, even as mid-
century writers incorporated psychological themes and insights into their plots and 
characters, they were reluctant to bestow those powers of insight on the psy professionals 
they created. Winick hypothesized several possible causes, including what he saw as a 
kind of rivalry between novelists and psychiatrists. In this view, writers’ characterizations 
lead them into musings about individuals’ motivations, feelings, and perceptions that is 
similar to work done by psy professionals. Therefore, Winick surmised, the writer “may, 
though his [sic] craft, be turning the tables on a potential enemy or rival by making the 
fictional psychiatrist troubled and unable to understand himself, but with motives that are 
                                                




clear to the outside observer.”8 It is important to note that, in this view, the unflattering 
portrayals of psy professionals have more to do with writers’ insecurities and the 
resulting desire to “turn the tables” on a “potential enemy” than with any actual qualities 
of real psychiatrists.  
While the present-day reader may acknowledge the similarity of novelists’ and 
psychological professionals’ interests and approaches, one is struck today by Winick’s 
defensiveness. In addition to the “turning the tables” theory, Winick suggested three other 
possible reasons for the negative portrayals of psy characters. First, he supposed that, 
since many people are self-conscious around psy professionals, a given writer might be 
afraid of how psychiatrists would perceive the authorial self via the story. However, 
Winick never explained why a writer might mask that insecurity by portraying 
psychiatrists in unflattering ways. Second, he thought that a writer may be ambivalent 
about psychiatry, but for some unexplored reason “be able to voice only the negative side 
of his ambivalence.”9 Finally, he allowed that some writers might “actually perceive” 
psychiatrists as ineffective, he never acknowledged that at least some psy professionals 
were indeed ineffective, as are at least some members of any profession. In his frustration 
over the negative portrayals, Winick seems to taken the fictionalized image of 
psychiatrists as “insightless persons” and projected it back on to the writers themselves.  
                                                




The Caine Mutiny 
Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny is a particularly rich example of popularized 
psychology in the mid-century novel.10 Published in 1951, the novel spent 122 weeks on 
the New York Times’ best-seller list, apparently tapping into a public nostalgia for the 
purposefulness of the war years. In a 1955 cover story, Time magazine called Caine “the 
biggest U.S. bestseller since Gone with the Wind.”11 For our purposes, the book’s 
enthusiastic reception and broad readership make it an ideal vehicle through which to 
examine popular perceptions of psychology. The central focus of the novel is the 
protagonist’s slow and circuitous maturation into a man of character aboard a Naval ship 
run by the petty, abusive tyrant Captain Queeg. The captain’s punitive and unusual 
behavior intensifies until he finally freezes into indecision at the helm during a terrible 
storm. With the help of the protagonist, the naïve but noble executive officer Steve 
Maryk takes control of the ship and saves it, only to be court-martialed.  Character itself 
is a major theme in the novel, and Wouk contrasts his ideal of manly character, 
epitomized by the Maryk, with psychology and its practitioners. 
Tellingly, psychology is introduced in the novel by the character who turns out to 
be the villain of the story, an intellectual and writer named Tom Keefer who persuades 
Maryk that the captain is insane. However, when Keefer first plants that suggestion in 
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Maryk’s mind, the reader is unaware of Keefer’s manipulative and self-serving 
intentions. In fact, Keefer makes an impressive-sounding argument:  
Look, Steve, I’m no psychiatrist, but I’ve read a lot. I can give you a 
diagnosis of Queeg. It’s the clearest picture I’ve ever seen of a 
psychopathic personality. He’s a paranoid, with an obsessive-compulsive 
syndrome. I’ll bet a clinical examination would back me up a hundred per 
cent. I’ll show you the description of the type in the books—12 
 
At this point, Keefer sounds persuasive, and the reader is positioned to be frustrated by 
Maryk’s unsophisticated response: “Tom, it’s a known fact that you read a hell of a lot 
more than I do and talk better … .  You’re all wound up in big words, paranoid, 
psychopath, and all that.”13 
 However, the reader learns, along with Maryk, that Keefer’s words were as 
insubstantial as his character. Keefer continues his strategy of persuasion, adding 
“diagnoses” of infantilism and inversion to his assessment of Queeg, and urging Maryk to 
take action against the captain for the good of the ship, the crew, and the Navy. However, 
when Maryk asks Keefer to accompany him to report on the captain’s mental state, 
Keefer refuses, claiming that it’s not his place. When Maryk finally relieves the captain 
of his command for reasons of mental instability, Keefer pretends to be shocked and lies 
under oath to hide his involvement. Keefer, intellectualism, and psychology itself 
suddenly appear shallow and suspect, and readers are left wishing that Maryk had 
followed his own instincts and ignored the “big words.” The climax of the novel hinges 
                                                




on the court-martial, which in turn hinges on whether or not Queeg was insane at the time 
of the incident. 
Wouk’s characterization of the Navy psychiatrists who find Queeg sane also 
positions psychology as something that stands in opposition to moral character. One 
psychiatrist is “stout,” “pink faced,” and “good humored,” all descriptors that seem 
intended to position him as intellectually insubstantial and, in light of the novel’s 
celebration of mature masculinity, as “soft” as well. Early in his testimony, this 
psychiatrist explains that “normality, you know, is a fiction in psychiatry.”14 Maryk’s 
defense attorney presses that statement to its logical conclusion, leading the psychiatrist 
to acknowledge the fine line between psychological adjustment (defined in its 
psychoanalytic sense as effective coping strategies for underlying problems) and illness, 
and making the psychiatrist appear not quite credible in the process. He comes across as 
complacent, a bit pompous, and less than straightforward. His colleague, described as 
“extremely slender” and “youthful looking,” is presented as both inexperienced and 
arrogant. He insists that he fully understands the stresses of a Naval command, but is 
forced to later admit that he has only been in the Navy for six months and has never been 
to sea. In the world of this novel, the man is a poseur, and his psychology is an overhyped 
and ineffective tool for evaluating the real worth of men. 
In this extraordinarily popular novel, then, psychology itself is introduced as a 
seemingly sophisticated concept, but that apparent sophistication is discredited by novel’s 
                                                




end. Psychology is introduced by the self-serving villain of the story, and is embraced by 
men who are dishonest, ineffective, inexperienced, and unmanly. The attorney “wins” his 
case by using the slippery language and concepts of psychology, but he recognizes that 
what he has done is immoral. In short, the idea of psychology is suspect in The Caine 
Mutiny, and is used to obfuscate reality and manipulate others. It is worth noting that no 
mid-century reviewer I am aware of mentioned the role that psychology itself played in 
the plot. The early reviews mentioned psychology, but in the context of describing 
Queeg’s (and sometimes Maryk’s, Keefer’s, and the protagonist’s) psychodynamic 
characteristics.  
Mass Media Theory and Polysemy:  Reading Representation 
The popularity of  The Caine Mutiny notwithstanding, novels were far from the 
most popular entertainment medium of the postwar era. The advent of television had 
sparked interest in mass media studies, fueled partly by public fears about television’s 
influence on audience members. In the early days of mass media studies, researchers 
focused on their search for media effects on individuals. They tended to believe in a 
“silver bullet theory,” positing that mass-mediated messages would affect all audience 
members in the same way and to the same extent. This perspective grew from an 
underlying assumption that there was a single, large, homogenous audience, a perspective 
that was congruent with the consensus approach to history in the postwar era. This 
fostered a research agenda focused on the dissemination of information, with an implicit 
assumption that all mediums of dissemination worked in much the same ways. 
Researchers only began to challenge assumptions about the uniformity of audience 
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reception in 1961, when a study isolated children’s reactions to television, comparing 
children who watched television with those who didn’t.15  Soon after, Marshall 
McLuhan’s Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964) challenged received 
wisdom about the uniform impact of various media and initiated a more nuanced 
understanding of electronic media’s role in modern life.16 
Since the late 1970s, contemporary mass media theory has emphasized reception 
analysis rather than textual analysis, insisting on both the polysemy of mass mediated 
discourses—an “open text” quality that allows for the possibility of various 
interpretations—and on the interpretive agency of viewers.17  The recognition that texts 
are polysemic is grounded in a structural analysis of culture. Despite fears of the 
Frankfurt school theorists and others that popular culture was a hegemonic tool of 
capitalist dominance that would atrophy the will of an unthinking public, modern 
observers understand popular culture as a contested terrain in which various groups 
struggle to make meaning. As John Fiske reminds us, “Meaning is as much a site of 
struggle as is economics or party politics,” and he identifies popular texts as arenas in 
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which various subordinated groups can reject, subvert, or modify the meanings imposed 
by dominant ideology.18  
Psy Cartoons 
Humor is particularly significant to the psychological community. Humor’s 
propensity to reflect unacknowledged hostility and unconscious desires makes it 
especially resonant to psychological professionals. Additionally, since the effectiveness 
of a joke often hinges on multiple—and often conflicting—meanings, humor is a 
particularly fertile breeding ground for polysemy. Cartoon representations of psy 
professionals seem particularly compelling to the practitioners themselves, and inspired 
both cartoon collections and a handful of papers in the postwar era, often justified via 
lengthy discussions of Freud’s The Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious and Der 
Humor.19 These papers involved fairly informal descriptions and occasional 
reproductions of cartoons from popular periodicals. Although one author did not cite his 
source periodicals, the cited periodicals were generally middle- and upper-middle class 
publications: The Saturday Evening Post, The New Yorker Magazine, Colliers, and The 
New York Herald-Tribune. One noticeable shift occurred during the course of the 1950s; 
in the late 1940s, the cartoon psychiatrist typically seemed European, with a Freudian 
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moustaches and goatee, a European-style frock coat, often a hooked nose, and sometimes 
a German-language diploma on display. By the early 1960s, the psychiatrist was visibly 
American, and the most consistent symbol of his profession was no longer his 
appearance, but his therapeutic couch. Despite this shift, the content of the cartoons 
stayed fairly constant.20  
The cartoons parodied the psychiatrist in one of four ways: he (all samples in 
these papers portrayed male psychiatrists, despite, as one author pointed out, the 
comparatively large proportion of women in the actual field21) was either foolish and 
naïve, pompous, money-grubbing, or lecherous. Psychiatrist Henry M. Davidson offered 
an example of the foolish psy in a 1964 article for a psychiatric journal:  “a moustached, 
empty-faced psychiatrist is sitting in his chair, making notes, his back to his patient, 
talking about kleptomania. The patient, meanwhile, is walking out of the door, carrying 
the couch.”22 This reflects a fairly popular view that the psychiatrist has his head in the 
clouds, and is so caught up in his own cerebral gymnastics that he fails to function 
effectively in the world.  
Another example, again from Davidson, describes a “bearded, big-nosed, frock-
coated doctor … telling the patient that head-shrinkers are Peruvian Indians, and that he 
is a psychiatrist, not a head shrinker.” While that particular rendition may not seem 
particularly funny to modern sensibilities, it’s clear that the professional was being 
inappropriately pompous and pedantic. It’s also worth noting that, since “head shrinker” 
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was a slang term typically used by the nonprofessional classes, the psychiatrist was being 
both a psychiatric bully and, by reprimanding a patient for using colorful, idiomatic 
language, a class bully. Current working-class studies theorists identify the practice of 
correcting the less formal or nonstandard language of social “inferiors” as a form of class 
bullying. 
The money-grubbing image of the psychiatrist, while fairly rare in cartoons 
running soon after World War II, became much more prevalent by 1960. An early 
cartoon shows a weeping woman saying, “My current depression started when I got your 
bill for curing the first depression.”23 A slight variation on the same theme has a young 
man holding a bill from his therapist and crying out, “But can’t you see, Dr Friedrich, 
that these huge fees are only a childish attempt to build up your ego?”24 This particular 
category of psy joke was very common by the 1950s, and continues to enjoy widespread 
circulation today. It speaks to the tension between helping patients and profiting from 
them, and probes the uncomfortable fact that, while most psy professionals belong to the 
financially comfortable professional/managerial class, most patients do not. 
The last category of cartoon psychiatrist, the lecher, was quite common in the 
1950s and 1960s,25 but has fallen out of favor since second wave feminists convincingly 
demonstrated the sexist nature of both classical psychoanalysis and traditional adjustment 
therapy. A typical cartoon of this type shows a lovely, buxom patient on the therapist’s 
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couch, talking intently, while a psychiatrist with a very wide smile takes notes—while 
lying on the couch next to her. In psychoanalytical terms, this type of cartoon reflects 
issues of transference, the process by which patients unconsciously project unresolved 
feelings and desires onto their therapists; and countertransference, therapists’ 
(inappropriate) emotional response to transference. In lay terms, it reflects power 
imbalances in the patient/therapist relationship as well as the irony of a therapist’s weak 
impulse control. 
It’s important to remember that these particular cartoon depictions of psy 
characters ran in The Saturday Evening Post, The New Yorker Magazine, Colliers, and 
The New York Herald-Tribune. They were created for and read by a middle- and upper-
middle class audience. In the early postwar era, despite—or perhaps because of—the 
sudden popular diffusion of psychological concepts, a large number of the popular 
representations of psy professionals were negative. People in a variety of class positions 
were both intrigued by the new “science” of psychology and concerned about it. Fears of 
mind control, the longstanding American tendency toward anti-intellectualism, a 
lingering perception of psy as an elite affectation, the American preference for 
practicality over abstraction, and squeamishness over psychology’s emphasis on sex 
combined to create widespread ambivalence over this new, rapidly expanding cultural 
force. As cultural theorists could have predicted, we can see that ambivalence most 
clearly in the polysemic texts of popular culture. 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Interestingly, Davidson neither discusses this trope of cartoon nor provides examples of it. However, the 
Redlich article includes several examples, as do a number of magazines of the era. 
 
 159 
Television: The Dominant Medium 
Starting around 1948, television programming became increasingly popular with 
the American audience. Though only 0.4% of households owned television sets in 1948, 
by 1950—just two years later—9% did. The percentage almost tripled in the next year, 
and shot to 64.5% by 1956. By decade’s end, 90% of American homes had a television 
set. And while early adopters tended to have high incomes, by the early 1950s many 
working- and middle-class families, particularly those with children, were buying sets of 
their own.26 In addition to having a fairly heterogeneous class viewership, early television 
borrowed content from a wide swath of class-inflected entertainments. In addition to 
broadcasts of symphonies and old films, stations filled air time with variety shows that 
modeled themselves on lowbrow vaudeville traditions. And, early in the 1950s, the half-
hour situation comedy became a television staple.27  
Comedy itself is a class-inflected genre, creating humor by inverting official 
hierarchies and upending dominant values as in Bakhtin’s description of the 
carnivalesque. In addition, early comedy variety shows generally featured hosts with 
identifiable working-class roots: Jackie Gleason, raised by a struggling widowed mother 
in Brooklyn; Milton Berle, son of a paint and varnish salesman; Sid Caesar, whose 
parents owned a 24-hour luncheonette in Yonkers; Queens native Don Rickles; and Red 
Skelton, the son of a circus clown who died before his son was born. Early situation 
comedies, too, portrayed working-class lives more often than they would after 
                                                
26 James L. Baughman, The Republic of Mass Culture: Journalism, Filmmaking, and Broadcasting in 
American since 1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 30, 41-42. 
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television’s infancy.28  The Honeymooners’ Ralph Kramden was a bus driver with a thick 
Brooklyn accent living in a tiny, cold-water flat. The Life of Riley featured an Irish-
American airplane riveter often frustrated with factory work and his own ill-fated 
attempts to improve his family’s status.  I Remember Mama portrayed a Scandinavian 
immigrant family, living (at the beginning of the series) in a tenement apartment, and The 
Goldbergs headlined a similarly situated poor Jewish family in a New York tenement.29  
These working-class portrayals, however, were not necessarily sources of cultural 
pride for the working-class members of their audiences. Portrayals of working-class 
family life typically sketch the father as an incompetent buffoon (for example, Ralph 
Kramden in The Honeymooners, Chester A. Riley in Life of Riley, Fred Flintstone, and 
Archie Bunker) who must constantly be rescued by his more capable wife. In these series, 
according to sociologist and media scholar Richard Butsch, “Mother, not father, typically 
knows best.” 30 According to Butsch, this trope is uncommon in sitcoms featuring 
middle-class heads of household in which either the wife is the harebrained partner (as in 
I Love Lucy), or both spouses are reasonably mature and responsible adults. However, we 
have evidence that this portrayal of working-class men as emasculated and ineffective 
was particularly offensive to working-class male audiences of the 1950s.  
                                                                                                                                            
27 Baughman, 47-48. 
28 In one study of 262 domestic sitcoms broadcast between 1946 and 1990, only 11 featured blue-collar 
heads of household. When researchers included clerical, service, and agricultural workers, the total number 
of working-class fathers was still only 32, compared to 185 middle-class heads of household.  Richard 
Butsch, “Class and Gender in Four Decades of Television Situation Comedy: Plus ça Change…,” Critical 
Studies in Mass Communication 9 (1992): 387-399. 
29 The Honeymooners (CBS 1955-1956); Life of Riley (NBC 1949-1950 and 1953-1958); I Remember 
Mama (CBS 1949-1957); The Goldbergs (CBS 1949-1951, NBC 1952-1953), Dumont (1954-1955). 
30 Butsch, 3-6. 
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Sociologist Herbert J. Gans identified the ways in which the men in one working-
class community made meaning out of television programs. He studied working-class 
Italian Americans in a recently condemned “slum” (he takes issue with the term) for 
seven months in 1957 and 1958. He lived in the neighborhood, the inner-city West End 
area of Boston, interacting with inhabitants and observing their behavior patterns, values, 
and worldviews. He found that male West Enders preferred television programs that 
reflected their own values, with virile, independent male characters who were loyal to 
their friends, moral, unpretentious, and unashamed of his humble roots. They disliked 
programming that valorized middle-class men, overly educated characters, and authority 
figures (particularly police) that failed to acknowledge working-class contributions and 
strengths, and they particularly disliked programming “in which the husband is shown as 
a weak or stupid pawn of his wife and children”—the most typical portrayal of working-
class heads of household on television.31  These men, Gans insisted, were not “frustrated 
seekers of middle-class values.”  They cultivated their own working-class values that 
reflected their particular position in the social and economic hierarchy. Further, Gans 
believed that class, not ethnicity, was at the core of these values, and he demonstrated 
that the West Enders’ worldviews and way of life were similar to those of other working-
class populations in significant ways. 
By the end of the 1950s, representations of working-class characters, inadequate 
as they were in many ways, were on their way out. The variety shows featuring lowbrow 
                                                
31 Herbert J. Gans, The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans (New York: 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 188-191. 
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humor were losing ratings and, as a result, contracts. The working-class sitcoms suffered 
similar fates: The Honeymooners’ honeymoon was over, The Life of Riley had its plug 
pulled, and Mama’s family and The Goldbergs, along with an unprecedented number of 
upwardly mobile Americans, moved to houses in the suburbs. The move, however, could 
not ultimately save the shows. The Goldbergs disappeared in 1955,32 Mama followed in 
1957, and no new situation comedies featuring working-class characters were introduced 
between 1955 and 1971, rendering the working class largely invisible in mass media.  
Working-class representations weren’t the only content casualties of late 1950s; 
televised portrayals of social problems also dwindled during this period. Early television 
featured “anthology” programs, live theater plays broadcast for television audiences. The 
subject matter tended to be serious, the production values were high, and major sponsors 
often underwrote whole seasons of production. But despite the anthologies’ critical 
success, sponsors began to fear that the weighty subject matter—racism, poverty, social 
conflicts—was incompatible with the happy, idealized world that sponsors portrayed in 
their commercials. Additionally, sponsors became concerned that the anthologies and 
variety shows were not formulaic (or, in economic terms, “rationalized”) enough to build 
the kind of consistent audience that they assumed would maximize the return on their 
underwriting.33 So from 1960 on, television programming increasingly relied on 
representational dramas and situation comedies that painted attractive, homogenous 
                                                
32 Part of the reason for The Goldbergs’ demise was the blacklisting of Philip Loeb, the actor who played 
Molly Goldberg’s husband Jake. Harry Castleman and Walter J. Podrazik, Watching Television: Six 
Decades of American Television (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 53-54. 
33 Ella Taylor, Prime-Time Families: Television Culture in Postwar America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), 22-23. 
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portraits of postwar prosperity overwhelmingly populated by middle-class WASPs in 
programs that one scholar has dubbed “fifties suburban domesticoms.”34 According to 
media studies scholar Michael V. Tueth, the networks had apparently decided that  
[T]he comfortable homes of middle-class suburban families—with their 
up-to-date kitchen appliances and laborsaving devices; the fashionable 
clothes, jewelry, and hairstyles; and the lawnmowers and automobiles in 
the garages—provided more appropriate environments for the sales 
pitches for those very products in the accompanying commercials.35 
 
Psy Professionals on Television 
But even as working-class characters disappeared from the small screen, another 
character was popping up everywhere. Psychiatrists had been shown on television since 
its earliest variety-show days. Sid Ceasar did a recurring shtick as a loony Viennese 
psychiatrist; Milton Berle’s self-named character visited a psychiatrist in a sketch when 
he felt that the show had become too demanding; in an early episode, the title character of 
I Love Lucy pretended to need psychological help; her husband, discovering the ruse, 
produced a pretend “physiochiatrist.” But by the early 1960s, psy professionals had 
become more than bit parts, evil mesmerists, and one-dimensional jokes. A number of 
psy professionals became main characters in regular series.  Many of these new 
characters, however, reflected the negative aspects of psy that so concerned the postwar 
populace. While lechery was extremely rare (and never explicit) in 1950s television, the 
other three negative portrayals of psy professionals seen so often in cartoons—foolish, 
                                                
34 David Marc, Comic Visions: Television Comedy and American Culture (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 
chapter 3. Marc also notes that most of these “domesticoms” began with an exterior shot of the family 
home, which “emphatically underscore[s] the family’s unbearably secure upper-middle-class status.” 
35 Michael V. Tueth, Laughter in the Living Room: Television Comedy and the American Home Audience 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 108. 
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pompous, and greedy—were prevalent. Less prevalent but in evidence was the portrayal 
of the evil psy professional that had been developed earlier in literature and film.  
Some, like the inimitable Dr. Zachary Smith character on the hit CBS series Lost 
in Space (1965-1968), managed to combine all four unpleasant personas.36  Colonel (Dr.) 
Smith was the show’s undisputed villain.  Although he was the United States Space 
Corp’s staff psychologist, he had stowed away on the Robinsons’ space ship to sabotage 
their mission at the behest of an unnamed foreign power.  Early in the series, he was 
characterized as evil and selfish, but in later seasons, the writers reworked his character. 
They minimized his evil qualities, and instead developed his self-absorption, laziness, 
and ineptitude as comedic tropes.  Still, at the end of the rewrite, Dr. Smith’s psychiatrist 
character was an unappealing individual.  Another unappealing psychiatrist character 
served as a primary plot foil on I Dream of Jeannie (1965-1970). The character of Dr. 
Alfred Bellows, NASA’s staff psychiatrist, created dramatic tension for the sitcom by 
insisting to NASA brass that there was something wrong with or suspicious about the 
show’s protagonist, Tony Nelson. These programs were visibly middle-class: the 
characters generally lived in middle-class suburban homes, dressed professionally, and 
spoke well-modulated, standard English. The shows offered arenas in which viewers 
could grapple with their ambivalence about science, gender, nationalism, 
professionalism, and psychology. However, the issue of class simply was not on the 
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agenda in these programs. The mass-mediated erasure of the working class, Seguin’s 
“middle-classlessness,” was well underway.37 
The Beverly Hillbillies 
It was into this disproportionately middle-class televisual world that a new sitcom, 
The Beverly Hillbillies, debuted in September of 1962. The Hillbillies is a screwball 
comedy about a group of irrepressible, dirt-poor, backwoods cabin-dwellers who strike 
oil and relocate with rusty truck, moonshine still, and hound dog in tow, to the posh 
environs of their new Beverly Hills mansion. This program is, for several reasons, an 
ideal vehicle through which to examine popular, class-inflected representations of 
psychiatry. First, it was enormously popular, dramatically outperforming its competitors 
and holding an unusually high percentage of the television audience. It was the first of 
what Janet Staiger calls “blockbuster sitcoms,” or network-era serial comedies that 
garnered significantly higher ratings than the competition for weeks on end. Thirty-six 
percent of American televisions were tuned to the Hillbillies during its first broadcast 
season, beating both competitors, Candid Camera and The Red Skelton show, by 4.9 
percent. And it had staying power—until its last season on the air in 1971, throughout a 
nine-year run, the Hillbillies ratings kept it in the top 25 programs.38  Clearly, the 
program offered something compelling to diverse audiences.  
Additionally, the Hillbillies’ basic narrative premise involves a clash of class 
positions and values. While ostensibly not about class at all—the show’s focus is on the 
                                                
37 Seguin.  
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backwoods, pre-modern nature of the hillbillies and the resulting miscommunications 
with their new sophisticated, urban neighbors—the series is, as communications theorist 
Paul Attallah has illustrated, all about class.  According to Attallah, the show “mobilizes 
a discourse on class” by creating characters with distinctly incompatible worldviews and 
values that reflect class stereotypes.39 The rich, greedy banker is lampooned for his 
transparent avarice and lack of human kindness; his snobbish, cultured wife is skewered 
for her pretensions; and the unsophisticated Clampetts are frequently spoofed for their 
lack of culture, their nonstandard speech patterns, their inability and refusal to use their 
wealth for appropriate status display. Interestingly, while a large portion of the public 
loved the program, reviewers hated it, finding it offensively lowbrow. Their evaluations 
of the program included “mindless” and “stupid,” and one UPI correspondent wrote: 
“The series aimed low and hit its target.”40 While viewers can read the Hillbillies as 
foregrounding rural/urban tensions, the emphasis on wealth, status, and the juxtaposition 
of proper and improper social actions also strongly correspond to a class interpretation.  
The final factor that positions the Hillbillies so favorably for this project is that 
psychiatry is a recurring theme in the series. The pilot ends with Mr. Drysdale, the 
banker, narrating the story of the Clampetts moving in, with all of the attendant 
misperceptions, cross-communications, and confusion. As the camera pulls back from a 
closeup to a wider shot, it becomes evident that Drysdale is actually telling the story to 
                                                                                                                                            
38 Janet Staiger, Blockbuster TV: Must-See Sitcoms in the Network Era (New York: New York University 
Press, 2000), 9, 15-16, 80. 
39 Paul Attallah, Situation Comedy and the Beverly Hillbillies: The Unworthy Discourse (Montreal, 
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his therapist. Both Drysdales apparently have standing appointments with this 
practitioner, and there are indications that Mrs. Drysdale’s prized poodle also visits an 
analyst regularly. Significantly, two episodes from the second season center around a 
psychiatrist and his interactions with the Clampett clan, and those two episodes provide a 
rich source of material for closer analysis. 
“The Psychiatrist Gets Clampetted” and “The Clampetts Get 
Psychoanalyzed” 
Both of the psychiatry episodes feature the familiar Hillbillies theme of cultural 
misunderstanding. In “The Psychiatrist Gets Clampetted,” nephew Jethro, a strapping, 
college-aged sixth-grader, needs a certificate of health from a doctor to continue at 
school. The Clampetts don’t know any doctors in Beverly Hills—in fact, Granny, who is 
exceptionally proud of her own home-grown doctoring abilities, has always tended to the 
family’s medical needs in the past. But Jethro remembers the name of a doctor who the 
imperious Mrs. Drysdale, their banker’s (and next-door neighbor’s) wife, has been seeing 
for seven years, and he makes an appointment. The audience discovers that Dr. Twombly 
is a psychiatrist, but neither Jethro nor any of the other Clampetts know what a 
psychiatrist is, and Dr. Twombly, for his part, never seems to understand the mistake 
they’ve made. Jethro misinterprets the doctor’s psychoanalytic questions about his 
mother as romantic interest, and tells her, after his session, that the doctor wants to see 
her, “the sooner, the better.” 
                                                                                                                                            




Our first view of the representation of “psychiatrist” in this episode reinforces 
mainstream ideas about a psychiatrist’s status and professionalism. We see his diploma 
framed on the wall; we read his dark, well-tailored suit, expensive haircut, and classic 
good looks as signifiers of his professional status, especially in contrast to the patient in 
the introductory scene, who is wearing a lighter, less well tailored suit, a shiny tie-pin, 
and a too-short, military-style haircut. The patient is not classically handsome; in 
addition, he smiles too much and calls Dr. Twombly “sir.” Twombly solidifies his 
dominance in the scene by looking at his watch and announcing, “Your analysis is 
progressing most satisfactorily. Tomorrow same time.” They rise. The patient is smiling 
and grateful, and Twombly is professional and a bit distracted as he writes in his 
notebook, adding, “And don’t worry about the regression into infancy syndrome. You’ll 
overcome this desire to be a baby again.” The punch “line” is a visual gag: the smiling 
patient pulls a frilly, oversized baby’s bonnet and a pacifier from inside his suit jacket, 
pulls the bonnet on his head, puts the pacifier in his mouth, and, smiling, walks out of the 
office.   
The joke, of course, resides both in the visual image of a grown man in a frilly 
bonnet and pacifier and in the fact that the seemingly infallible doctor is wrong. 
Additionally, different viewers will undoubtedly locate the humor in different ways. 
Twombly’s reaction is important. He stops writing in his appointment book, turns to face 
the patient, and loses the small social smile he’d had on his face. The screen cuts to a 
close-up showing an intensity that is supposed to indicate surprise contained into a 
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professional impassivity. He was wrong, but he’s still a professional, and his dignity is 
intact. The psy professional has not, at this point, been discredited. 
Jethro, whose dimwittedness is a stock Hillbillies joke, admits under the doctor’s 
questioning that he has a problem staying awake in school while the teacher is talking. 
This information causes Twombly to expound on psychological theory in a decidedly 
professorial manner.  He begins slowly; “Well that may be nothing more than a benign 
rejection of authority represented by the teacher.” As he speaks, he becomes more intent, 
looking away from Jethro and lecturing with an alert, pleased, focused look on face. “It 
doesn’t mean that you necessarily lack interest or capability or intelligence.  Above all,” 
and here he raises his finger to emphasize a point, “you mustn’t let this cause you any 
distress.” At this point Twombly smiles, lecturing to his imaginary audience, looking off 
into the distance, and gesturing with his pencil like a pointer. He continues: “Together we 
will probe into the underlying causations, and…” 
The punch line this time is the sound of a snore, coming, as the audience quickly 
learns, from Jethro, who has fallen asleep on the couch. The laugh track plays over the 
image of Jethro sleeping; he looks foolish. Falling asleep in public is unacceptable as 
proper, middle-class behavior. The camera cuts to Twombly’s surprised face, and another 
layer of laugh track plays. The joke, again, is multivalent: it is both that Jethro cannot 
stay conscious like a normal, respectable, middle-class person, and it that the doctor’s 
self-absorbed eggheadedness led him to be unaware of his actual situation. The joke is on 
the underperforming hick and the joke is on the overbearing intellectual. 
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The main conceit of this episode is that the doctor’s professional intentions are 
mistaken by Jethro’s mother, Aunt Pearl, for romantic intentions. For most of the 
episode, the joke is on her; she is overeager to find a beau in Beverly Hills; she is 
pretentious, introducing herself to the doctor with horribly mangled pseudo French 
(“Bawn joor, sil voo plate, I’m sure”), and she is ridiculous in her pretensions, arriving in 
the professional’s office in a floor-length, excessively spangled evening gown, long black 
gloves, a large fur stole, and overly large and overly fussy crystal earrings. She is also the 
butt of the joke in her naiveté about the doctor’s procedures and in her mistaken 
impression that he is not only interested in her romantically, but is being too fresh. The 
audience has seen Dr. Twombly prepare for clients earlier in the episode. He invariably 
dims the light on his desk and draws the curtains closed over the window to prepare for 
analysis. However, Aunt Pearl watches the doctor’s preparations with growing unease, 
believing that he is trying to seduce her. When the doctor tries to help her lie back on the 
couch to begin the session, she drops her exaggeratedly genteel pretensions and wallops 
him in the stomach, then storms out of the office. 
However, Aunt Pearl’s foolishness is contained in the broader narrative of the 
episode in several ways. Her foolishness is a gender-based foolishness borne of vanity, 
not entirely a class- (or sophistication-) based foolishness. Additionally, the doctor, the 
representative of both urbanity and a privileged class, becomes foolish himself. He visits 
the Clampett mansion, ostensibly to “apologize for the mistaken impression,” but with an 
ulterior motive of more closely observing the unusual specimens of humanity there. He 
begins his visit suave, self-assured, and unflappable. When Granny, still jealous of 
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anyone else being designated “doctor,” grills him on folk ailments and remedies, he holds 
his own at first.  
Granny begins belligerently. “So. You call yourself a doctor, do you?” 
Dr. Twombly answers smoothly: “Well, I do hold several degrees.” 
Granny: “All right, doctor.” She stalks around the kitchen table where he’s seated, 
strutting like a banty rooster, then suddenly squats down next to him to ask her question 
abruptly and in close face-to-face range: “How do you cure warts?” 
Dr. Twombly is unfazed. “Warts? Well, dermatology isn’t my field, but I assume 
electrodessication is still the preferred method.” 
Granny, unimpressed, makes an emphatic, disgusted noise. “Aaah.” 
Dr. Twombly remains unperturbed: “Oh, is there a newer method?” 
Granny: “Stump water and lye mixed with ground-up crawdad tails, daubed on with the 
leg bone of a buzzard, just before the moon comes up. Think you can remember that?” 
Dr. Twombly smiles at Granny indulgently, and replies pleasantly, “Well, I’ll try.” 
 But despite Dr. Twombly’s ability to maintain his professional superiority under 
Granny’s goading, the unpredictable nature of interactions at the Clampett house begin to 
fray the doctor’s composure. He expresses interest in daughter Ellie May’s jaguar, 
assuming that it is a car. Ellie May’s jaguar, however, is actually an infant panthera onca, 
and her promise to bring it in the house so that he can see it confuses the doctor severely 
and comically. His persona shifts from competent professional to confused naïf; he looks 
dazed, takes a seat, shakes his head as if to clear it and actually taps it with the side of his 
palm in an exaggerated pantomime of confusion. When Aunt Pearl enters the scene to 
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forgive him and allow him to court her at roughly the same time that Jethro confesses that 
he tried to inflate a car tire by mouth and, forgetting his own strength, accidentally 
exploded the tire, the doctor has completely morphed into the misfit  who is unable to 
cope with the environment. He is, technically, playing the “straight man” to the 
Clampetts’ clown acts, but he does so in an unprofessional, ineffective, thoroughly 
befuddled way.  The scene ends as he slumps his shoulders, dashes to the door, and quips, 
“Well, good-bye, folks. It’s been weird!” His professionalism could not stand up to the 
Clampetts’ simple, down-home wackiness, a wackiness that the audience knows is 
harmless and enjoyable.  
 Further, the real hero of the episode—as of every episode—is Jed, the folk-
talking, shotgun-toting paterfamilias with the extremely moth-eaten hat. Despite his 25 
million, Jed is clearly a working-class figure; he is plain-talking, hard-working, loyal, and 
unpretentious. But, unlike other televisual working-class heads of household, Jed is not 
portrayed as inept or foolish. He certainly makes mistakes, all of which involve the 
difficulty of cross-cultural understanding. But Jed is the program’s moral character; he is 
wise, compassionate, and forgiving, but he articulates and expects adherence to high 
moral standards that the rest of the characters often have trouble with. It was Jed who, 
though mistakenly, journeyed to Dr. Twombly’s office to uphold the honor of his “blood 
kin.” He was honorable and straightforward in his mission; he politely suggested that the 
nurse might want to leave the room, because his moral code forbids frightening women.  
He declined to shake Dr. Twombly’s hand, refusing a gesture of goodwill that would 
have been false, but he refused politely and with dignity: “Before I shake your hand 
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maybe I’d better speak my piece.” He even offers gruff but apparently sincere advice for 
what he interprets as Dr. Twombly’s problem. Told of Pearl’s accusation that he 
“commenced pullin’ her to the settee,” Dr. Twombly replies, “Mr. Clampett, you don’t 
understand. I do this every day. I’m a psychiatrist.” Jed, still unfamiliar with the word, 
muses, “Well I’d try to get cured of that if I was you, or else you’re liable to wind up bad 
hurt.” 
 Conclusions 
As actual psychological professionals gained visibility and influence in the public 
sphere, their fictional counterparts became more prevalent in various popular culture 
media. Psy professionals regularly appeared in books, cartoons, film, and radio. With 
some exceptions, however, the portrayals were not flattering. Fictional psychological 
practitioners were, variously, evil, manipulative, pompous, greedy, unethical, foolish, 
naïve, lecherous, or deeply disturbed themselves. These portrayals suggest deep 
ambivalence about the project of psychology and its increasing influence on American 
lives. Additionally, these negative portrayals occur in all types of media, from elite 
literature to lowbrow television. It is notable, though, that the more literary work 
typically featured psychological professionals who were neither bumbling nor evil, but 
who weren’t as perceptive as they imagined themselves to be. If, as Pfister suggests, self-
aware psychological interiority was a kind of cultural currency among the educated 
classes, perhaps the literary writers—and readers—preferred their protagonists to be more 
perceptive than their psychological practitioners. Since readers generally identify more 
closely with protagonists, insightful protagonists offer readers the positive emotional 
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Chapter Four. Psychology in the “Sweats”: Men’s Adventure Magazines 
As postwar audiences sat in front of their black-and-white television sets, they 
found increasingly homogenous programming. Despite some casting differences, Leave It 
to Beaver, Father Knows Best, and My Three Sons provided relatively interchangeable 
fare. Mid-century Americans witnessed the development of a homogenous, mass-
mediated popular culture aimed at a national audience, while specifically working-class 
media representations dwindled. However, there was a late-blooming holdout; a little-
remembered but popular print genre known as “men’s adventure magazines” entertained 
working-class male readers for two decades. 
If postwar psychology unwittingly promoted middle-class normativity, how did 
members of the working classes perceive a psychology that framed them as non-
normative? This chapter approaches that question by examining how a particular 
working-class medium navigated psychological ideas in the postwar period. Men’s 
adventure magazines, known in the trade as “armpit slicks,” “men’s sweat magazines,” or 
“the sweats,” were widely popular in the 1950s. Aimed at working-class white men, 
sweats were the direct descendants of the earlier pulps, though printed in a larger format 
and on more expensive paper to appeal to the newly affluent working-class reader. 
Between their heyday in the 1950s and their swan song in the 1970s, more than 100 titles, 
such as Real, True, Bold Men, and Rugged, regaled readers with tales of danger and 
heroism. In addition, they, like mainstream American periodicals, wrote about the “new” 
phenomenon of psychology. But while the middle-class Newsweek advocated “fine 
tuning” one’s emotions and Life declared the 1950s the “Age of Psychology,” the sweats 
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took a different approach, framing psychology as either sexy, threatening, or absolutely 
frightening.  
To fully explore the classed  nature of the sweats, this chapter first examines the 
genre itself, tracing the cultural forces that shaped its development as well as the ways in 
which the sweats and their readers differed from the increasingly homogenous mass 
culture of the postwar era. The classed location of this readership manifested itself in 
both the economic and cultural realms: economically, the sweats were clearly targeting 
their appeals to a different audience than the one celebrated in the many discussions of 
postwar prosperity. The pages of men’s adventure magazines hawked bargains, 
commiserated with tight budgets, and expressed the fears and cautions of the economic 
underdog, while the rest of the country was diving into the postwar love affair with 
consumer culture. Culturally, the sweats reflected concerns, pleasures, and identities that 
had developed separately from—and sometimes in opposition to—those of the 
mainstream culture. For example, while mainstream periodicals in the 1950s focused on 
achieving and enjoying “the good life,” the sweats emphasized being aware of and 
avoiding life’s many dangers. And, significantly, the concept of masculinity reflected in 
the sweats was not the same masculinity extolled by the growing middle classes. 
Amidst the broader consolidation of heterogeneous popular culture during the 
1950s, men’s adventure magazines offer a counterhegemonic perspective. These 
magazines demonstrate evidence of a struggle over the meanings of masculinity, the good 
life, relationships with women, and the newly influential profession of psychology. I do 
not suggest that every reader who browsed through a copy of Man’s World or Adventure 
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read in opposition to mainstream culture. The sweats reflected many aspects of that 
mainstream culture: the desire for affluence, patriotism, traditional gender roles. But the 
sweats also reflected a view of the world that was not consistent with mainstream, 
middle-class tastes. This chapter teases out not only how working-class readers made 
sense of the world through the sweats, but also how they made sense of—and use of—the 
increasingly ubiquitous norms of psychology.1  
 “Mass” Culture in the 1950s 
The 1950s witnessed the development of homogeneity in popular culture. Ethnic 
and foreign-language newspapers, theaters, and social halls gave way to standardized 
commercial leisure pursuits. Like much other production in postwar America, the 
production of popular culture became more centralized, while at the same time 
technological advances dramatically expanded media’s distribution capabilities. Network 
radio, then television, constructed a fictionalized vision of America that minimized or 
erased regional, ethnic, and class differences. Tracing the various aspects of this national 
culture, Roland Marchand identifies an increasing sameness in food, clothing, housing, 
furniture, and the architecture and offerings of the rapidly expanding franchised chain 
businesses. Marchand concludes that “[t]he postwar period saw the emergence of a 
popular culture more homogenous than Americans had previously known.”2 
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Evidence of this homogeneity was seen in the magazine industry as well. Some of 
the larger magazines experienced circulation increases during World War II, even amid 
paper shortages. After the war, the numbers of mass circulation magazines skyrocketed. 
Partly in an attempt to compete with television for advertising dollars, mainstream 
magazines such as Readers’ Digest, Saturday Evening Post, Life, Look, and McCall’s 
cast wide nets for a broader share of readers. Most of these leaders lowered their 
subscription prices to foster larger circulations and, consequently, greater appeal to 
advertisers. A number of factors combined to increase magazine circulations: 
unprecedented postwar affluence, the spike in postwar college enrollment, and an 
expansion of many Americans’ leisure time. Between the end of World War II and the 
early 1960s, the news magazines doubled their combined circulations, and a handful of 
other mass circulation magazines almost doubled theirs as well. By 1959, more than 80 
percent of American households were magazine buyers.3   
Antecedents of Men’s Adventure Magazines 
As postwar America witnessed the development of a homogenous, mass-mediated 
popular culture aimed at a national audience, working-class media representations 
dwindled. Working-class situation comedies such as The Honeymooners, The Life of 
Riley, Mama’s Family, and The Goldbergs gave way to the middle-class homogeneity of 
Leave It to Beaver and Father Knows Best. Similarly, postwar mass-circulation 
magazines positioned themselves for the largest possible market by reflecting affluent 
                                                
3 Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1964), 45, 
47-48, 54.  
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images of postwar prosperity. However, there was a late-blooming holdout; a little-
remembered but popular genre known as “men’s adventure magazines” entertained 
working-class male readers for two decades. These men’s adventure magazines had two 
primary ancestors: the pulps and the “true” stories popularized by Bernarr Macfadden.  
Pulp magazines, named after the cheap paper they were printed on, had 
themselves descended from nineteenth century dime novels. Popular from the 1920s 
through the 1940s, pulps were smaller than contemporary magazines, at seven inches by 
ten inches. The covers typically featured brightly colored illustrations of partially 
dressed, imperiled women and dangerous-looking men, but the magazines’ interiors were 
filled with columns of text interrupted by infrequent pen-and-ink line drawings. Pulp 
fiction was aimed at the working class, and the content of the pulps was procured 
cheaply: stories earned three or four cents a word in the 1920s, and only a penny a word 
during the Depression era. While the writing was by no means always good, there were 
pleasant surprises. Notable authors including Ray Bradbury, Raymond Chandler, and 
Dashiell Hammett wrote for the pulps. However, pulps had little advertising revenue and 
needed to survive on circulation income. Rising costs during World War II and its 
aftermath hurt the industry, as did the fact that the more affluent postwar populace was 
lured away by the more upscale slick magazines such as Life, Look, Sports Illustrated, 
and Playboy. By the end of the 1940s, the pulp genre was dead.4 
                                                
4 Erin A. Smith, Hard-Boiled:  Working-Class Readers and Pulp Magazines (Philadelphia:  Temple 
University Press, 2000), 18-19, 34-35; and Peterson, 306-309. 
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While the pulps prefigured the sweats in terms of intended audience, economics 
of production, and sexualized “damsel in distress” motif, the two genres were not 
identical.  Physically they were dissimilar, as the pulps were smaller and their paper was 
grainier (though a few sweats kept the rough “pulp” paper as well). Their content was 
different too: while pulp magazines published fictional stories, the sweats’ formula was a 
fictionalized realism. They ran ostensibly “true” accounts of real-life adventures, 
“journalistic” exposes, and “historical” reports. Additionally, and in keeping with the 
realistic motif of the sweats, they used photographs as well as drawings to illustrate 
stories, whereas pulps could not, because the poor quality of pulp paper did not reproduce 
photos clearly. 
In many ways, the controversial fitness and publishing impresario Bernarr 
Macfadden was the progenitor of the men’s adventure genre. Macfadden was born in 
1868 as Bernard McFadden, a sickly and impoverished child who found health, his 
calling, and eventually fame and fortune through bodybuilding. To spread the gospel of 
fitness, he took over publication of Physical Culture magazine in 1899, increasing its 
circulation from 3,000 to 100,000 in just two years.5 Physical Culture foreshadowed 
some aspects of the sweats: the publication regularly displayed scantily clad women’s 
bodies, prompting charges of lewdness and obscenity on more than one occasion. 
Physical Culture also foreshadowed the “reality”-based regularly including testimonials 
about how physical culture had changed readers’ lives. A second publication, debuting in 
                                                
5 Harvey Green, Fit for America: Health, Fitness, Sport, and American Society (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1986), 242-245. 
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1919, continued to solicit reader’ experiences. True Story developed the “confessional” 
genre, paired it with staged photos, and became wildly successful, earning more than $3 
million in advertising revenues by 1922.6 However, the working-class readers who made 
True Story so successful were not attractive to mainstream advertisers. According to the 
American Studies scholar Ann Fabian,  
Lurid tales of seduction and redemption sold magazines, but they did not 
provide the right atmosphere for the products of an advertising profession 
searching for professional respectability. Until the late 1920s advertisements 
followed strict class lines, and it is hard to find evidence of the middle-class world 
of cars, insurance policies, prepared foods, and cleaning products in True Story. 
Ads for mail-order courses, exercisers, weight reducers, quick cures, and for 
Macfadden’s own schemes and books continued to appear on the pages of his 
confession magazines.7  
Macfadden went on to launch other ostensibly nonfiction magazines targeted to 
male audiences; True Detective Mysteries came out in 1924, and Red Blooded Stories 
(reconfigured as Tales of Danger and Daring after five issues) was published in 1928. 
Three years later, inspired by Macfadden’s masculine offerings as well as a readership 
study indicating that male readers preferred factual fare to fiction, an editor at Fawcett 
Publications by the name of Ralph Daigh pitched the idea of a new nonfiction men’s 
magazine to his publisher. He apparently didn’t convince his publisher to launch a new 
genre in those early days of the Depression, but in 1937, Daigh and Fawcett introduced 
not one but two men’s nonfiction magazines: a pocket-sized For Men and a “sensational” 
photo magazine titled True.8  
                                                
6 Ann Fabian, “Making a Commodity of Truth: Speculations on the Career of Bernarr Macfadden,” 
American Literary History, 5, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 51-76; True Story advertising revenues on 59. 
7 Ibid., 66. 
8 Peterson, 311-312, and Steven Heller, “Blood, Sweat, and Tits: A History of Men’s Adventure 
Magazines,” in Men’s Adventure Magazines in Postwar America, ed. Max Allen Collins and George 
Hagenauer (Köln: Taschen, 2004), 6-19; Daigh on 9. 
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According to New York Times art director Steven Heller, the early True was 
“racy,” “grisly,” and “lurid;” the early covers also frequently featured bondage imagery. 
Heller claims that “bare breasts, sex, and violence” propelled the magazine’s monthly 
circulation to 250,000. 9 Unfortunately, by the early 1940s, the breasts, sex and violence 
had also caught the attention of the new Postmaster General, Frank Walker. A Catholic, 
Walker was heavily influenced by the Church’s decency crusade, which had inspired the 
American bishops to found the League of Decency in 1934 and the National Office for 
Decent Literature in 1938. Between 1942 and 1943, Walker declared more than twenty 
men’s magazines obscene and revoked their second-class mailing privileges. Soon after, 
the publishers of True and its closest competitor, Argosy, completely reformatted their 
magazines. Instead of Peterson’s “gradual metamorphosis,” True became inoffensive 
overnight.  Heller described the transition: “Gone were the lurid headlines, rapacious Jap 
soldiers, and cowering bound women. In their place were such harbingers of the sedate 
fifties as older men fishing and pretty young women in Women’s Army Corps 
uniforms.”10 Instead of maidens in bondage, the March 1945 True featured a close-up of 
a brown-and-white pointer—a hunting dog—on its cover. 
Financially, the makeover worked. A laudatory 1948 Time article pointed out that 
in its six years as a “sexy, fact-detective pulp,” True had 240,000 readers and was “barely 
making carfare.” However, once it became respectable, readership shot up. By the 
publication of the Time article, True’s circulation was at one and a half million; over the 
next decade, it reached two million. Not everyone, however, was impressed. Writing in 
                                                
9 Heller, 10-11. A 1948 Time magazine article puts the circulation at 240,000. “Good Man & True,” Time 
19 April 1948. Online: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,798402,00.html>. 
10 Heller, 13. 
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2003, a journalist dismissed True’s popularity: 
 
Everyone knew why Fawcett Publications’ True commanded a massive 
two million copy circulation. Its inoffensive emphasis on mild recreation and dogs 
and sweaters made for family-sanctified barbershop reading and the safe and 
proper gift of wives, who could rely on True accommodating husbands without 
arousing them with photo-spreads of comely hoores [sic] or suggestive lip-
smacking articles.11  
 
In fact, while Peterson classes the later, reformed True in the men’s adventure magazine 
genre, neither of the two recent men’s adventure retrospectives agree.  
 Postwar Men’s Adventure Magazines 
The early incarnations of True and Argosy notwithstanding, the postwar men’s 
adventure genre was launched in 1949 when a low-end comic book and pulp fiction 
publisher named Martin Goodman wondered if returning GIs would be interested in a 
men’s adventure tabloid. They were. Within a year, Goodman’s title, Stag, was joined by 
a competitor—Macfadden Publications’ Saga—then Male, Men, and Man’s Magazine.12 
Two years later, there were 11 titles in the “sweats.” By the height of the genre’s 
popularity in the late 1950s, more than one hundred publications followed the men’s 
adventure format. The genre’s titles leaned towards the ruggedly masculine (including 
Rugged Men), and often included variations on the words “man” and “male”: Bold Men 
and Challenge for Men competed with Man’s Action, Man’s Adventure, Man’s Conquest, 
and Man’s Daring.  
                                                
11 Adam Parfrey, “From Pulp to Posterity: The Origins of Men’s Adventure Magazines,” in It’s a Man’s 
World: Men’s Adventure Magazines, The Postwar Pulps, ed. Adam Parfrey (Los Angeles: Feral House, 
2003), 7. 
12 Goodman had initially published a Stag title in 1941, hoping to copy the upscale success of 1933’s 
Esquire launch. Misled by a conniving editor into unknowingly recycling literary work without the authors’ 
consent, Goodman ended up with a federal injunction to stop publication. After the war, Goodman recycled 
the Stag name into his new publication. See Heller, 11-13. 
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Many titles, such as Climax and Stag, sound explicitly sexual to the modern ear. 
Others, such as Guy: True Adventures and Impact: Bold True Action for Men, translate 
awkwardly into twenty-first century lexicons.  Similarly, the stridently homosocial 
masculinity, the exaggerated manliness, is—to our era—a homoerotic manliness. As 
Adam Parfrey, the editor of a recent compilation of men’s adventure art, acknowledged, 
“Most heterosexuals today would not be comfortable purchasing a magazine illustrating 
the adventures of manly men. Male interest in male things is no longer sanctioned for 
straight audiences, particularly in the form of a magazine, outside of professional 
sports.”13 While that assessment is generally accurate, it should be added that even today, 
expectations of heterosociality are classed; middle and upper-middle class men are 
expected to be heterosocial, while a stronger tradition of homosociality exists in the 
working classes. 
But these magazines clearly tapped a receptive vein in their contemporary readers. 
While the men’s adventure genre never enjoyed the broad audiences of the middle-class, 
mass-circulation magazines—or even the readership numbers of the sanitized True—a 
few of the sweats developed monthly circulations as high as 500,000.14 Amid postwar 
affluence, most of the sweats were slick publications, printed on higher-quality paper 
than the few remaining pulp-paper magazines, and within a few years, virtually all had 
adopted the standard magazine size of eight and a half by eleven inches. 
                                                
13 Parfrey, 7. 
14 For the development of the genre, see Heller, 13-16. For circulation, see Parfrey, 281-287. With the 
exception of True, which was an anomaly both because it was a “respectable,” domesticated version of the 
men’s adventure genre and because of its million-plus circulation numbers, the highest circulation cited by 
Parfrey was Stag’s 1960 record of 471,702.  
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Readership and Advertising 
Like the pulps before them, the sweats targeted a working-class readership. Heller 
positions the sweats as part of the “dark side” of postwar culture, when  
[t]he heroes who beat Hitler and Hirohito came back home to a period of difficult 
adjustment—a postwar economy that initially had few jobs and a shortage of 
housing. Many went from their courageous battle to save democracy to 
unemployment or repetitive, blue-collar manufacturing or service jobs. As horrific 
as the war was, for many it would be their greatest adventure.15 
 
And like the pulps, the sweats featured distinctly working-class advertisements. Erin 
Smith outlines the cultural function of advertisements aimed at working-class readers of 
the hard-boiled detective pulps popular from the 1920s through the 1940s. Arguing that 
by the 1920s, the expansion of consumer culture, the advent of women’s suffrage, and the 
rapid decline of skilled, autonomous labor had combined to make men anxious about 
gender norms, Smith suggests that the pulp advertisements worked to mediate those 
stresses. She describes ads that helped working-class men navigate the new consumer 
culture by adopting strategies of impression management that were more typically 
associated with the middle classes; ads that promised upward mobility through job 
training, self improvement, and accessible education; and ads that offered to reinforce 
readers’ sense of masculinity through body-building courses, sporting purchases, and 
weaponry.16  
Similar advertising messages existed in the postwar men’s adventure magazines. 
Almost always in black and white, ads in the sweats hawked job training, muscle 
building, sex manuals, and trusses. There were some differences: while the pulps printed 
                                                
15 Heller, p. 8. 
16 Smith, chapter 2, “The Adman on the Shop Floor.”  
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several small ads on the same page, and clustered ad pages in the front and back of each 
issue, most sweats included full-page ads throughout, in addition to the smaller clusters. 
But much of the advertising message was the same, as a single 1955 issue of Man’s Life 
illustrates. It includes practical pitches for working men, such as one small box, three and 
a half by two inches, that addressed the reader directly: “Save 75% on Work Clothes!” 
The ad featured a small pen-and-ink drawing of a folded button-up shirt, with a 
description of the bargain underneath, reading, “SHIRTS 79¢ What a buy! 4 for the price 
of one! These shirts, though used, are washed, sterilized and ready for long, tough wear. 
In blue or tan. Send name, address, neck size.” The ad also offered “COVERALLS … 
wear ’em used and save plenty,” noting that although they had originally sold for $5.95, 
the Galco Sales Co. sold used pairs for $1.95.17 
The Man’s Life reader urged to buy used clothing for “long, tough wear” seems to 
inhabit a completely different country than the one described in an exuberant Time 
magazine article published early the next year. The unnamed writer seems positively 
intoxicated by the signs of unprecedented American prosperity. The article is worth 
quoting at length: 
By virtually every measure, 1955 showed the flowering of American 
capitalism. ... Across the land the signs of limitless bounty were evident. … With 
full employment and soaring paychecks, the U.S. had more money to spend ($303 
billion) and spent more of it ($250 billion) than ever before. Savings tumbled to 
the lowest in five years ($16 billion) as confident consumers denied themselves 
nothing. In 1955 they bought: 1,330,000 new homes … 7,250,000 new cars, [and]  
]7,600,000 new TV sets, 200,000 better than record 1950. … As a frosting on the 
cake, some 300 U.S. companies in 1955 had stock purchase plans involving 
2,000,000 U.S. workers. Many another low-salaried worker went out and bought 
                                                
17 Galco Sales Co. work clothes advertisement, Man’s Life 3, no. 3 (March 1955), 78. 
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stock on his own.18 
 
The article continued in the celebratory vein for pages, painting a picture of a very 
different America than the one experienced by Galco’s customers. While mainstream 
media extolled the virtues of the new and prosperous economy, the sweats hawked 
bargains and warned readers against throwing away money on scams that seemed too 
good to be true.  
 Automobile advertising provides a perfect example of the gap between the 
postwar prosperity of the middle class and the economic doldrums of the sweats readers. 
Mainstream advertising glamorized cars in the 1950s; the ads were shot from low angles 
to make the enormous cars seem even larger than they were. One observer of the 
advertising industry noted that “[c]ars were designed and advertised to resemble the 
exciting hardware of the cold war: streamlined, finned like airplanes, fitted with 
elaborate-looking controls, decorated with flashing chrome.” The same observer quoted 
the text of a 1961 Buick ad that embodies the smugness of affluence:  “What a wonderful 
sense of well-being just being seen behind its wheel. No showing off. Just that Clean 
Look of Action which unmistakably tells your success.” 19 
 In contrast, the same 1955 Man’s Life issue addressed automobiles four times. 
Two of those discussions were in articles; one article warned readers about the tricks and 
deceptions common in the used-car trade; the target reader of Man’s Life was not likely 
to buy that 1961 Buick new. Another expose shed humorous light on the challenges of 
                                                
18 “California's Gain Was Once the East's Loss, but 1955's Economy Was Big Enough for Everyone,” Time 
9 January 1958. Online: <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,866744,00.html>. 
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being in the automobile repossession business, or, as the headline described it, “King of 
the Car Snatchers.” The piece was written in the manner of a hard-boiled detective novel, 
and detailed the cleverness necessary to outfox the “deadbeats.”20  
The third mention of automobiles in the issue was an advertisement, but it had 
little in common with the exciting cold war hardware of postwar cars, or with Buick’s 
“wonderful sense of well-being.” The full-page, black-and-white ad featured the small 
image of a 1940s-era auto, which would have been at least ten years old at the time. “Car 
Lost It’s Pep?” the ad asked. “Burning oil?” For only $2.98—a bargain, down from the 
regular $4.45—the reader could buy a PEPGO Ring Seal and avoid a hundred-dollar 
engine overhaul. This ad also indicates a readership that was excluded from the postwar 
economic boom.21 While most historians have characterized the 1950s as a time of 
unprecedented affluence, these advertisements indicate that the affluence was by no 
means universal. 
The last inclusion of automobiles in the issue, another full-page ad, gives the 
bleakest evidence of readers’ financial straits. Its headline warns against the high price of 
car repair: “Don’t Be ‘Buffalo-ed’ by Any Car Repair!” The advertisement is for an auto 
repair manual, guaranteed to be “Faster…Easier…and Right on the very first try!” 
Though the manual only cost $6.95 (plus a thirty-five cent delivery charge), the readers 
are never given that figure. Instead, they are instructed to pay in installments: “remit $2 
                                                                                                                                            
19 Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip 
Consumerism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 61. 
20 Dave West, “Follow that Car!” Man’s Life 3, no. 3 (March 1955): 8, 10, 58; Charles Stewart, “King of 
the Car Snatchers,” Man’s Life 3, no. 3 (March 1955): 40-41, 46-47.  
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in 7 days, then $2 monthly for 2 months, and a final payment of 95¢ (plus 35¢ delivery 
charge) a month later.”22 Clearly, if a $6.95 expenditure was formidable enough to be 
paid on the installment plan, that wonderful Buick sense of well-being was completely 
out of reach.  
However, despite such indications that Man’s Life readers weren’t fully 
experiencing the much-vaunted postwar prosperity, advertisements in the magazine did 
encourage various forms of impression management. A handful of theorists, primarily in 
sociology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology, have defined impression 
management as a self-presentation strategy that is typically employed by members of the 
middle classes. Impression management is clearly useful for functioning in the 
competitive, relatively anonymous communication contexts of middle-class suburban 
life, though members of the working classes often read the strategy as “fake” and 
manipulative.23 However, to compete in the new, image-based world of consumer, rather 
than producer, culture, working men were encouraged by advertisers to become aware of 
impression management strategies. A number of the advertisements in the sample Man’s 
Life suggested this perspective; one promised to “Make Your Hair Last a Lifetime”; 
another portrayed a trim, smiling, all-American man in a “Figure Slimmer” (“Only $3.49 
complete with crotch piece”), a garment that “flattens your front and takes in inches of 
                                                                                                                                            
21 Modern Mart Pepgo Ring Seal advertisement, Man’s Life 3, no. 3 (March 1955): 59. 
22 Motor’s Auto Repair Manual advertisement, Man’s Life 3, no. 3 (March 1955): 7. 
23 See Smith, pp. 10, 58, 63-71, 77-78, 106-108, 111-115; Foley, Learning Capitalist Culture, 176-181; 
and Douglas E. Foley, “Does the Working Class Have a Culture in the Anthropological Sense?” Cultural 
Anthropology 4, no. 2 (May 1989): 137-162, especially 154-155. 
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your appearance. Clothes will look well on you now!”24  
And, like the pulps, the sweats featured ads that held out the promise of self 
improvement and upward mobility. A full-page ad in the sample Man’s Life features a 
bold headline: “How You Can Master GOOD ENGLISH—in 15 Minutes a Day.” 
Language use is a significant class marker, and the text in this advertisement works to 
foster readers’ insecurity about their speech. It warns that “Thousands of persons make 
mistakes in their everyday English—and don’t know it.” In case the reader were 
insufficiently insecure, the text continued with a list of common mistakes: “It is 
surprising how many persons … say ‘between you and I’ instead of ‘between you and 
me’; use ‘who’ for ‘whom’;  and mispronounce the simplest words.” Luckily for the 
Man’s Life audience, a professorial-looking photograph of the system’s founder—
complete with a neatly trimmed Freudian beard, suggesting high cultural capital—smiles 
reassuringly at the reader and offers assistance.25  
Once proper English was mastered, one could “Start Speaking Spanish or French” 
and “Let CORTINA Show You a Short-Cut To…more money [,] a new career [,] cultural 
enjoyment [and] travel fun.” The text’s promises became more explicit further down the 
page: “With a Second Language—You’re a Big Step Ahead of the Other Fellow; Job 
Opportunities Here and Abroad” awaited. Other advertisers in the same issue offered 
writing aptitude tests and instruction; correspondence courses in 116 subjects, ranging 
from “Steamfitting” and “Radio Operating” to “Good English;” and an “Easy Low-Cost 
                                                
24 “Make Your Hair Last a Lifetime,” The Keratone Co., Inc., Man’s Life 3, no. 3 (March 1955): 11;  
“Figure Slimmer,” 61. 
25 For the foundational work on language use as a class marker, see Bernstein. Advertisement, “How You 
Can Master Good English,” Sherwin Cody Course in English, Man’s Life 3, no. 3 (March 1955): 49. 
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Method” of music instruction for “piano, guitar, accordion, or any other musical 
instrument” (emphasis in original).26 These self-improvement ads demonstrate the 
multiple registers in which the sweats engaged their readers. While the magazines overtly 
appealed to rugged, self-sufficient masculinity, the advertisements targeted the 
economically marginalized readers’ financial and cultural insecurities.27  
Finally, as one would expect from the manly genre, advertising in the sweats 
hawked the stereotypically masculine commodities of weapons and bodybuilding. A full-
page ad for a Black Forest brand hunting knife urged readers to “Make This remarkable 
Test! Place a metal disc the size of a half dollar on some pieces of thick cardboard. 
Plunge the point of the Black Forest knife downward. The knife will completely pierce 
the metal piece without ANY damage to the blade!” While mainstream men’s magazines 
also carried advertisements for knives, the instructions for the hands-on, metal-stabbing 
demonstration are more vigorous than would be expected from, say, Field and Stream. 
Another knife advertisement that would not be found in a mainstream men’s magazine 
was a much smaller ad—a text-heavy, 2 ¼ inch by 1 ½ inch square—which offered a 
throwing knife touted as “Balanced—With Deep Penetration.” Knife throwing has 
traditionally been a “rough,” non-middle-class, entertainment.28 And, of course, the 
omnipresent, full-page Charles Atlas ad on the inside back cover virtually shouted in its 
                                                
26 “Free Record,” Cortina Academy, 9; Newspaper Institute of America, inside cover; International 
Correspondence Schools, 5; U.S. School of Music, 51. 
27 Smith describes similarly contrasting appeals in Hardboiled. 
28 For example, in a self-published memoir of his working-class boyhood, Howard Chislett describes knife-
throwing as one of the “dangerous games” he and his cohort played. Howard Chislett, From This Place and 
Time (Bloomington, Indiana: iUniverse, 2006), 11. 
 
 192 
huge bold lettering, “I Can Make you A Real He-Man.”29 Clearly, the advertising in 
postwar men’s adventure magazines implied promises of personal image enhancement, 
upward mobility, and reaffirmed masculinity. 
The Stories and Images of the Sweats 
But the sweats drew their audiences in with other implied promises: the cover 
illustrations, which have recently become collectors’ items, featured rock-muscled he-
men, barely clad women, danger, sadistic violence, and implications of sex. In fact, 
without the newfound popularity of the magazine covers (which became marketable on 
the coattails of their extremely desirable ancestors, pulp magazine covers), the genre may 
have been forgotten. Aside from Peterson’s brief and somewhat sanitized mention of 
men’s adventure magazines in his magazine history, a pair of recent volumes that focus 
on the genre’s cover art constitute the full extent of publication on the magazines. 
Postwar librarians considered the men’s adventure magazines distressingly lowbrow, and 
few institutions subscribed to them.30 
The sweats were, for the most part, aimed at members of what historians have 
called “rough” working-class culture, as differentiated from the “respectable” one. While 
respectable working-class masculinity was predicated on the old craft tradition of honor, 
responsibility, industry, thrift, and pride in craft, men who had been excluded from or 
who had chosen to reject the craft model developed a competing version of working-class 
masculinity. The two groups shared some signifiers of masculinity: both valued 
                                                
29 Black Forest hunting knife advertisement,.55; throwing knife, Knife-Crafters, Inc., 80. 
30 The two recent books are from Parfrey, It’s a Man’s World, and Collins and Hagenauer, Men’s 
Adventure Magazines in Postwar America. While few institutions subscribed to the sweats, fewer still have 
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patriarchal male supremacy, physical vigor, and, in David Montgomery’s phrase, a 
“defiant egalitarianism.” In addition to those qualities, “rough” working-class masculinity 
rejected domesticity, displayed profanity and aggression, consumed alcohol, gambled, 
was profligate, and engaged in extra-marital sex. It is important to remember, however, 
that these two forms of working-class masculinity could and did occasionally overlap and 
coexist, both within individuals and groups.31  
The articles in the sweats reflected working-class fears and fantasies as well. 
Given the blood-and-guts content of the adventure tales, it is unsurprising that many 
articles described ways one could die or be dismembered. While virtually every issue 
spun yarns about exotic dangers—death by wild animal, Nazis, or lunatics—warnings 
about more pedestrian perils were also common, under titles such as “Anesthetics Can 
Kill You” and “10 Reasons Why You Will Die Young.”32 The world, for readers of the 
sweats, was a threatening place. But, based on the frequency of exposes, the fear of being 
cheated seems to be one that resonated with men’s adventure readers. Issue after issue 
described “How Crooked Gamblers Prey on You,” “How to Pick a Golf Cheat,” “50 
Ways to Gyp a GI,” and how to “Watch Out for Auto Lemons.”  
The frequency of this theme suggests a readership uncomfortable with evaluating 
interpersonal motives and communications in a rapidly changing world. It also suggests 
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an audience that often feels as if it has been treated unfairly. In an unusually self-
reflexive twist, Men’s Digest even published an expose on its own industry in the 1965 
“Men’s Adventure Stories Debunked,” whose author admitted that “we ‘stage’ our 
adventures—exaggerate them—or make them up altogether.” He softened the blow by 
sharing some tricks of the trade and letting readers feel “in the know.” But still, the 
impression remains that, at least in the opinions of the publishers and writers, these 
readers were easily fooled. Or, as Adam Parfrey put it, “in postwar America, working-
class [former] soldiers depended upon the mass-market magazines for their civilian life-
lessons. … Men’s adventure magazines. All of them had, among the lures of woman 
flesh and vicious bad guys, a lot of warnings, how-to’s, and comforting memories of 
wartime, when decisions were black and white … .”33  
And, in fact, the idea that their readers were rubes that did seem to be the 
overwhelming opinion of the magazines’ staffs. Parfrey, talking about staff perceptions, 
refers to readers as “blue-collar yahoos,” and notes that staffers were often embarrassed 
about where they worked.34 Writer Dorothy Gallagher, who had served a stint at Marvin 
Goodman’s Magazine Management Company in her youth, remembered that “at 
Magazine Management, magazines were produced the way Detroit produced cars.”35 
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Salaries were low, management was gruff, and many of the staffers were alcoholics, 
misfits, and has-beens. Many others, though, were neophyte writers on their way up: 
Gallagher names Mario Puzo, Bruce Jay Friedman, David Markson, Mickey Spillane and 
Martin Cruz Smith as former Magazine Management writers. Pen names were common, 
both because they were embarrassed about the formulaic writing, and to pretend an 
expertise they didn’t have. For example, pieces written by “Dr. Shailer Upton Lawton,” a 
frequent contributor, were in reality the work of Jules Archer.  Lawton had indeed been a 
physician, as well as a writer, but had sold the rights to his name before his death in 
1966.36 
Portrayals of Psychology  
The sweats used sex and swaggering masculinity to appeal to rough working-class 
men. And, like other media in 1950s America, they also featured the language and broad 
concepts of psychology. But the psychology of the sweats differed from the psychology 
of middle-class magazines like Life or Time. The middle-class magazines typically 
framed the new popularity of psychology as a balm for the stresses of the modern, 
middle-class world. Their portrayals emphasized that psychology was scientific, that it 
required the expertise of the professional, that it was uniquely American, and that it was a 
status symbol. They linked it to elite culture, as exemplified in a 1961 Time cover 
introducing the week’s feature article, “The Anatomy of Angst.” The cover featured a 
full-page reproduction of Edvard Munch’s “The Scream,” with the magazine’s title 
prominently superimposed on the sky in white lettering. Across the upper right-hand 
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corner, covering part of the TIME lettering and part of the sky, a bright yellow banner 
announced “Guilt & Anxiety.”37 Time and magazines of its ilk emphasized the high 
cultural capital that psychology already enjoyed. These portrayals emphasized Freud and 
his Continental sophistication, and they associated psychology with elite education, as 
when Time grounded one discussion in existentialist philosophers’ influences on 
psychoanalytic thought.38 These magazines tended to celebrate psychology as an 
instrumental means to further the middle-class self-improvement project: the unconscious 
was a tool to be tapped and harnessed, and the therapist was an expert guide in this 
process.  
While the middle-class magazines talked about psychology as a panacea for the 
new stresses of modern middle-class life, the sweats’ presentations of psychology offered 
no panacea. In fact, portrayals of psychology in men’s adventure magazines from the 
1950s and 1960s contained three major, recurring themes: fear of being controlled by 
external forces; concern over gender roles; and insecurities about sexual performance and 
sex norms. Control was associated with psychology in both the middle-class and 
working-class magazines. However, while the middle-class magazines portrayed 
psychology as a way for patients to re-gain control of their own lives, representations of 
psychology in the sweats instead focused on the loss of control. Headlines made 
frightening suggestions: “You Can Be Railroaded into a Psycho Ward”; “Hypnosis Can 
                                                                                                                                            
1990), 208. 
37 “The Anatomy of Angst,” Time (31 March 1961), 44-51. 
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Make You a Killer!”; and “Could You Commit a Murder in Your Sleep?” (the answer 
was “yes”). Control was threatened on several fronts. One common theme in the sweats 
was that of false accusations: articles such as “You Can Be Accused of a Sex Crime!” 
and “They Called Me a Sex Fiend!” narrated tales of unscrupulous women who falsely 
claimed rape. Such recurring motifs, uncommon in middle-class magazines, reflect 
working-class men’s unstable claims to respectable, law-abiding citizenship, even when 
they were indeed abiding by the law. The articles with psychological twists are similar: 
“You Can Be Railroaded into a Psycho Ward” and “My Neighbors Put Me in a Mental 
Hospital” recounted false accusations that resulted in the narrator’s loss of liberty.39  
Working-class fears of the system malfunctioning to deprive them of their liberty 
were hardly far-fetched. However, the theme of external control in the sweats went 
further than this. Hypnosis was a common trope. In a 1956 article titled “Can a Snake’s 
Eye Hypnotize You?” readers were warned that snakes “have hypnotic powers” and 
“hypnotize rodents, birds, and sometimes men.” Another headline warned readers to 
“Beware! Hypnosis Can Make You a Killer.’ In addition to hypnosis, hormones could 
threaten readers’ autonomy: the 1956 article “The Mystery of Your Glands” traced 
Napoleon’s degeneration from an “aggressively masculine” womanizer to a defeated, 
shrunken shell with “pronounced feminine characteristics” because of  a glandular 
malfunction. Then there were other physical threats to one’s control: “The Truth about 
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Amnesia” solemnly reported in 1960 that “true loss of memory strikes 40,000 
Americans…each year,” apparently sending them into seedy, immoral, and dangerous 
situations that they would have avoided in their normal states. And sleepwalkers were 
cautioned to lock themselves up securely at night, lest they become another of the many 
hapless somnambulists who had unknowingly committed murder without waking up.40  
The underlying feeling of all of these pieces is that one can never be certain of one’s 
control over oneself, and that external, nefarious forces might take the reins at any 
moment. Although the stories in the sweats were clearly fantastical, workers had certainly 
lost a measure of control in the workplace in the postwar period. While the 1946 labor 
strikes had demonstrated union solidarity, they had also provoked a backlash from 
Congress in the form of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Act prohibited key union strategies and 
collective organizing of supervisors. It also purged communists from leadership positions 
in unions, effectively neutering union radicalism. To distance themselves from the taint 
or radicalism, as well as to increase the likelihood of sharing in postwar prosperity and 
the expanding consumer culture, labor leaders turned to a model of business unionism 
that downplayed the natural conflict of interest between management and workers. 
Unions did manage to get wage increases for their members during the postwar 
prosperity boom, but in exchange they relinquished their earlier demands for a voice in 
operations and decision-making. Additionally, postwar industrial expansion went hand in 
hand with authoritarian control of industrial workers, and industrial-organizational 
psychologists often facilitated those mechanisms of control. This new level of 
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management control on the shop floor was an affront to traditional codes of working-
class masculinity, frustrating the ideals of independence and “defiant egalitarianism.”41  
 The second major psychological theme in the sweats involved a pronounced 
anxiety about gender roles. Working-class masculinity, particularly “rough” working-
class masculinity, emphasized a homosocial male supremacy that was threatened by the 
“new woman” of the 1920s, as well as by women’s incursions into the workplace during 
World War II. While many of those women had been forced out of paid labor and back to 
domesticity in the postwar era, the foundation of traditional gender roles had clearly been 
cracked. Tellingly, a good deal of the paid employment still open to women after the war 
placed middle-class women in positions of authority over working-class men. Teachers, 
social workers, and, increasingly, female psychologists made decisions that affected 
working-class men and their families.42  
 These cultural tensions help us understand the gender role anxiety that saturated 
the sweats. A 1955 Man’s Life title summarized the theme perfectly: “The American 
Male Is No Longer a Man, Says a Woman Psychologist.” The “woman psychologist,” 
writing in a style that is suspiciously colloquial, nonpsychological, and masculine, 
claimed that “the American male is turning soft.” The article emphasized two points: men 
had become “pampered” “foul-ups and weaklings” (qualities in direct opposition to 
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traditional working-class masculinity, and—not coincidentally—qualities which 
working-class men had long attributed to both women and higher-class men); and women 
were plotting to take over man’s dominant role (indicating a complete inversion of the 
basic definition of masculinity). Even the modern feminist reader can sense the deeply 
disquieting impact that this prophecy must have had on its intended audience. 
Another indication of gender role anxiety was the regular discussion of 
homosexuality in the sweats. It was the second-most frequent topic in the magazines 
surveyed, just after sexual performance itself. Readers were told “Why Homos Like 
Elvis” and “Why Homosexuals Feel Superior,” and they were asked, rather pointedly, 
“What Are Your Homosexual Tendencies?” It is important to note that homosexuality 
appeared to signify a failure in masculinity itself rather than a specifically sexual act; 
researchers and historians have observed that homosexual activity did not necessarily 
define a working-class man as a homosexual, nor did it necessarily threaten his 
masculinity, as long as he took the dominant, or traditionally masculine, role. However, 
that was predicated upon the non-dominant partner being visibly feminine, a self-
presentation that was much more typical of working-class homosexuals than of middle-
class homosexuals. As male homosexuality became more visible—and more visibly 
middle class—in the postwar period, it also became less comprehensible to heterosexual 
working-class men.43  
Interestingly, the postwar presentations of lesbianism in the sweats did not have 
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the male-focused, titillating quality found in popular representations today. Lesbians were 
generally signified as yet another way a man could lose his wife, be humiliated, or 
become disadvantaged. One exposé, ostensibly penned by Dr. Shailer Upton Lawton, 
introduced the case of a diamond cutter who had fallen in love with a lesbian and 
managed to persuade her to marry him. She could never love him, though, and when he 
finally understood that fact, he fell apart: his vision became blurry, and he developed an 
uncontrollable trembling in his hands. In short, in addition to being left loveless, he had 
also destroyed his livelihood. The moral, according to the fictitious Dr. Lawton, was that 
“[m]any men pass up the danger signals, as Dennis did, and rush into marriage with girls 
who have latent homosexual desires. This is one good reason why every man ought to 
know all he can about female homosexuality.44  “Another article, “Lesbians Are Not 
Legally Liable,” features large photos of mannish women in boxy, unflattering suits, 
complete with neckties, and complains that despite laws against homosexual behavior, 
women’s activities tend to be overlooked. Once again, men are portrayed as being treated 
unfairly: their sexual deviance is always punished.45 
Despite the bodice-ripping images on the covers and the overt and pervasive 
sexualized article titles, the actual sexual content of the sweats was fairly tame. In fact, 
the tone of such discussion was decidedly more anxious than erotic. Readers were told in 
dozens of ways that they were inadequate: typical titles include “Ex-G.I.’s Make Lousy 
Lovers”; “What You Don’t Know about Sex”; “American Males Are Lazy Lovers,” and 
“Your 10 Worst Sexual Blunders.” Unsurprisingly, psychological terms and ideas were 
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often borrowed to legitimize discussions of sex, leading to a flurry of titles featuring 
nymphomaniacs.  And in a magazine version of bait-and-switch, sexually oriented titles 
were slapped indiscriminately onto decidedly nonsexual articles. For example, one 1969 
article titled “The Sex Drives that Cause 1,000 Student Suicides a Year” presumably 
titillated potential readers with the expectation of a story about college girls having sex, a 
fairly frequent trope in the sweats. Once the reader bought the magazine, however, he 
discovered a long and dull article that attributed most student suicides to worry over 
grades and the stresses of independent college life.  
The insecurity about sex reflected in the sweats, like the concerns over control 
and gender roles, seems to reflect worries about the changing nature of working-class 
masculinity as an identity rather than worries about sexual activity in itself. Perceptions 
of sex have been highly classed since the middle class emerged in the early 19th century 
with values of restraint, including sexual restraint. In addition, sexuality became a 
component of working-class masculinity during the age of mass production, and by the 
postwar era, an aggressive and overt sexuality was associated with working-class 
masculinity.46 However, the debut of oral contraceptives in 1960 and the resulting sexual 
revolution changed the cultural meanings of sexuality. In the midst of this upheaval, 
nonmarital sex would not necessarily have been seen as a symbol of rugged, working-
class opposition to middle-class society; middle-class teens (and often their parents) were 
engaging in the same behavior. If sexuality had been, at least in the popular imagination, 
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the province of the working class rather than the repressed middle class, it was no longer. 
So in this arena, too, the codes and meanings of working-class masculinity were in flux in 
response to broader cultural changes.  
Conclusions 
Men’s adventure magazines of the postwar era offer modern observers a glimpse 
into the interests and concerns of their working-class readers. The magazines themselves 
were starkly different than the slick, mass-circulation magazines of the period that were 
marketed to middle-class and upwardly mobile readers. The sweats were cheaply printed 
on thin, low-quality paper. Their advertisements were small and cluttered, and they 
hawked products associated with need and thrift, not the sparkling new mass-produced 
consumer goods advertised in the mainstream publications. The articles in the sweats 
betray fears of being cheated, falling behind, and not being adequate. And their 
presentations of psychology bear no resemblance to the positive, scientific, optimistic 
portrayals of the discipline published in the mainstream magazines. Psy in the sweats is 
instead about sex, fear, and loss of control, and indicates the ambivalent use that these 




Chapter Five. Successes and the Seeds of Failure: The Community Mental Health 
Movement 
 By the early 1960s, interest in class issues, mental health, and how the two 
intersected was at an all-time high.  Social progressives had every reason to imagine that 
their hopes for a more enlightened, humane, and egalitarian society could be fulfilled. 
The sitting president of the United States not only put mental health on the national 
agenda, he also specifically linked it to social, economic, and cultural factors that needed 
to be improved. Congress responded, funding the Community Mental Health Centers Act 
of 1963, which proponents believed would revolutionize prevention and treatment of 
mental illnesses, particularly among previously underserved groups. But the optimism 
extended even further than that. Mental health experts now possessed more than a decade 
of research findings about correlations between class, environment, and mental health. 
They believed that, as expert guides to optimal ways to live, they could improve the 
quality of life in disadvantaged communities. They thought that the community mental 
health center system would finally allow the discipline of psychology to express its full 
potential for facilitating human development and uplifting the whole nation. More 
surprisingly from the vantage point of half a century later, a  significant number of them 
also recognized the structural and ideological changes that would be required to achieve a 
truly healthy, democratic society; they believed that the psy professions could, and 
should, work toward those changes. 
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 In addition, less than a year after the Community Mental Health Centers Act was 
passed, Lyndon Baines Johnson launched a “war on poverty,” publicly acknowledging 
massive economic inequalities in the country and pledging to alleviate them. This war on 
poverty became a cornerstone of Johnson’s “Great Society,” a series of domestic 
programs designed to eliminate poverty and racism. Continuing in the direction of 
Kennedy’s New Frontier policies, Johnson’s Great Society initiatives combined 
legislation, direct aid, educational programs, and job training with “community action,” a 
strategy that involved organizing and empowering disadvantaged people to participate in 
developing and administering the programs aimed at their communities. Here, too, 
optimism ran high; the feeling seemed to be that surely in a nation so powerful, wealthy, 
and progressive, social problems such as poverty could be dispatched much as we had 
dispatched polio almost decade earlier. 
 And, in the background of this national attention to mental health and class 
inequalities, a small but vocal group of psychiatric practitioners had begun what would be 
known as the anti-psychiatry movement, arguing that the concept of mental illness itself 
was a social construction developed to legitimize conformity and elite social control. 
While all three of these developments in the 1960s would, at first glance, appear to 
provide new tools with which to decouple the profession’s unreflexive associations of 
mental health and middle-class standards, all three paradoxically ended up reinforcing 





Community Mental Health Centers 
 In 1963, John F. Kennedy became the first sitting president of the United States to 
put mental health on the national agenda. Part of his interest was likely personal: his 
younger sister Rose had suffered from mental problems that resulted in a botched 
lobotomy and permanent institutionalization at the age of 23. However, Kennedy was 
also impressed with the new psychotropic drugs that had been developed in the 1950s, as 
well as with sociological research demonstrating the links between economic factors and 
mental illness. Based partly on the 1961 recommendations of the Joint Commission on 
Mental Illness and Health, and partly on an ambitious reworking of the Joint Commission 
proposal  prepared by the National Institute of Mental Health, Kennedy urged Congress 
to take a “bold new approach” to the problem and establish community mental health 
centers that would democratize access to mental health care. Like other proponents, he 
also believed that the centers would be able to both prevent and cure most mental 
illnesses. Kennedy’s views on mental illness reflected the social and scientific optimism 
of the times and led him to claim, “I am convinced that, if we apply our medical 
knowledge and social insights fully, all but a small portion of the mentally ill can 
eventually achieve a wholesome and constructive social adjustment.”1 
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 The community mental health center (CMHC) approach was certainly new. 
Rather than warehousing mental patients in huge, troubled state hospitals, CMHCs would 
focus on prevention and, for those whom preventive measures failed, outpatient 
treatment. To address the chronic shortage of psychological professionals, the centers 
would increase the use of trained para- and non-professionals, many of whom could be 
members of the community served, thus strengthening the centers’ ties to the community. 
Finally, the centers promised to increase access to care for previously underserved low-
income populations, and to incorporate the profession’s growing awareness of how social 
and environmental factors impacted mental health. Kennedy himself acknowledged that 
preventing mental illness would require “the general strengthening of our fundamental 
community, social welfare, and educational programs which can do much to eliminate or 
correct the harsh environmental conditions which often are associated with mental 
retardation and mental illness.”2 
The timing was ideal for Kennedy’s proposal. One reason was the force of public 
opinion: by the time Kennedy spoke, it was widely accepted that the state mental hospital 
system needed reform. State mental hospitals had been vilified since the 19th century for 
their overcrowding, lack of therapeutic treatment, and inhumane conditions. After World 
War II, a series of exposes launched by a Life photo essay titled “Bedlam 1946,” had 
heightened public and legislative awareness of those brutal conditions. The images and 
articles detailed filthy conditions, beatings, starvation, overdrugging, and inhumane use 





of physical restraints. A number of the exposes noted similarities between the American 
state mental hospitals and Nazi concentration camps. For example, prominent journalist 
Albert Deutsch investigated dozens of hospitals, and wrote in 1948 that many of them 
“rivaled the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps—hundreds of naked mental patients 
herded into huge, barn-like, filth-infested wards, in all degrees of deterioration, untended 
and untreated, stripped of every vestige of human decency.”3 Fictionalized versions drew 
still more attention to the topic. Forty million people experienced the horrors of a state 
mental hospital along with Olivia de Havilland’s character in the 1948 film The Snake 
Pit. Based on a former inmate’s 1946 memoir, The Snake Pit became one of the five top-
grossing films of 1949. 4  
By the early 1950s, more than half of the states had initiated reforms in their state 
hospital systems. According to psychology professor Bernard L. Bloom, two reforms in 
particular—in addition to the development of new psychotropic drugs—set the stage for 
the community health movement: geographic decentralization and the related idea of the 
therapeutic community. Under geographic decentralization, the more progressive of the 
huge state hospitals moved away from the old system, which had housed patients based 
on treatment modalities, diagnoses, and infirmities. Typical hospitals, under the old 
system, would allocate patients to electroshock therapy wards, insulin therapy wards, 
wards for alcoholics, wards for the elderly, wards for patients with certain physical 
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illnesses, and so on. Under the new system, patients were housed in wards based on the 
town or area they had lived in before being institutionalized. At the same time, some 
hospitals developed the idea that the patient community, not just hospital staff, could 
have a therapeutic function. In this therapeutic community model, the hierarchical 
relationship between patients and staff was disrupted to include patient collaboration and 
input on treatment planning, discharge, and assessments of other patients’ behavior. 
According to Bloom, these developments “worked together to democratize the clinical 
decision-making process.”5  
At the same time, as Bloom suggested, dramatic advances in 
psychopharmacology provided perhaps the most widespread reason for optimism among 
psychological professionals. Before the 1950s, chemical treatment of mental illness 
consisted of tranquillizers, which were primarily used as a chemical restraint for 
uncontrollable patients. The early drugs were not therapeutic, and they had the 
unfortunate side effects of impairing patients’ thought processes and inducing 
unconsciousness. However, in the early 1950s, new classes of psychoactive drugs were 
developed. The first of the new drugs, chlorpromazine, was marketed heavily in the 
United States as Thorazine, and was hailed as a miracle drug by the psychiatric 
profession.  Thorazine, along with the other neuroleptics that followed, reduced agitation, 
discomfort, and aggression in patients without excessively sedating them. These new 
drugs allowed many patients to function outside of an institution, as long as they 
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continued their drug therapy, and ushered in what proponents called the “neuroleptic 
revolution.” Looking back on that heady time, a psychiatrist explained the excitement: 
It is difficult to communicate to younger colleagues the miracle that 150 to 
300 mg of chlorpromazine a day appeared to be to the house officers of 1956. It 
not only sedated the patients but actually made them less psychotic. Some patients 
began to hallucinate less, and their delusions softened. Finally we were like other 
doctors in that we had a treatment that actually worked. It was truly an 
intoxicating time.6 
 
It is notable that this psychiatrist was excited not only about the efficacy of this new 
treatment, but also about his perception that it made him and his colleagues “like other 
doctors.” Psychiatrists saw the new drugs as both confirmation of the medical model of 
mental illness and as evidence that the broader medical community had been wrong to 
marginalize psychiatry. 
 In addition to optimism about psychotropic drugs and the structural experiments of 
some progressive mental hospitals, another wave of concern about mental hospitals 
developed in 1961, helping to nudge public and congressional opinion towards the 
community health center plan. In that year, sociologist Erving Goffman published his 
observations as a participant-observer in a mental hospital under the title Asylums: Essays 
on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Goffman described the 
abasement and loss of self typically experienced by patients in mental hospitals, and 
argued that a good deal of the behavior that outsiders—and, significantly, hospital 
personnel—would consider “insane” was instead a reasonably rational adaptation to a 
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repressive institution. Goffman further claimed that mental hospitals fostered alienation 
among their inmates that was frequently more debilitating than the inmates’ original 
problems. In other words, the state hospitals were more likely to create and intensify 
mental dysfunction in their inmates than to cure it.7 The following year, Ken Kesey 
published One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, a critically acclaimed and best-selling novel 
centered on a tyrannical nurse’s abuse of power in a psychiatric hospital. 
 Goffman’s indictment of institutionalization seemed to echo the claims of the 
community mental health movement. With the new psychotropic drugs, the improved 
understanding of how to structure treatment, and the unprecedented political support, 
proponents of community mental health programs believed they could conquer mental 
illness. The enthusiasm was widespread: by 1961, psychiatrist Leopold Bellak had hailed 
community psychiatry as the “third psychiatric revolution,” placing it in company with 
the 18th century “moral treatment” that removed mental patients from their shackles, and 
with the 19th century work of Sigmund Freud.  The sobriquet “third psychiatric 
revolution” stuck, and to many practitioners, it seemed justified. In the mid-1950s, the 
number of patients in state mental hospitals had begun to decline, dropping from a high 
of 600,000 in 1955 to 500,000 by 1963. When the popular president urged Congress to 
establish community health centers in February of 1963, Congress complied eight months 
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later, and Kennedy signed the Community Mental Health Centers Act into law on 
October 31. As one observer noted, “community psychiatry is like a swirling modern 
convention blaring with noise and spirit that is being beamed to large numbers of friends 
and neutrals and the opposition party.”8 
 Kennedy’s assassination did not derail the development of CMHCs. If anything, 
many of the slain president’s former supporters redoubled their efforts to implement his 
vision. His legacy acquired a near-mythical status in many quarters, as evidenced by the 
dedication to a1964 Handbook of Community Psychiatry. The first line reads, “ To John 
F. Kennedy, President of the United States, who was the rare political leader to be literate 
and intellectual, courageous as well as sane.”9 For many, Kennedy’s assassination 
provided even more evidence of the need for a broad-based national mental health 
movement.  
 The War on Poverty 
 While the War on Poverty was not directly linked to the CMHCs, the fates of the 
two programs were intertwined. The new Johnson administration developed an ambitious 
and progressive domestic agenda that worked to legitimize the CMHC movement even 
further. The cornerstone of the Great Society agenda was Johnson’s War on Poverty. The 
Kennedy administration had developed the program, and Johnson introduced it during his 
first State of the Union address in January 1964, less than seven weeks after Kennedy 
                                                                                                                                            
(1982): 267-274. 
8 Leopold Bellak, “Community Psychiatry: The Third Psychiatric Revolution,” in Handbook of Community 
Psychiatry and Community Mental Health, ed. Leopold Bellak (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1964), 1-11. 
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was killed. Journalist Michael Harrington had shocked a complacent nation with his 1962 
book, The Other America: Poverty in the United States. As Harrington emphasized, the 
poor—40 to 50 million Americans, almost a quarter of the population—were “invisible.” 
They lived in crowded slums and remote rural regions, places where middle-class 
Americans rarely ventured, places in which the poor were truly invisible to their more 
affluent countrymen, who generally assumed that poverty had been conquered by New 
Deal policies. Harrington’s book sold more than a million copies and facilitated postwar 
America’s belated “discovery” of its poor.10 
 Harrington, who was a democratic socialist, recognized the entrenched nature of 
poverty in late capitalist society. When the head of the new Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) enthusiastically described the billion-dollar appropriation to end 
poverty, Harrington replied that such an intractable problem could not be eradicated with 
“nickels and dimes.”11 However, most Americans—and most policymakers—responded 
to this recognition of deprivation in the midst of affluence with the boosterish optimism 
so characteristic of the postwar period. Morris Abram, a member of the National 
Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, captured that optimism in a later interview: 
“I must say at that time I was very much of the opinion that the government could wipe out 
poverty, like it could wipe out venereal disease if it just had enough penicillin.” 12 That belief 
                                                
10 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: MacMillan, 1962); 
invisibility on p. 7. For sales and reception, see Maurice Isserman, “The Other America: Michael 
Harrington,” in Poverty in the United States: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, and Policy, ed. 
Gwendolyn Mink and Alice O’Connor (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 529-530. 
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1002-1009; quote on 1005. 
12 Transcript, Morris Abram Oral History Interview II, 5/3/84, by Michael L. Gillette, p. 15. Internet Copy, 
 
 214 
was widespread; in fact, according to historian Alice O’Connor, the assumptions and 
worldviews of social scientists and policymakers who developed the new postwar specialty 
of “poverty knowledge” ensured that the new body of knowledge would reaffirm rather 
than challenge the mainstream culture: 
Poverty, to use the terminology of the day, occurs in some “other,” separate 
America; as an aberration, an exception, a “paradox” of plenty rather than as an 
integral or necessary condition of the affluent society. Built on this premise, 
poverty knowledge continues to hold out a certain promise: doing something 
about, even eliminating, poverty will not require radical change; whether through 
social engineering, wage subsidies, economic growth, or the new/old-fashioned 
strategy of pushing people into the market, the paradox can be resolved without 
resorting to a massive redistribution of power and wealth.13 
 
 One major component of the war on poverty was the Community Action Program 
(CAP), a program that also impacted the CMHC movement. One New York Times review 
called the Community Action Program the “heart” of the war on poverty, and other 
observers agreed.14 The CAP funded local Community Action Agencies as small, real-
world research laboratories whose mandate was to attack the causes of poverty. The 
program was intentionally designed to be flexible so that participants could try a variety 
of approaches and tailor them to the local community’s needs.  Modeled after two 
successful community projects in New York City, the CAP’s theoretical underpinnings 
drew on cutting-edge progressive social science research, and emphasized participation 
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New York Press, 2007), 12; Kent B. Germany calls it “a foundation” of the war on poverty in “War on 
 
 215 
by members of the community. In fact, the bill’s language required “maximum feasible 
participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served.” The reasons for 
this participatory process were threefold: to minimize dependency, to channel 
dissatisfactions that might otherwise erupt in antisocial ways, and, as one 1969 study 
described it, to shape social behavior of poor participants “so that the poor would become 
more ‘socially responsible’ and imitative of the middle class.”15 
While the idea of facilitating the “maximum feasible participation” of low-income 
stakeholders in a government program may seem benign, the would turn out to have 
potentially radical implications in the volatile racial and social climate of the time. But 
when it was drafted, there was little agreement about what the clause meant, or about 
what it should mean. Sociologist Lillian B. Rubin summarized the situation clearly in 
1969, five years after passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, when she wrote, 
“[T]he revolutionary implications of what they were proposing escaped the framers of the 
act, in part, because of the preconceptions about poverty, race, and welfare that grip 
American thought and distort our vision.”16 However, the revolutionary implications of 
community activism were not lost on the members of the communities in question. In 
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1966, Time magazine described what it clearly felt were extreme examples of community 
participation:  
In Cleveland, slum dwellers organized, marched on city hall and left 
dead rats on the steps to dramatize their demand for better housing. In 
Washington's Lafayette Square across from the White House, 90 
Mississippi Negroes pitched tents to publicize their own pitiable housing 
situation. In Syracuse, an OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity]-
financed group sent jeering squads to heckle Republican Mayor William 
Walsh during his 1964 re-election campaign, used poverty funds to bail 
out demonstrators. When their funds ran out, they sent a 25-man 
delegation to besiege [Sargent] Shriver [head of CAP] for more, and when 
he turned them down, they went to the White House in a vain attempt to 
see Lyndon Johnson.17 
 
While the public reaction to the nonviolent civil disobedience tactics of the early Civil 
Rights movement had generally been positive, that acceptance apparently did not extend 
to protests involving dead rats. More importantly, early Civil Rights protestors had 
disciplined themselves to be not only nonviolent but polite; many of them were middle-
class, and they reflected the appearance and mannerisms of the white, middle-class 
culture they wanted access to. These new protesters did not. 
 Almost immediately, CAP drew fire from established powerbrokers. The 
Republicans saw the program as a way to politicize new Democratic forces; the 
Democrats saw it as a challenge to their existing local power structures. And for the most 
part, the men who had created it saw it as a disaster. When one Syracuse organization 
launched sit-ins, rent strikes, and protests at city hall, the mayor accused both the 
organization and the OEO of “class warfare.”18 By August 1965, LBJ himself railed 
against CAP in a private office conversation: “I think somebody ought to veto these 
                                                




damned fool community action [programs]. Don’t you put any money in community 
action. Just cut it down. Hear that? Just cut that down… .”19 But perhaps the most vocal 
critic of CAP was Pat Moynihan, assistant secretary of labor until 1965. A few years 
later, a Johnson staffer described Moynihan’s antipathy to CAP: 
 Moynihan was very disturbed from the beginning by community 
action.  I  remember … driving him home one night, and he said, "You 
realize what you've done, don't you?  You've ruined the poverty program 
and the anti-poverty effort with community action. It's wild; these people 
are out to destroy you.  And you're giving money to the very people who 
are going to destroy you." It was a really vigorous, violent speech about 
the crazy way we were proceeding to remedy the problems of poverty.20 
 
Moynihan, of course, was also famous (or infamous) as the author of The Moynihan 
Report (1965), formally titled The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. The 
report issued a warning about the “pathology” of the black community, which Moynihan 
attributed to the breakdown of the black family and the predominance of matriarchal 
cultural patterns in black communities. Reception of his work was as sharply polarized as 
it remains today: functionalists, conservatives, and proponents of individual 
responsibility applauded what they saw as his insight and candor. Moynihan’s work 
revived and popularized Oscar Lewis’s “culture of poverty” idea, which became a major 
tenet of public policy during the 1980s. From the other end of the political spectrum, 
structuralists saw Moynihan’s argument as racist and coined the phrase “blaming the 
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victim” to describe his perspective.21 
 Sargent Shriver had little tolerance for either radicalism or public relations 
problems. At the same time, the escalation of the war in Vietnam drained budget and 
national focus from the war on poverty. By the end of 1965, the OEO had significantly 
reduced or discontinued funding for the most controversial CAP groups. The next year, 
Congress cut funding to the bone for local CAP programs; in 1967, the Green 
Amendment effectively finished CAP off, and precluded any possibility of real change, 
by placing programs under the control of existing local governments. Liberals were the 
first to wave the white flag in the war on poverty; writing in 1969, one of Robert 
Kennedy’s former staffers admitted that “by January of 1966, the battle was already 
lost.”22   
 There were many reasons for the failure to eradicate poverty. Critics on the far 
left argued that poverty is an intrinsic part of late capitalism. Without an actual 
redistribution of power and resources, no problem so deeply imbedded can possibly be 
changed. Another reason cited by many liberals was the lack of a job creation program. 
Johnson was unwilling to spend the large amounts of money that would have been 
necessary to create jobs on the scale needed, and even the amount he had been willing to 
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allocate dwindled as the war in Vietnam took more and more of the country’s resources.  
Vietnam itself is an of-cited reason for the failure of the war on poverty; as U.S. military 
involvement escalated, so did domestic conflict about our participation. Other issues fell 
by the wayside. A number of observers argue that racism was a component of the 
public’s eventual rejection of the war on poverty; a large segment of the white population 
saw anti-poverty initiatives as benefiting only African Americans, at just the same time 
that the Black Power movement was alienating many of those white people. Additionally, 
the Watts Riots in August 1965 made both Congress and middle-class voters leery of any 
further empowerment of disadvantaged communities.   
 However, despite the preponderance of belief that the war on poverty failed, it 
does have some defenders. Noel A. Cazenave, a historical sociologist, has argued 
recently that although the Johnson administration did not eradicate poverty, CAP 
achieved the “unlikely success” of politicizing and empowering the poor. This also had 
the continuing (if not continuous) effects of increasing citizen participation in community 
issues and of making urban social service organizations more aware of and responsive to 
the needs of the people they serve. Similarly, historian Robin D. G. Kelley believes that 
CAP projects fostered interracial ties among liberal activists, provided venues in which 
already-politicized African Americans could act, and, as Cazenave mentioned, gave poor 
blacks more input with the social service agencies designed to help them.23 
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 220 
 CMHCs: Trouble in Utopia 
 However, just as Community Mental Health Centers were being launched, using a 
participatory, grassroots model intentionally patterned after CAP, the CAP programs 
were alienating both their government sponsors and the public. Even before the Act was 
passed, the community mental health project was troubled. The American Medical 
Association was horrified by what it saw as excessive government interference in 
medicine. Its members lobbied vigorously against the act, and almost every congressman 
was warned against passage by his own physician. In psychologist George Albee’s 
words, “the implication was that the centers as proposed by Kennedy and his friends in 
the Congress were another step down the road to socialized medicine, and perhaps 
ultimately, of course, to Godless Communism and worse.”24  
 The AMA particularly opposed funding for staffing the centers, fearing that 
federal staffing money would undermine physician autonomy. Under pressure from 
AMA leaders—and against the recommendations of AMA’s mental health experts—
Congress cut the money for staffing. The upshot was that a great deal of federal money 
became available to build facilities. Further, that money was most likely to be awarded to 
entities that were already developed enough to be able to navigate the labyrinthine 
application forms and demonstrate that they could meet the requirements for federal 
funding. At best, this favored existing large institutions—hardly the “bold change” 
Kennedy had hoped for. At worst, it lent itself to outright money grabs by organizations 
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whose leaders were happy to build or improve their structures, but who had no interest in 
serving the wider community.25  
 However, there was a deeper conflict. The community mental health movement 
was predicated on the idea that social environment and mental health were intrinsically 
linked. While this idea had been central to social psychology at its inception as a distinct 
discipline in the early 20th century, mainstream psychological professionals insisted on an 
ahistoric, self-contained, intrapsychic “self” as the object of their investigations. And, in 
fact, even social psychology in the United States had moved away from a truly “social” 
view of human behavior by the 1920s, as evidenced by social psychologist Floyd 
Allport’s famous claim that “[t]here is no psychology of groups which is not essentially 
and entirely a psychology of individuals.” 26 Many psy professionals saw the community 
mental health movement as an illegitimate digression from the true object of the 
discipline, the intrapsychic self.  
Worse still, much like early sociologists, many mainstream psychological 
professionals were disturbed by the social activism of some CMHC proponents.  Not only 
was social activism, in their view, a digression from the true task, but it also seemed to 
carry the taint of unprofessionalism. Finally, the CMHC proponents’ concern for the 
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poor, emphasis on collective action, and progressive perspective provided ample fodder 
for the era’s remaining Cold Warriors. Despite its spreading popularity, psychology was 
still suspect among certain groups as a potential form of social control; that fear, coupled 
with the CMHCs’ explicitly progressive agenda, sparked charges of anti-Americanism. In 
the debut issue of Community Mental Health Journal, a psychologist described the 
thought process behind that perspective: 
The anti-mental health position typically, although not uniformly, begins 
with the assumption that there exists an international communist conspiracy 
… [which] has as its aim the destruction of freedom and liberty. The mental 
health professional acts so as to deprive citizens of their freedom. Hence, the 
mental health professional is either a Communist or a tool of the 
Communists.27 
 
When this was published in 1966, during the escalation of both U.S. involvement in the 
Vietnam War and the antiwar movement, this perspective must have seemed ludicrous to 
readers of a community mental health journal. Similarly, those readers’ zeal for 
empowering the poor, leveling hierarchies, battling racial oppression, and working 
collectively must have been incomprehensible to the anti-communist contingent. The 
CMHC project was clearly situated on the era’s major cultural fault lines. 
Insurgencies 
The largest CMHC quakes precipitated by those fault lines occurred in New York 
City, and were a direct result of class schisms. Echoing the fallout from the “maximum 
feasible participation” clause in the CAP legislation, psy professionals and policymakers 
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were soon sharply divided over community participation in community mental health 
centers. While NIMH emphasized the importance of community participation and a sense 
of “ownership” of the centers, the wording of the CMHC Act was even more vague on 
the topic than the CAP language had been. However, despite the fuzziness, the idea of 
citizen input threatened some psy professionals. Psychiatrist H. G. Whittington was more 
candid about his concerns than many of his colleagues: 
The community mental health establishment, in theory at least, is conceived 
of as being democratically based. Recent guidelines for the administration of 
federal construction grants, emphasize that services must be tailored to local 
needs and desires and that citizens must have a voice in policymaking and 
decisions. In an age when the majority of governmental processes are carried 
on by the consent, rather than the participation, of the governed, is such a 
heavy reliance upon the citizen governing board--the usual mechanism for 
ensuring citizen participation--entirely realistic? In an age of bureaucracy, is 
the "servant of the people" model of sufficient prestige to be attractive to 
mental health professionals?28 
 
Whittington, apparently assuming a sympathetic readership, didn’t even bother to 
camouflage his elitism. While most practitioners who expressed discomfort with the 
citizen input component of CMHCs cited the need for trained professionals to make 
decisions in patients’ best interest, Whittington cut to the chase. Not only was citizen 
participation “unrealistic” (and his use made it unclear whether he meant that expecting 
citizens to care enough to participate was not realistic, or whether he meant that any 
citizens hoping to have a real voice was being unrealistic), but—more to the point—it 
would diminish the professional prestige necessary to attract psy professionals.  
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 While Whittington’s perspective was not universal, it was by no means unique.  A 
great many critics cited such professional elitism as one reason for the CMHCs’ failure to 
achieve real community participation. In addition to blatant provider arrogance, a 
pervasive middle-class orientation at most of the CMHCs was likely to have chilled 
community interest. Ralph Nader’s organization, The Center for the Study of Responsive 
Law, investigated the CMHC program and produced a fairly critical report. One major 
observation, though, was that “the centers program as a whole embodies a fundamentally 
middle-class model,” reducing (or eliminating) its effectiveness with target 
communities.29 The individuals in charge of the centers were overwhelmingly white, 
middle-class, and male. Even in the best centers, a marked paternalism was evident. The 
professionals, especially in the early years, wore office attire, expected to be addressed 
with honorifics, and spoke in a relatively formal style. One 1972 study of CMHCs in 
impoverished areas noted that the structures created to facilitate citizen involvement were 
patterned on middle-class volunteer boards, a structure that must have seemed formal and 
foreign to the low-income members of the communities.30  
Given the distance between the glowing promises of CMHC egalitarian rhetoric 
and its less-luminous reality, it is not surprising that discontent festered. And, given the 
cultural precedent of protest and civil disobedience that had developed during the Civil 
Rights movement and continued with the anti-war movement, it is not surprising that 
some members of the communities took matters into their own hands. As historian David 
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F. Musto pointed out, “The centers began operating just as many local communities, 
particularly those mired in poverty and given priority as CMHC targets, were seething 
with overt anger against the Establishment.”31 In 1968 and 1969, that anger boiled over 
twice in New York City, as residents and then staff members demanded that the 
grassroots promise of CMHCs be fulfilled.   
 The first incident took place in September of 1968. Lawrence Kolb,32 chair of 
Columbia University Department of Psychiatry, had gathered a small group of 
community leaders from the impoverished neighborhood of Washington Heights and the 
adjoining middle-class Inwood. The university wanted the community’s support for a 
new CMHC. However, rather than soliciting community feedback in the planning stage, 
as program guidelines instructed, Kolb and Columbia wanted their hand-picked guests to 
rubber-stamp the plans they had already developed. Moreover, those plans included 
demolishing the Audubon Ballroom, the site of Malcom X’s 1965 assassination. And, 
according to the alternative journal Health/PAC (Policy Advisory Center) Bulletin, 
blueprints for the proposed CMHC included two public entrances—one for the mostly 
black and Puerto Rican residents of Washington Heights, and another for the white, 
middle-class inhabitants of Inwood. While the separate entrances were, in all likelihood, 
planners’ attempt to conform to the CMHC “catchment area” rules that required separate 
centers for each geographic area to be served, the result was breathtakingly insensitive.33 
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 Black and Puerto Rican residents of Washington Heights—residents who had not 
been invited to Kolb’s meeting—crashed the gathering, took control of the meeting, 
declared the existing plans illegitimate due to their lack of community input, and insisted 
that the community be allowed to plan its own CMHC. Amazingly, from the vantage 
point of four conservative decades later, the city’s Community Mental Health Board and 
the New York State Department of Mental Health named the gatecrashers the new mental 
health planning group for the area. No significant funding came with the title, and since 
CMHCs were required to provide inpatient as well as outpatient care, it was clear that the 
new health planning group would have to “come back to the medical empire for 
psychiatric beds and services.”34 In other words, the community members felt as if they 
had been give a voice, and the city and state agencies could claim to have significant 
community involvement, but the basic structure of services would remain the same. 
Another, more widely publicized, battle began over the use of paraprofessionals 
in the CMHCs. One of the ways in which CMHCs were supposed to provide “maximum 
feasible participation” for community residents was by hiring what was first termed 
“indigenous nonprofessionals” (later, the preferred term became “paraprofessionals”) 
drawn from the communities to work in the centers. Ideally, they were supposed to 
function as conduits between each community and its CMHC, helping the professional 
staff to understand the community and its needs, and helping the community residents 
understand and access the CMHC’s services. In addition, the paraprofessionals would 
                                                




benefit from job training and upward mobility. The philosophy behind the use of 
paraprofessionals had been part of the initial call for CMHCs in the 1961 final report by 
the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, which, to a great degree, dismissed 
the psy professionals’ claims to singular expertise. The report noted that, “In the absence 
of more specific and definitive scientific evidence of the causes of mental illnesses, 
psychiatry and the allied mental health professions should adopt and practice a broad, 
liberal philosophy of what constitutes and who can do treatment … .” The report also 
argued that “nonmedical mental health workers with aptitude, sound training, practical 
experience, and demonstrable competence should be permitted to do general, short-term 
psychotherapy.”35 
 The use of paraprofessionals was hailed as one of the great successes of the 
CMHC plan. It seemed like a win-win proposition. The employment of community 
members would help alleviate the growing mental health manpower shortage; it would 
enhance communication and understanding between professionals and the community; it 
would facilitate community empowerment; and, according to early projections, it would 
“give work to millions of the unemployed,” preparing them for better lives. Additionally, 
a number of independent studies had demonstrated that paraprofessionals and other 
individuals could be just as therapeutically effective as professional psychological 
practitioners.36 
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The rosy vision did not pan out. Instead of hiring “millions,” CMHCs employed 
only 10,800 indigenous nonprofessionals by 1974. Additionally, few of those hires had 
come from the ranks of the unemployed: in one sample of 380 nonprofessional workers, 
half had college degrees, and only a quarter had ever received welfare. According to the 
researchers, “Quite often those hired were the least representative of the community, the 
closest to conforming to middle-class standards.”37 And, despite the recommendations of 
the Joint Committee report, the paraprofessionals did not end up doing “general, short-
term psychotherapy.” Instead, they tended to be assigned tasks that were menial, 
unpleasant, or both. Arthur Pearl, co-author of a 1965 book that partially inspired 
NIMH’s New Careers Training Branch for paraprofessional training, was appalled by the 
inadequate implementation of his ideas. Rather than establishing the foundation for 
upward mobility and a better quality of life, Pearl found that the new programs were 
largely “conning poor people into doing some lousy jobs.”38 
The insurgency occurred in New York City’s Lincoln Hospital, whose Mental 
Health Services division had not only obtained CMHC status, but had been designated 
one of eight “model centers” in the country by NIMH.  In addition to traditional 
psychiatric services at Lincoln Hospital Mental Health Services, Lincoln had opened 
three “neighborhood service centers” in the South Bronx, and staffed them with 140 
                                                                                                                                            
Community Mental Health Journal, 1965), 4. Quote—and estimate of “millions”—in Frank Riessman, New 
Careers: A Basic Strategy Against Poverty, A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund, pamphlet no. 2, p. 1; 
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black and Puerto Rican “indigenous workers.” The service centers and their staffs were 
informal and accessible, and they helped disadvantaged people deal with the outside 
world, assisting with employment, housing, and the bureaucracy of other social service 
agencies, and working to organize and educate members of the community to be more 
effective advocates for themselves. The work in the neighborhood centers emphasized 
looking at clients’ problems as a whole, not just as psychological phenomena. 
Additionally, the centers were highly attuned to problems of racial and socioeconomic 
disadvantage. Paraprofessional staff in the neighborhood centers enjoyed a reasonable 
amount of autonomy in their work, as well as the satisfactions of actually helping 
community members. In the words of two former administrators, neighborhood center 
staff “could feel fully skilled” in their work.39  
However, prior to the conflict, staff learned that funding for the storefront centers 
was being cut. Nonprofessional staff would be retained, but in more traditional positions 
at the Lincoln Hospital Mental Health Services outpatient clinic itself. Those positions 
involved much less autonomy; workers’ primary task was to fill out screening forms for 
new patients (not “clients,” the preferred terminology in the neighborhood centers). All 
therapeutic interactions were handled by professional staff. Additionally, 
nonprofessionals at the Lincoln Hospital Mental Health Services shared small offices, 
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with eight workers and two telephones in each. With this upcoming change looming, the 
actual crisis was precipitated by the dismissal of four nonprofessional workers, and 
management’s refusal to reevaluate the decision. Equally important, however, was the 
staff’s awareness of broken promises and unfulfilled expectations. A career ladder than 
had been promised to nonprofessionals failed to materialize; the program’s stated 
commitment to community control proved hollow; and the program innovations that had 
attracted many of the professional staff were being abandoned, along with the theoretical 
orientations that had fostered them.40 
On March 4, 1969, a group of 150 employees—mostly nonprofessionals, but with 
a scattering of professional supporters, including three psychiatrists—occupied Lincoln 
Hospital Mental Health Services. They ousted department heads and replaced them with 
nonprofessionals. They evicted any staffers who supported the administration and issued 
an 18-page list of charges and demands. The charges included racism, administrative 
inefficiency, and a disintegrating quality of services provided to the community. The 
demands included the replacement of the much-criticized director, reinstatement of the 
dismissed workers, establishment of an advisory committee of community members with 
actual power to make decisions, a professional training program for the 
paraprofessionals, and the implementation of seniority- and competence-based promotion 
guidelines. The occupation continued for fifteen days, and ended in a mixed victory: 
nineteen insurgents were arrested, but charges were later dropped; the director was 
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replaced, and his replacement was vetted by the staff and community; and the community 
board was formed. However, with the closing of the neighborhood centers, Lincoln was 
left with a traditional model of psychiatric care.41 
The optimism that had been so prevalent in the psychological profession just a 
few years earlier had dissipated. In 1965, an abridged English translation of Michel 
Foucault’s Madness and Civilization had been published, arguing that the concept of 
madness had been used as a mechanism of social control. Two years later, the South 
African psychiatrist David Cooper coined the name for the “anti-psychiatry” movement. 
The movement, most closely associated with Cooper, Thomas Szaz, and R. D. Laing, 
consisted of a small but publicity-savvy group of theorists who challenged the existence, 
diagnosis, and treatment of mental illness, claiming that psychiatric treatment was often 
more destructive than helpful. While Foucault never considered himself part of the 
movement, others interpreted his work that way. 
By the early 1970s, the CMCH movement and the War on Poverty had both 
suffered irreversible blows. CMCHs, though they still exist today, exist now to provide 
traditional psychological services, the same services whose inadequacy for large swaths 
of the population inspired the CMHC solution. The War on Poverty had been hobbled by 
insufficient funding, unwillingness to closely examine the nature of poverty and 
capitalism, and a racial backlash sparked by the Watts Riots and a widespread belief 
among white people that the program had benefited only blacks. With the escalation of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
41 Castel, Castel, and Lovell, 158-159; Kenny, 11; Chu and Trotter, 180-181. 
 
 232 
the Vietnam War, interest in poverty fizzled. In 1973, President Richard  Nixon 
dismantled the Office of Economic Opportunity. Even Morris Abram, the member of the 
National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity who had been so optimistic about 
the potential for ending poverty, succumbed to the prevailing mood. Sadly, he expressed 
the views of many members of the administration and the public when he said that the 
“maximum feasible participation of the poor … turned out to be a rip-off.  The only thing it 
did was to teach a good many blacks to become more effective leaders, which is not a bad 
thing.  But it was a rip-off, and it really, perhaps, furnished the patronage route out and up 
for a group for rather talented, but not necessarily honorable, and somewhat venal, black 
leaders.” 42 His discouragement—and his racism—fit in well with the new mood of the 
times.43 
With the failure of the CMCHs, the forfeiture of the War on Poverty, and the 
professional retrenchment in the wake of the anti-psychiatry movement, the 
psychological professions lost their thread of interest in class issues. A few persistent 
socially minded practitioners continued to advocate social change as a preventive 
measure for mental health into the early 1980s, but they seemed out of step with the 
times, and very few discussions of class appear in the professional journals after the 
1970s. Additionally, there was  no consensus on what had gone wrong with the promise 
of the CMHCs. According to psychiatrist Morton O. Wagenfeld, there were two views: 
either the CMCH movement failed because it took a wrong turn into social activism, or it 
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failed because it didn’t succeed at social activism. There was precious little common 
ground between the views.44 
Conclusions 
In the optimistic, socially progressive 1960s, the Community Mental Health 
Center Act appeared poised to at least partially alleviate the profession’s class-based 
inequalities, inequalities that had concerned a small number of psychological 
professionals for decades. In tandem with the War on Poverty, idealists in the profession 
believed that the CMHCs could revolutionize mental health and personal fulfillment 
among the poorer classes. In retrospect, their idealism was both naïve and 
understandable. The forces that curtailed the egalitarian experiments of the War on 
Poverty as well as the CMHC movement were foreseeable, since eliminating poverty and 
allowing traditionally subordinated groups to take power would necessarily entail some 
kind of redistribution of money and power from other groups. So while the reformers 
were unlikely to have been able to anticipate the specific ways in which resistance 
occurred—the racial backlash, the class-based conflicts over propriety and form—it does 
seem as if they could have anticipated structural resistance of some kind. However, part 
of their utopianism likely stemmed from their psychologically driven tendency to 
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individualize. Even in the midst of implanting a structural solution to inequality, they 





Whereas middle-class culture allows people to ‘self-actualize’ their abilities, 
to develop intellectually and artistically, to ‘become’ in a very individual 
sense, working-class culture allows other things. What is viewed from a 
middle-class point of view as a kind of mindless herd mentality is experienced 
in a working-class community as intimacy, belonging, and loyalty. From a 
working-class perspective, we can see the middle class’s severely restricted 
body language. Can you imagine a news anchor who speaks with great feeling 
and facial expression and uses his hands? Working-class people perceive 
most middle-class people as talking heads. They don’t fully trust people who 
show no expression or emotion.  
–Barbara Jensen1 
 
[P]sychology is a site where power and knowledge are transformed into each 
other in particularly dense ways in modern worlds.  
 –Peter Hegarty2 
 
 
 This project is, at its root, about the subjectivities of class and perceptions of those 
subjectivities. As Barbara Jensen suggests, the ways in which individuals make sense of 
their worlds are heavily inflected by classed positioning and classed cultures. And, as 
Jensen’s examples demonstrate, those classed ways of making sense are intrinsically 
bound with values, self-presentation, communication styles, and emotion—core focal 
points of psychology. I argue that the subjective class experience of postwar 
psychological practitioners distorted their perception of other class experiences, fostering 
their unreflexive adoption of middle-class values, perspectives, communication styles, 
and ways of being as normative. Contemporary sociologists and psychologists have 
identified a number of common (though certainly not universal) class-based differences 
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in what I have referred to as “worldview.” Broadly, members of the middle classes tend 
to value a future orientation and deferred gratification, while members of the working 
classes value a “here-and-now sensibility.”3 Members of the middle classes emphasize 
individuality and competition, while members of the working classes emphasize 
community and belonging.4 Members of the middle classes tend to use more abstract 
language and more modifiers, suggesting mastery and reflecting universality, whereas 
members of the working classes use a more concrete vocabulary and rely more on body 
language and vocal tone to convey meaning, suggesting interrelationship and reflecting 
the specific communication situation.5 Additionally, members of the middle classes value 
“impression management,” while members of the working classes prioritize authenticity.6 
While the contrasts are, admittedly, broad, imprecise, and not universal, they provide a 
starting point for understanding how classed position can impact the realm that we 
understand as psychology. 
 Since the earliest days of modern psychology, practitioners and theorists have 
assumed middle-class ways of being human as their standard. By the 1950s, when both 
the discipline and popularization of psychology grew exponentially, this class 
normativity was entrenched and largely invisible to most of it practitioners. I have 
outlined a number of reasons that this normativity was invisible: most psy practitioners 
unthinkingly accepted the broader culture’s middle-class standards; their desire to frame 
                                                
3 See, for example, Wanda M. L. Lee, 16, and Barbara Jensen, 174. Quote in Jensen, 174. 
4 Stephens, Markus, and Townsend. 
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psychology as a “science” precluded cultural analysis of its tenets; and, for the most part, 
practitioners were middle class and privileged, and it is extraordinarily difficult to see 
one’s own privilege.  
 The invisibility of middle-class privilege among psy practitioners, along with the 
sense of entitlement fostered by that privilege, has become a recurring theme in the 
emerging field of multicultural counseling. In a recent qualitative study of psy 
professionals and academics who were not from middle-class families, an unnamed 
psychological academician summarized his discomfort with this normative privilege, 
saying  “One of my difficulties in the academy is that I very often find myself not having 
much in common with some of my colleagues who either came through upper-middle-
class or privileged experiences and consider themselves entitled to the privileges they are 
enjoying.”7 Working-class clients have also articulated unease with that sense of 
privilege. One anonymous client, talking about her experience with a female therapist, 
said, “”I think being from different classes separates us, and it’s more than just the 
money. They just present themselves with such self-assurance, that I can’t identify. I 
wonder how different their lives must have been, that they can seem so sure of 
themselves. My life has never been that secure.”8 The first-person accounts illustrate 
some of the classed differences in cultural expectations of interiority and self-
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presentation, differences that contributed to misinterpretations between psy professionals 
and people from the working classes. 
 While this project was unable to investigate postwar, working-class perceptions of 
psychological professionals, I did have the opportunity to analyze various representations 
of psychology and psychological professionals in both class-specific and mass media. 
Mass-mediated, fictionalized portrayals of psy professionals were generally unflattering 
during the postwar period, as were both fictionalized and ostensibly nonfiction 
representations in the working-class men’s magazines.9 However, nonfiction portrayals in 
mainstream, middle-class-oriented magazines were generally celebratory. The 
unflattering portrayals of psychology and psychologists, both in mainstream and 
working-class media, appear to reflect a broad discomfort with the increasing role of 
psychology in public and private life. The discomfort is understandable: psychology is 
invasive. It presumes to “see” inside individuals’ minds, and to uncover things that they 
may wish to keep covered. The discipline deals with aspects of human nature that many 
people are uncomfortable acknowledging. Given that view of psychology, and given its 
meteoric rise in the postwar public sphere, it is not surprising that so many 
representations were negative. What is surprising is the almost-uniformly positive 
portrayals of psychology in the mainstream magazines. Perhaps those portrayals reflect 
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the early adoption of the psychological worldview by what we now call the “creative 
class,” which would have included the writers and editors of the mainstream magazines. 
Perhaps the middle-class nature of the psychological project was, at some level, clear to 
those writers and editors, who actively promoted a middle-class, consumerist lifestyle in 
the postwar period.10  
 The working-class men’s magazine portrayals of psy, however, reflected fears. 
Their portrayals emphasized the loss of control over oneself, the loss of the traditional, 
dominant male gender role, and the loss of sexuality as a signifier of working-class 
masculinity. While the mainstream magazines, and some of the fictionalized portrayals, 
emphasized the potential for personal growth and individual development that 
psychology promised, that perspective was conspicuously missing in the sweats. Instead, 
in the midst of psychology’s increasing credibility and status in the public sphere, the 
sweats presented psychology as manipulative and seamy. Whether this neutralized the 
threat of psychology’s invasiveness, or appropriated a cultural status symbol for earthier, 
personal gratifications, or simply mocked yet another set of men in suits, there is no way 
to tell. In the realm of working-class men’s magazines, however, the psychological 
professionals were represented in ways that they would not have approved of. 
 While both psy professionals and working-class people have misinterpreted each 
other, the impact of the misinterpretations is not equal. Class positioning reflects power 
differentials, and privileged groups possess more power to publicly define subordinated 
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groups than vice-versa. And, as Hegarty reminds us, psychology is positioned at an 
intersection of knowledge and power in the modern world. As the discipline and ideas of 
psychology have gained more power in the public sphere, psy professionals’ 
(mis)perceptions of working-class ways of being have found their way into public 
systems of education, social services, and criminal justice. While the scope of this project 
precludes examination of specifics, what is clear is that psychology’s continued 
valorization of middle-class ways of being has worked to legitimate the marginalization 
of non-middle-class individuals, communication styles, and self-presentations.  
I have argued that this is one previously neglected reason for Americans’ vague and 
inaccurate belief in “middle-classlessness.” From the normative middle-class perspective, 
even though not everyone is middle class, those who are currently in the “lower” classes 
should all aspire to upward mobility and eventual middle-class status.  
 This perspective of middle-class normativity was dominant in the culture at large 
and among psy professionals during the postwar period. While challenges to this 
normativity arose from a handful of practitioners, their concerns never achieved 
widespread currency in the discipline. Researchers did produce a large body of literature 
detailing class-based differences in psychology, but the very emphasis on  that difference 
continued to frame members of the working classes as psychological “others” who were 
both objects of curiosity and in need of remediation. Even with widely read and generally 
sympathetic works, such as Hollingshead and Redlich’s pathbreaking study, most readers 
                                                                                                                                            




seem to have focused on the descriptions of differences between the working and middle 
classes, particularly the rates of mental illness, types of diagnoses, and different 
prognoses. Very few seemed to note the authors’ suggestion that new types of therapies 
be developed for non-middle-class patients. And, in fact, despite Hollingshead and 
Redlich’s attempts to interrogate middle-class standards of normalcy, their work also 
reinscribed those norms. For example, in a discussion of school socialization in late 
childhood, the authors take care to indicate their critical stance towards middle-class 
values judgments. They continually frame value descriptions in quotation marks to 
remind the reader of their skepticism:  
This is the time when the neighborhood and the school determine wither 
“good” manners, that is, manners of classes I, II, and III, will replace 
“crudeness” and violence or whether official restraints imposed by 
teachers and juvenile authorities check uninhibited instinctual 
gratification. “Nice” children of the upper and middle classes become 
differentiated from the “bad” children of the lower classes.11 
 
In this passage, the authors insist on value relativity. However, on the same page, when 
they turn to psychological analysis, they fail to interrogate their own clinically based 
value descriptions, writing “A defective superego—an already severe disturbance in 
identity formulation—is clinically more prominent in lower class children than in the 
higher classes.” Where the modern reader would imagine that the idea of the “defective” 
superego is, like the idea of “good” and “bad” manners and children, culturally relative, 
Hollingshead and Redlich made no such parallels in 1958. Their belief in psychology as a 
science seems to have curtailed their ability to analyze its cultural construction. Here, as 
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with most of the postwar work on class and psychology, even the views of critical 
practitioners were shaped by cultural and professional norms. 
 Challenges to those norms in the 1960s and 1970s opened discursive space in 
which some practitioners could imagine utopian potential for the newly developed 
CMHCs. For the small number of psy professionals and theorists who had decried the 
middle-class normativity of the profession, proponents’ visions of CMHCs as non-
hierarchical, community-based, and culturally sensitive held enormous promise. 
Ultimately, though, the practitioners’ idealism was unsustainable. Backlash occurred on 
multiple fronts: from established elites such as AMA members, worried about the erosion 
of their autonomy, status, and income-generating capacity; from mainstream 
psychological practitioners, disturbed at what they perceived as anti-psychological 
activism; from white members of the public, interpreting anti-poverty programs in 
racialized ways; and, not least, from the pervasive middle-class assumptions and 
structures that undergirded most of the CMHCs, and distanced their prospective clients.  
 While the increasing volume of psychological discourses of class during the 1960s 
and 1970s illustrates the blind spots in liberal—and radical—practitioners’ perceptions of 
class positions, class relationships, and class-based power dynamics in the broader social 
structure, the abrupt decline of those discourses in the 1980s is also illustrative. The 
cultural conservatism of the Reagan era and its emphasis on individualism was one 
reason for the decline, as was the failure of the War on Poverty and the backlash that 
blamed the poor for their plight. Additionally, disciplinary embarrassment over the anti-
psychiatry movement and disillusionment with the CMHC ideal led most psy 
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professionals to turn their attention away from class issues. In this context, concern over 
class-based inequalities began to seem psychologically suspect, as public discourse 
redoubled its insistence on the individual as the root of and solution to social problems.  
 In one ceremonial nod to this individualistic perspective, Ronald Reagan awarded 
the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Eric Hoffer in 1983. Hoffer, a former 
longshoreman, field worker, and self-taught philosopher, first championed psychological 
individualism in 1951 with the publication of The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature 
of Mass Movements.12 Hoffer insisted that any kind of collective social action was simply 
evidence of individual maladjustment and inability to function successfully in 
individualistic society. Hoffer was hardly the first person to espouse that view—industrial 
management and management-oriented industrial-organizational psychologists had said 
the same thing for decades—but Hoffer was responsible for a wider popularization of the 
idea, both in the postwar period and in the 1980s.13 
It was not until the 1990s that psychological professionals once again addressed 
class issues with any regularity, and it took another decade before the discipline began 
seriously interrogating its own views of and complicity in class and classism. To date, the 
crowning achievement of the resurgence is an official American Psychological 
Association (APA) task force report on socioeconomic status. In 2000, that body adopted 
a resolution on poverty and socioeconomic status, noting the increasing economic 
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inequality of the country and the various psychological ills that result. The actual 
resolutions listed were fairly tepid—calls for more research and professional training, and 
support for public policies that would benefit education, health care, children, and the 
poor. The APA convened a task force on the topic in 2006, and its final report, issued the 
following year, generally repeats the task force resolution. However, in a nod to the 
recent developments in critical psychology and multicultural counseling, the report 
encourages practitioners to recognize the various forms of classism, and the ways in 
which classism can impact both therapy and psychological well-being.14 
While this appears to be a positive shift in the psychological profession’s 
awareness of and approaches to class, the uneven trajectory of class understanding in the 
discipline’s history suggests a cautious interpretation. Class is still an extraordinarily 
slippery concept, and understanding of different class subjectivities is difficult, requiring 
a thorough understanding of one’s own privilege and class-based assumptions. Despite 
the efforts of multicultural counseling proponents, that kind of self-knowledge still 
appears rare. Additionally, the psychological project itself favors the view of the “self” as 
deep, complex, and interior, a structure that literary scholar Sarah Winter claims 
“functions as a new kind of ‘psychological capital’ for the educated classes … in order to 
generate the imaginary psychological unity of an educated class, represented as the basic 
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psychological homogeneity of humanity.”15 Winter’s point echoes Pfister, arguing that 
the development of psychology created, rather than “discovered,” a particular kind of 
psychological interiority that then came to be associated with the privileged classes. If 
those observations are accurate, and I find them persuasive, it is unclear how any 
development in psychology, no matter how well intentioned, could completely divest 
itself of classed assumptions and perceptions.  
Mid-century Americans existed in classed positions, even when they were 
unaware of that fact; that very lack of conscious awareness of class could make one’s 
classed position seem “normal.” This was just as true of the mostly middle-class 
psychological professionals as of anyone else, and it was true at a time when 
psychological professionals were literally mapping definitive descriptions of what it 
meant to be “normal.” Inevitably, psychological professionals’ views of normalcy were 
inflected with their middle-class socialization, valorizing middle-class ways of being as 
“healthy” and other ways of being as deficient. The psychological professions’ 
unreflexive alignment with middle-class values, assumptions, communication styles, and 
psychological processes has naturalized middle-class normativity by associating middle-
class patterns and preferences with ideals of mental health and personal fulfillment. 
Those associations remain, and are still largely unchallenged. 
And while psychology and its ideas have clearly shaped the understandings of 
class in American culture, it also seems clear that psychology’s orientation toward class 
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has helped to shape the development of the psy professions. For example, if mid-century 
professionals had taken a more critical view of class divisions and assumptions during the 
Cold War, one wonders whether psychology would have become as culturally influential 
as it did, or whether that influence would have developed as rapidly. It seems likely that 
the military, government, and business leaders who embraced psychology in the postwar 
period did so partially because psychological professionals generally shared the leaders’ 
views of where power belonged and what “normal” meant. While a small number of psy 
professionals expressed concern over their discipline’s approaches to and influence on 
class, most psychological ideas and practitioners supported the hegemony of the 
dominant culture. 
Psychology and psychological ideas continue to be central to modern American 
life in both the personal realm and in the institutions of the society. Further, the 
psychologization of culture that shaped postwar understandings of class continues to 
impact those understandings. Examining the intersection of class and psychology in the 
middle of the twentieth century, then, provides a starting point from which to develop a 
clearer awareness of how psychological ideas and American perceptions of class evolved 
in relationship with each other, as well as who those ideas privileged and who they 
marginalized.  Ultimately, this juxtaposition of class and psychology helps us to 
complicate commonly held notions of American egalitarianism, psychological 
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